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ABSTRACT
WELL-BEING AND ACTUAL DESIRES
SEPTEMBER 2005
MARK E. LUKAS, B.A., LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
What makes a life good for the person who lives it? According to one answer,
enjoyment. Hedonists tell us that one’s life goes well to the extent that he enjoys
himself and avoids pain. Another answer is that we do well in life to the extent to
which we get what we desire. Some versions of this last answer count only “rational”
of “informed” desires as relevant to well-being. I defend the view that a person’s
quality of life is determined by the overall fit between what he actually wants and
what he gets, whether or not he is informed or rational.
In Chapter 1 , 1 present and explain a theory about well-being. Actual Desire
Satisfactionism. I discuss some intuitions about the value of getting what we want
and show several ways to develop a theory around these intuitions. In Chapter 2,
1
respond to the objection that well-being cannot be determined by the satisfactions and
frustrations of our actual desires because sometimes our actual desires are defective.
In Chapter 3, 1 argue that our lives can be improved by getting what we want even
when the things we want are apparently irrelevant to how our lives unfold. In
Chapter 4, I show that Actual Desire Satisfactionism is consistent with our ordinary
vi
intuitions about self-sacrifice. In Chapter 5, 1 respond to an objection based on the
fact that our desires often change over time. In Chapter 6, 1 discuss an argument
based on the idea that some of our desires are unwanted. In Chapter 7, 1 show that
Actual Desire Satisfactionism is compatible with various common intuitions about the
narrative arrangement and variety of goods in a life. Finally, in Chapter 8, 1 suggest
several ways to reconcile Actual Desire Satisfactionism with hedonistic accounts of
well-being.
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INTRODUCTION
It goes without saying that one can fare well or poorly in life. Our ordinary
feehngs of envy and pity reflect our deep intuitive acceptance of this fact. We pity
those who do not do so well and we sometimes envy those who we think have achieved
a level of well-being exceeding our own. But what exactly is well-being'?’ Socrates
tells us we do well when we achieve some optimal combination of knowledge and
pleasure.
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Aristotle tells us that things go well for us when we act in accordance with
the highest virtue. 3 Hedonists tell us, in one way or another, that pleasure alone is the
answer; the more pleasure “minus” pain we experience, the better off we are. 4 Some
contemporary philosophers and economists tell us that well-being is determined entirely
by the extent to which one's “informed” or “ideal” or “fully rational” desires or
preferences are satisfied. Another answer to the question is that well-being consists in
getting what we actually want. This last answer is the topic of the dissertation that
follows.
The idea that one’s well-being is determined entirely by the extent to which he
gets what he actually wants has met with much resistance in the philosophical literature
surrounding the concept of well-being and various forms of utilitarianism. In what
follows I’d like to take the idea seriously and see whether it is as implausible as most
seem to think. In the end I conclude that the idea isn’t half bad.
In Chapter 1, 1 introduce some of my intuitions about the value of getting what
we actually want and present a theory according to which well-being is determined
entirely by the satisfactions and frustrations of actual desires. In chapter 2, 1 respond to
the claim that some desire satisfactions are not good for us (either worthless or bad)
because the relevant desires are based on false beliefs, misinformation, or sloppy
thinking, etc. In chapter 3, 1 discuss the claim that some satisfactions are worthless
because the relevant objects of desire have nothing at all to do with the people who
want them. In chapter 4, 1 discuss and reject the idea that desire satisfaction theories of
well-being such as mine are incompatible with our ordinary intuitions about self-
sacrifice. In chapter 5, 1 take on a well-known objection given by Richard Brandt that
plays on the fact that our desires often change over time. In chapter 6, 1 consider Derek
Parfit s suggestion that if something like my preferred account of well-being is true,
then we might all be better off becoming drug addicts. In chapter 7, 1 consider some
issues relating to the variety of goods in a life and their temporal or narrative
distribution. In chapter 8, 1 discuss some matters relating to the apparent intrinsic value
of pleasure.
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Notes
1
In the literature “self-interest”, “well-being”, and “welfare” are oBen used
interchangeably. To avoid monotony, and because no harm will come from it, in whatfollows I too treat these words as nearly interchangeable.
2 See Plat0 (1993), especially 18e-22c, 27d, and 66a-b.
See Aristotle (1991), especially Book X.6-8. For an interesting discussion of a
ditterent but relevantly similar view of well-being see Sen (1993),
There are too many hedonists to name. Here are some of my favorites- Bentham
(1988), Mill (1979), Feldman (2004).
Richard Brandt seems to endorse such a view in Brandt (1966). James Griffin
suggests a version of this view in Griffin (1986).
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CHAPTER 1
ACTUAL DESIRE SATISFACTIONS
Introduction
Most of the present work is devoted to defending Actual Desire Satisfactionism
(ADS), the view that a person's well-being is determined entirely by the satisfactions
and frustrations of his actual desires. Of course as just stated ADS is very vague; there
are certainly many different ways that one’s well-being could be “determined” by his
getting or failing to get what he actually wants . 1 Resolving some of the vagueness is
the goal of the present chapter. But for now, we can think of ADS, roughly, as a view
with two main parts. The first part is an axiological principle about the sorts of things
that are intrinsically good or bad for people. It says, roughly, that actual-desire
satisfactions are good and actual-desire frustrations are bad. The second part is the
mechanical part. It tells us how to assign values to satisfactions and frustrations and
how, in principle, to use the values to evaluate a person’s level of well-being. In the
present chapter, I first introduce and briefly explain the axiological part of ADS. I then
introduce several versions of ADS.
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The Personal Intrinsic Value Principle
The axiological part of ADS is based on a collection of somewhat elusive
intuitions about the value of getting what we actually want. These intuitions can be
roughly expressed in various ways, some perhaps better than others. One thing I might
say, for instance, is that I think there is something good for us about situations in which
our desires match up in a way that is “just right” with the world; the closer the overall
fit between the way things are and the way we want them to be, the better off we are. If
I exist in two possible worlds and have all the same desires in both, then if one of these
worlds is exactly as I would like it to be whereas the other is not, then I’m better off
inhabiting the first world. Alternatively, we might say that other things being equal it’s
better for us to get what we want rather than not. Or, for any given thing that we do get,
other things being equal, it s better that we want it. These locutions go some way
towards capturing the idea, but the intuitions are somewhat slippery, so let me try
saying this instead: wanting a thing seems to me to bestow a kind ofprima facie value
on getting the thing. In other words, if a person wants something, then absent any
reason to think that getting it would be worse for him than not getting it, we have reason
to think it would be better for him to get it. All this is not to say that wanting a thing
makes that thing good for us or that getting what we want always leaves us better off, or
never hurts us or leaves us disappointed. It is just to say that I think there is something
good for us going on when we get what want, regardless of what we want, why we want
it, or what the consequences are of getting it.
All these ways of trying to get at the intuitions behind ADS are imperfect and
are certainly somewhat vague. And on balance a good chunk of the dissertation ahead
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IS devoted, in bits and pieces here and there, to revealing the intuitions with greater
clarity. My hope is that in the end the central idea will be clear enough to warrant the
fair consideration I think it deserves, but that it rarely gets. In the mean time, I’d like to
propose a shorthand formulation of the key axiological intuition I have in mind. This
formulation is meant to give us what I take to be the basic building blocks of well-
being. It is meant to tell us the fundamental sorts of things that I think enhance or
diminish a person s level of well-being; these are the things that determine the intrinsic
value that a life has for the person who lives it; they ultimately determine his quality of
life. We can state the idea as the follows:
The Personal Intrinsic Value Principle (PIP)
(i) The fundamental bearers of positive personal intrinsic value are actual-desire
satisfactions.
(ii) The fundamental bearers of negative personal intrinsic value are actual-desire
frustrations.
Since a good deal of what follows amounts to a defense of PIP, or the intuitions
that underlie it, some explanation is in order. Let me begin with a few words about
desires, satisfactions and frustrations, and personal intrinsic value.
Desires, Satisfactions and Frustrations
In what follows I operate with a rather rough-and-ready conception of desire as
an attitude akin to belief. And although I offer nothing resembling an analysis of desire,
I would like to say a few words about how I understand the phenomenon of desiring.
Perhaps the first thing to note is that in everyday discourse desire attributions are often
pretty vague. Suppose some guy, Will, comes up to us and says “I want to own a
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sloop" Now, even if we assume that Will is using his words in a normal way and that
he indeed has a genuine sloop-related desire, we might nevertheless wonder what
exactly he wants. Does he merely want to be free from sleeplessness? Would owning
just any old sloop do the trick? Or is there some particular sloop such that he wants to
own that sloop? Does he wish he were currently a sloop owner? Or does he want to
acquire a sloop sometime in the near future? Or both? Does he want to own a sloop
only temporarily, for some particular fixed period of time? If so, when does the period
of time begin and when does it end? Or does he want merely to start owing a sloop
soon, at some time or other in the near future, and continue owning it for the rest of his
life, however long that might be? Does Will really want to own a sloop, or does he just
want all the familiar sloop-owing experiences? Does owning the sloop really matter, or
would it be sufficient to have free and unfettered access to a sloop that he may treat as
his own? Etc., etc.
Now chances are that context would resolve some, most, or maybe all of the
vagueness associated with Will's self-directed desire attribution. If we are friends of
his, we probably have some idea “where he is coming from” when he tells us he wants
to own a sloop. Suppose, for instance, that we have recently been visiting one of the
local sloop shops with Will, down in our local sloop district. Suppose we’ve done some
sloop research with him and helped him select some particular sloop. Suppose the
sloop in question is called Minnow
. So suppose that part of what Will expresses
when he says he wants to own a sloop is that he wants to own Minnow. Moreover,
suppose that Will has arranged to begin owning Minnow at some particular time
tomorrow, t. And suppose Will wants to own Minnow from t until some specific future
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time, t+n. Given all this, we might characterize Will’s desire regarding sloop ownership
as follows. We can say that at the present moment, t-n. Will wants it to be the case that
Will continuously owns Minnow during the period of time that begins at t and ends at
t+n.
But even this is not the whole story. Just as there are degrees of belief - some
things we believe with near certainty; other things we are less sure of - so too there are
degrees of desire. Some things we desire with great intensity; others with less. So
Will s desire must have an intensity. Suppose we can represent intensities with positive
integers by arbitrarily assigning greater numbers to more intense desires and smaller
numbers to less intense desires. So it Will’s current desire to own Minnow is very
intense, we should assign it a larger number; otherwise, we should assign a smaller
number. Suppose Will s desire is rather intense. To more accurately characterize
Will’s desire, then, we could say that at the present moment, t-n, Will wants it to be the
case, with intensity +200, that Will continuously owns Minnow during the period of
time that begins at t and ends at t+n.
But even this characterization of Will’s desiderative situation leaves something
to be desired. If Will is an actual person, here in our world, then his desire for Minnow
surely does not occur in isolation. As I see it, desires probably come in clusters. If Will
presently has the desire for Minnow just mentioned, then he probably also has a host of
related desires. For instance, he probably also wants it to be the case that Minnow will
not undergo any major structural changes between now and the time that he acquires
ownership. He probably wants it to be the case that while he is the owner of Minnow,
he is aware of the fact that he owns it. He probably wants to enjoy himself sailing
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around on Minnow at some time or other during his period of ownership. He probably
wants it to be the case that Minnow does not sink on its maiden voyage with him as its
captain. Etc., etc. So if we really wanted to fully characterize what Will now wants
regarding his ownership of Minnow, we should probably mention all these other desires
as well. Nevertheless, let us assume for the moment that Will's present desire for
Minnow occurs in isolation, that his desire for Minnow at t-n is the only desire he has at
t-n. What would it be for Will’s desire to be satisfied? I say that Will’s desire is
satisfied provided that its object occurs. In other words, Will’s desire is satisfied just in
case he continuously owns Minnow from t until t+n.
It should be obvious from what I’ve said that I do not take desire satisfactions to
entail “feelings” of satisfaction. Will’s desire could be satisfied, he could continuously
own Minnow from t until t+n, without ever feeling anything as a result. But of course if
Will is a normal person, he will have many desires about how he feels. At the moment,
he probably wants to feel good; he wants to enjoy himself. He wants feelings of
satisfaction. He probably also wants it to be the case that he will feel good tomorrow
when he comes to own Minnow and that he will feel good the day after that, and so on.
And when tomorrow rolls around, he will probably have more desires about how he
feels at various times. And, of course, if Will’s various desires for feelings of
satisfaction are satisfied, then he will experience feelings of satisfaction. But in general,
desire satisfactions need not involve feelings of satisfaction.
Suppose now that Will’s present desire to own Minnow is indeed satisfied. That
is, suppose he continuously owns Minnow from t until t+n. When is Will’s desire
satisfied? Is it satisfied now, even though he doesn’t yet own Minnow ? Or is it
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satisfied only later, when he does own Minnow? Or is it satisfied at both times? Was it
already satisfied yesterday, even before he started wanting to own Minnow? On the one
hand, there is an obvious sense in which it is correct to say that Will’s desire has not yet
been satisfied. After all, he does not yet own Minnow. But on the other hand, given
that he will own Minnow, it is also correct to describe Will’s life as a life in which his
desire for Minnow is satisfied. This is an atemporal fact about Will’s life. In other
words, given the stipulations that Will has the desire in question and that its object does
occur, it has always been true and always will be true that Will’s desire is satisfied. So
in one sense Will’s desire has not yet been satisfied, but in another sense it is already
satisfied.
To sort all this out, let me introduce a way of talking about satisfactions and
frustrations that will allow us to assign satisfactions and frustrations to the appropriate
parts of a person s life. Let us start with the individual moments that make up a life. I
would like to say that a momentary segment of a person’s life “contains” a desire
satisfaction provided that at the moment in question the person has a desire and the
object of that desire occurs. Alternatively, we could say that a person “gets” a desire
satisfaction at a time provided that at that time he has a desire and the object of that
desire occurs. Likewise, we can say that a momentary part of a person’s life contains a
desire frustration provided that at the moment in question he has a desire whose object
does not occur, or he gets a frustration at the time provided that he has a desire at that
time whose object does not occur.
In a similar way we can assign satisfactions and frustrations to temporally
extended parts of a person’s life. We can say that a period of a person’s life contains a
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satisfaction provided that during the period in quesl.on the person has a desire and the
object of that desire occurs; if the object does not occur, he gets a frustration. So in
Wl "’s Case
> at Nn Wi " has a desire to own Minnow from t until t+n, and the object of
his desire occurs. So the part of Will's life that exis.sjust at t-n contains a desire
satisfaction. Now consider the period of Will's life that starts at t-n and ends at t+n.
Assuming that during this period Will wants to own Minnow continuously from t until
t+n, I'd say that this period of Will’s life also contains the desire satisfaction in
question. But what about parts of Will’s life during which he has no desire for
Minnow? Do these nevertheless contain the relevant satisfaction because other parts of
his life contain the satisfaction? No. Consider Will’s early childhood when he had no
desires for Minnow. Although some future parts of Will’s life do contain the
satisfaction of a desire for Minnow, his early childhood contains no such satisfaction. It
contains no such satisfaction because it contains no desire for Minnow, and a person
can only get something he wants if he wants something. So in Will’s case, the only
parts of his life that contain the satisfaction of his desire for Minnow are those parts in
which Will wants to continuously own Minnow from t until t+n and in which it is true
that Will continuously owns Minnow from t until t+n, and these are all the parts of
Will s lite in which Will wants to own Minnow continuously from t until t+n.
Now suppose that Will has had his desire to own Minnow for some time.
Suppose he started to want Minnow yesterday and that he has wanted the very same
thing non-stop up until now. Also suppose that the intensity of Will’s desire has varied
during the time in question. Suppose, for instance, that at first it had an intensity of +2;
then it had an intensity of +3; then it had an intensity of +2 again; then it steadily rose
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over time until reached its present intensity of +200. How should we characterize
Will's situation now? Does Will’s life contain many desires about Minnow or just one?
Would it be best to say that during the period in question Will had a series of distinct
desires for Minnow, each with its own intensity, and that these are all satisfied because
he owns Minnow from t until t+n? Should we thus say that his life contains many
distinct Minnow-desire satisfactions, each with an associated intensity? Or should we
say that Will has really had only one desire all along but that it changed in intensity
over time? I prefer the latter answer. Since the exact thing that Will wanted over the
time in question has not changed, since his desire has always been to own Minnow
continuously from t until t+n, it seems to me that we should say that he has had only
one desire.
But what, then, is the desire s intensity? Although I’m not sure what the best
answer is, I see no harm in saying that the intensity of Will’s desire over the time in
question is an average of the intensities it has at each moment that he has the desire. It
might turn out, then, that the overall intensity of Will’s desire for Minnow - that is, the
average intensity of his desire from yesterday until now - is distinct from the intensity
that his desire now has. The upshot of all this is just that if we focus on only the
segment of Will s life that occurs now, at t-n, then we would say that this segment
contains a satisfaction of a desire with an intensity of +200, since +200 is his desire’s
current intensity. But if we focus on a larger chunk of Will’s life - one that includes all
of yesterday in addition to the present moment - then we would say that that part of his
life contains a satisfaction of a desire with an intensity less than +200. 3
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The point of my discussion of Will has been to introduce how I will understand
desires and their satisfactions and frustrations in the pages ahead. To summarize, my
assumptions are as follows. Desires are a kind of “pro attitude” in that when one
desires something he takes a certain kind of “positive” or “pro” stance towards some
thing s being the case. Desires are like other propositional attitudes in that they take
propositions/states of affairs as their objects. 4 I individuate a person’s desires by their
exact contents or objects. So if the object of my desire for X is exactly the same as the
object of my desire for Y, then my desire for X just is my desire for Y. 5 Also, desires
occur at times and over extended periods of time. They also have intensities. The
intensity of a desire at a time is represented by a positive integer; more intense desires
get greater numbers and less intense desires get smaller numbers. The intensity of a
temporally extended desire is represented by a number that is the result of averaging the
intensities that the desire has at each moment it is had. So if I want X at t with intensity
+20, and I want X at t+n with intensity +10, then the intensity of my desire during the
temporal period consisting of both t and t+n is equal to 20+10/2, or 15. Also, a person’s
desire is satisfied just in case the relevant object occurs; it is frustrated if the object does
not occur. A momentary segment of a person’s life contains a desire satisfaction
provided that at the time in question the person has a desire with an object that occurs;
it the object of his desire does not occur, then the segment contains a desire frustration.
A temporally extended segment of a person’s life contains a desire satisfaction provided
that during the segment the person has a desire with an object that occurs; if he has a
desire with an object that does not occur, then the segment contains a frustration.
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To elaborate on all this, let me address some questions suggested to me by Fred
Feldman. 6 Suppose Fred tells us that he wants to own a sloop. Suppose that for ten
years he doesn't own a sloop. Suppose then he gets one. Shall we say that his desire is
satisfied? Or should we say that it is frustrated? Or should we say that it was frustrated
for ten years and then satisfied? To answer these questions we need some more
information. When exactly does Fred have his desire for a sloop? What exactly is the
object of Fred’s desire? Does he have more than one desire for sloop ownership? If so,
when does he have these desires and what exactly are their objects? If we wanted to
fully and accurately characterize what Fred really wants here, how should we do it?
Let's consider a few ways we might flesh things out here. Suppose the best way
to characterize what Fred wants is to attribute to him a string of distinct desires. For
instance, suppose that at some time, t, Fred wants to own a sloop at t. Moreover,
suppose that at t+1 Fred wants to own a sloop at t+1
,
that at t+2 he wants to own a sloop
at t+2, etc. Suppose he has a string of such desires starting at t and ending at t+10.
Suppose also that he owns a sloop at none of these times, except at t+10 when he finally
gets a sloop. If this is the best way to characterize what Fred wants, then I would say
that he gets a string of desire frustrations followed by one desire satisfaction. But
maybe a better way to characterize what Fred wants would go in a slightly different
way. Maybe we should say that Fred wants, at t, to become a sloop owner sometime
relatively soon, if not now, then certainly no later than t+10. If this is the best way to
describe what Fred wants, then Fred’s desire at t is satisfied, for he becomes a sloop
owner at t+10.
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But maybe what Fred wants is something else. Maybe when he starts wanting a
sloop at t, Fred forms a kind of “global” desire about his life. Maybe what he wants is
to live a life in which he owns a sloop at t and in which he owns a sloop at t+1
, t+2, t+3
...t+10. If this is what he wants, then he really has only one desire during the period
from t to t+10, but his desire is never satisfied since his life is not as he wants it to be;
after all, he comes to own a sloop only at t+10. But perhaps a better way to characterize
what Fred wants would be to say that at t Fred forms a desire to live a life in which he
owns a sloop at t and at t+1 and at t+2, etc., but that he also forms a desire at t+1 0 to
own a sloop at t+10. If this is the way we flesh things out, then we would say that Fred
has two desires. The first is frustrated and the second is satisfied. Or maybe it is best to
characterize what Fred wants in some other way. Maybe he has a string of “local”
desires from moment to moment that he owns a sloop at each moment in question and
he has a global desire about what his life is like. If this last way is the best way to
characterize what he wants, then maybe he gets a bunch of frustrations associated with
his many (frustrated) “local” desires, a satisfaction of his “local” desire at t+10, and a
frustration of his “global” desire. The point here is that to answer Fred’s questions we
first need to sort out what exactly he wants and when he wants it. Once we do this, if
we are able to say precisely what he wants and when he wants it, then we should have
no problem saying whether he gets what he wants or not, and we should have no
problem saying which parts of his life contain the relevant satisfactions or frustrations. 7
But what if a person has a desire with no built in “time index”? In discussing
Fred’s desire to own a sloop, I suggested various ways that we might try to describe
what he wants by saying that he has various desires at times that are about what goes on
15
at specific times. But what if Fred now has a desire to own a sloop but not at any
particular time? Suppose he merely wants to own a sloop at some time or other. Is his
desire satisfied now if he owns a sloop ten years from now? Does he now get a
satisfaction because he later owns a sloop? Suppose Fred owns a sloop ten years from
now, at t+10. First, does the occurrence of Fred owns a sloop at t+10 together with his
desire to own a sloop at some time or other constitute a desire satisfaction? No. The
exact content of Fred’s desire is distinct from Fred owns a sloop at t+ 10. Fred does not
currently want to own a sloop at t+10; rather, he wants to own a sloop at some time or
other. But of course, if Fred owns a sloop at t+10, then he does own a sloop at some
time or other. And since Fred now wants to own a sloop at some time or other, and he
does own a sloop at some time or other, my position is that he now gets a desire
satisfaction.
Personal Intrinsic Value
What is it to say that satisfactions and frustrations are bearers of personal
intrinsic value? What is personal intrinsic value anyway? And how does it differ from
intrinsic value simpliciter? Let me first say, I take it that a thing could be intrinsically
good for a person and yet not be intrinsically good. A thing could be good “in itself’
for, say, me and yet not be good “in itself’. It might turn out, for instance, that my
feeling 10 units of pleasure on Monday would be intrinsically good/or me
,
and yet my
feeling this pleasure would not be intrinsically good. Such a case might arise if it turns
out that only deserved pleasures are intrinsically good and my pleasure on Monday is
not deserved. So when I say that desire satisfactions are bearers of positive personal
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intrinsic value, what 1 mean is that desire satisfactions are good in themselves for those
who get them. 1 do not mean to say that desire satisfactions are simply good in
themselves or that they contribute anything to the overall intrinsic values of the worlds
in which they occur. Likewise, I take it that desire frustrations are intrinsically bad for
those who get them, but I do not mean to assert that they are intrinsically bad or that
they detract from the intrinsic values of the worlds in which they occur. So PIP is a
principle about personal intrinsic value because it tells us which sorts of things are
intrinsically good and bad for people, as opposed to intrinsically good and bad
simp/iciter
.
Next, I subscribe to what I take to be, roughly, a traditional Moorean conception
of intrinsic value (.simpliciter) and my conception ofpersonal intrinsic value is, not
surprisingly, analogous in some important respects to a Moorean conception of intrinsic
value simpliciter. For one thing, just as those in the Moorean tradition take it that the
bearers of intrinsic value are “fine-grained” entities such as states of affairs, or
propositions, or facts, I take it that the bearers of personal intrinsic value are similar
entities.
8
More specifically, I take them to be states of affairs that take the following
forms:
S desires that p & p
S desires that p & ~p
Moreover, I take satisfactions and frustration to be thefundamental bearers of
personal intrinsic value. In other words, I think satisfactions and frustrations are the
smallest states of affairs that bear personal intrinsic value; they are the atoms of
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personal intrinsic value. They are the basic things that combine to determine the
personal intrinsic value of a person’s life or the value of some part of it 9
My understanding of personal intrinsic value is similar in another important way
to the traditional Moorean conception of intrinsic value simpliciter. Mooreans generally
believe that if a thing has some intrinsic value, its value supervenes on its own intrinsic
properties
.
10
That is, any two things alike with respect to intrinsic properties will be
alike with respect to intrinsic value. In the same way, I take it that personal intrinsic
value supervenes on intrinsic properties. I suppose, therefore, that if a thing is
intrinsically good or bad for a person, its goodness or badness supervenes on its own
intrinsic properties. And since I suppose that satisfactions are intrinsically good for us
and frustrations are intrinsically bad, I suppose that satisfactions and frustrations have a
kind of value that supervenes on their own intrinsic properties, and not on the intrinsic
properties of their proper parts taken individually or on any extrinsic properties that
they or their parts have. So among other things, I believe that a desire satisfaction is
intrinsically good for the person who gets it regardless of why he has the relevant
desire, regardless of whether or not the thing he wants has any value itself (either
intrinsic or extrinsic), and regardless of what happens as a result of his getting what he
wants.
Actual Desire Satisfactionism
As I see it, evaluating a person’s well-being is a matter of evaluating how
intrinsically valuable his life is for him or how intrinsically valuable some part of his
life is for him. Accordingly, I take it that the main task of giving an account of well-
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being comes down to specifying how we ought to assign values to a life and its parts.
This raises a question about which parts of a life we should be concerned with.
Certainly extended segments of a life should be of concern. Our account should tell us
how, for example, to assign a value to, say, the first half of a person’s life or to the last
half of it. And of course it should tell us how to assign a value to the whole composed
of these two parts. But what about very small parts of a person’s life? Do we need to
be concerned with assigning values to specific moments in a life? Indeed, does it even
make sense to wonder about how well someone is doing at just some one instant in
time? Or are assessments of well-being best thought of as assessments of how valuable
temporally extended segments of a life are? Although I am not sure how to answer
these questions, it does seem reasonably clear to me how we might evaluate well-being
both at a time and over an extendedperiod oftime in terms of satisfactions and
frustrations of actual desires. Let me now sketch four ways we might do this.
ADS1
The four versions of ADS that I am about to discuss all have PIP as a part. That
is, they all entail that the fundamental bearers of personal intrinsic value are actual-
desire satisfactions and frustrations. The views differ from one another mainly in what
they say about how to assign values to satisfactions and frustrations and in what they
say about how these values combine to determine the value of a person’s life or some
part of it. The first version ofADS I want to discuss is rather simple, and it is my
preferred version of ADS. It says first that the value to be had in a person’s getting
what he wants, and the disvalue to be had in not getting it, corresponds directly to how
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intensely he wants the thing. In other words, the personal intrinsic values of desire
satisfactions and frustrations are determined by the intensities of the desires involved.
More specifically, the value of a satisfaction is equal to the intensity of the desire
involved, expressed as a positive integer, and the value of a frustration is equal to the
negative of this intensity. So satisfactions are assigned positive numbers and
frustrations are assigned negative numbers.
The next part of ADS1 says that to determine a person’s level of well-being we
simply sum the values of all the satisfactions and frustrations he gets. If we are
interested in figuring how intrinsically valuable some particular moment of a person’s
life is for him, we first identify all the desires he has at that moment
,
then we note their
intensities and whether they are satisfied or frustrated, and then we sum the relevant
values. The result will be a number that tells us his level of well-being at that one
moment
;
greater numbers represent higher levels of well-being and smaller numbers
lower levels. In a similar way we could assign values to temporally extended parts of a
person’s life or indeed his entire life. We first identify all the desires he has during the
period of life in question, note their intensities and whether they are satisfied or
frustrated, assign values as determined by the relevant intensities, and then sum all the
values. What we end up with is a number representing the value of the period oftime in
question
;
again, greater numbers represent more valuable periods in the life and smaller
numbers represent less valuable periods.
To illustrate how this might work, suppose that at the present moment Jack has
only one desire; he wants to be in France now. So if Jack is in France now his desire is
satisfied; otherwise, it is frustrated. And if the intensity of Jack’s desire is, say, 50, we
20
would represent his level of well-being a, the present moment with the number 50 if his
desire is satisfied, with -50 if it is frustrated. In a similar way we could assign values to
each moment of Jack’s life and we could compare his various levels of well-being from
moment to moment by comparing the relevant numbers; greater numbers would
represent better moments and smaller numbers worse moments. We could do
interpersonal comparisons in a similar way. We could also assign values to extended
segments of Jack's life, or indeed to his entire life, and again do comparisons of well-
being by comparing the relevant sums.
One apparent problem with this simple approach revolves around the fact that
many of our desires are “directed at” or “aimed at” times other than the times at which
they are had. Some of our desires are about what’s going on at the present moment
while others are about what’s going on in the future or what went on in the past, and
some of our desires are not about any particular time at all. And when evaluating how
well off a person is at some particular time, it seems reasonable to think that his desires
about what’s going on at that time ought to carry more weight than his desires about
other times, or his desires that are not about any particular time or stretch of time. If
Jack wants to be in France now, whether he is or isn’t might seem relevant to how he's
doing now. But if Jack presently wants to be in France at some future time, while his
being there then might seem relevant to how well he’s doing then, it might seem to
some less relevant, or completely irrelevant, to how well he is doing now. How, it
might be asked, could anything that happens in the future have any bearing on Jack’s
current quality of life? 11 Yet ADS1 entails that Jack would be better off now if his
present desire to be in France later is satisfied. 12 In light of this, we might want to
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modify the simple view of well-being just sketched to take account of the temporal
directedness of desires. We might want a version ofADS that ignores entirely one’s
desires about the past and future and instead counts one’s well-being at a time as being
determined solely by one's desires about that time. This brings me to the second
version ofADS that I want to discuss.
ADS2
To accommodate the intuition that one’s well-being at some time ought not
depend on one’s desires about what is going on at other times, we could first distinguish
between what we might characterize as concurrent desires and nonconcurrent desires.
Concurrent desires are desires directed at the times they are had; nonconcurrent desires
are not directed at the times they are had. I have a concurrent desire at some time
provided that I have a desire about what’s going on at that time. If I have a desire at
some time that is about what’s going on at some other time, or that is not about what is
going on at any particular time, then I have a nonconcurrent desire. Let’s consider
some examples.
At the moment, I want to be in France. We can characterize this desire as
concurrent because its object, the state of affairs Mark is in France now
,
entails that I
am in France now, at the very same time I have the desire to be there. But at the
moment, I also want to be in France tomorrow. We can think of this desire as
nonconcurrent because its object, Mark is in France tomorrow
,
does not entail that I am
in France now, the time at which I have the desire to be there. At the moment, I also
want to own a vineyard someday. I consider this desire to be nonconcurrent also
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because its object, Mark owns a vineyard someday
,
does not entail that I own a vineyard
at the same time that I have the desire to own a vineyard, viz., now. 13 But suppose I
also currently want to own a vineyard at some time when I want to own a vineyard.
Should we think of this as a concurrent desire or a nonconcurrent desire? I think it is
reasonable to count this as a nonconcurrent desire, for it could be satisfied by an event
that occurs at some time other than now. However, if this desire is satisfied, if I do
indeed own a vineyard at some time when I want to own a vineyard, then I will also
have a concurrent desire at some time - i.e., at the time I own a vineyard while wanting
to own it - and that concurrent desire will be satisfied. So satisfaction of the
nonconcurrent desire in question entails the satisfaction of a distinct (concurrent) desire.
Now, I readily concede that the distinction I m trying to draw here between
concurrence and nonconcurrence might be somewhat problematic. And spelling it out
more fully certainly requires some more work. However, I think the gist of the idea
should be clear enough at this point to allow discussion of the next form of ADS I want
to consider. According to this version of ADS, ADS2, we say that at any given moment
in a person's life, or over any extended period of his life, all that matters to his well-
being are the satisfactions and frustrations of his various concurrent desires; his
nonconcurrent desires are completely irrelevant. So to determine a person’s level of
well-being we would first identify all the concurrent desire satisfactions and frustrations
he gets and figure how intrinsically valuable each one is for him, as determined by the
relevant desire intensities; we would then sum the values. ADS2 thus gives us a way to
solve the kind of problem mentioned above in my discussion of Jack and his desire to
be in France. If we count only the satisfaction of Jack’s concurrent desires as relevant
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to how well he is doing, then we need not say he is better off now because his desire to
be in France later is satisfied. His desires about the future just don’t factor into our
calculations about how well off he is now. Likewise, if Jack had any desires about the
past, these too would be left out of our calculations. The same would go for any desires
he might have that are not about what’s going on at any particular time.
Now although ADS2 does give us a way to avoid having to say that Jack would
be better off now if he is in France later, it gives us this at a price. And as I see it the
price is too high. I think ADS2 forces us to construe too narrowly what is relevant to a
person’s well-being. Although some might find it strange to think that Jack’s present
well-being could be tied to whether he is in France at some future time, thinking this
sort of thing has some benefits. For one thing, it allows us to say that the intrinsic value
that a person’s life has for him can be determined, at least in part, by what goes on after
he is dead and no longer exists. If I want my grandchildren to flourish after I am gone,
it seems to me that other things being equal I am better off if they do. And I think I am
better off now
,
while I still exist, by their flourishing then because their flourishing
satisfies my present (nonconcurrent) desire that they flourish. 14 Indeed I think ADS2 is
too restrictive because it forces us to ignore entirely our nonconcurrent desires. If a
person wants something, then I think that other things being equal he’s better off getting
what he wants, regardless of the temporal direction of his desire. Although perhaps
concurrent desires ought to play a greater role in determining one’s well-being, I don’t
think we ought to ignore nonconcurrent desires entirely. This brings me to the third
version of ADS that I want to discuss.
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ADS3
The third versions oi ADS involves weighting concurrent satisfactions and
frustrations in such a way that, other things being equal, concurrent satisfactions are
better for us than nonconcurrent satisfactions and concurrent frustrations are worse for
us than nonconcurrent frustrations. The idea is that the value of a satisfaction or
frustration is no longer simply a function of the intensity of the relevant desire; rather, it
is a function of both the intensity and the desire’s concurrence or nonconcurrence. It
seems to me that there are various ways we could accomplish such a weighting.
(Regarding satisfactions, for instance, we could say that the value of a nonconcurrent
satisfaction is given by the intensity of the relevant desire but that the value of a
concurrent satisfaction is given by the intensity of the relevant desire multiplied by what
we might call the concurrence factor
. This is some positive number that represents
the extent to which we think concurrent satisfactions are more valuable than
nonconcurrent. Of course the value we choose for this number will depend on how
much better we think concurrent satisfactions are than nonconcurrent satisfactions. If
we think that concurrent satisfactions should be weighted heavily, we would choose a
rather large number; if we think the weighting should not be so heavy, we would choose
a smaller number. We could say something similar about frustrations.)
At any rate, if we go for something along the lines of this third version of ADS,
we could say that to figure a person's well-being we simply sum the weighted values of
all the concurrent and nonconcurrent satisfactions and frustrations he gets. This version
ofADS gives us a way to count concurrence and nonconcurrence as relevant while
preserving the idea that all satisfactions and frustrations matter and that their values are
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commensurable. Regarding Jack's case, this vers,on of ADS commits us to saying that
he would indeed be better off now if his des.re to be in France later is satisfied.
However, it also allows us to say that satisfaction of Jack’s nonconcurrent desire to be
in France would be less valuable to him than the satisfaction an equally intense, or even
slightly less intense concurrent desire to be in France. But another consequence of the
view is that sometimes a person's nonconcurrent satisfactions will outweigh his
concurrent satisfactions. And some might find this consequence troubling.
Imagine that at the moment Jill has just two desires: she wants to be in France
later, and she wants to be in New York now. Now suppose that either but not both of
Jill s desires could be satisfied. If we could satisfy one of her desires, and if we want to
do what is best for her, if we want to maximize her level of well-being at the moment in
question, what should we do? Should we satisfy her desire about the future or her
desire about the present moment? According to ADS3, if Jill’s desire to be in France
later is intense enough, the value of its satisfaction might very well be greater than
the weighted value ot the satisfaction of her concurrent desire to be in New York
In such a case ADS3 commits us to saying that Jill would be better off now if her desire
to be in New York now is frustrated and her desire to be in France later is satisfied.
even
now.
This commitment might be unpalatable to some. We might think that when it comes to
a person’s well-being at a time the nonconcurrent desires he has at that time ought
pei haps to have some relevance but that they should never be more important than any
concurrent desires he has at that time. We might argue that even if Jill’s desire to be in
France later is infinitely intense, satisfaction of this desire just isn’t as important to her
present well-being as her desire to be in New York now. And we might argue more
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generally that, for any person, even if his desires about the future are infinitely intense
and numerous, satisfying these desires ought to be less important to his current well-
being than satisfying any desires he may have now about what’s going on now. This
brings me to the final version of ADS.
ADS4
The final version of ADS does not involve weighting the personal intrinsic
values of satisfactions and frustrations (like ADS1 and ADS2 it entails that the values of
satisfactions and frustrations are simply a matter of the relevant intensities, regardless of
whether the relevant desires are concurrent or nonconcurrent). Rather, it involves
specifying a way to count these values so that concurrent values always trump
nonconcurrent values, regardless of how intense or numerous the relevant desires are.
One way to do this would be to understand a person's well-being as an ordered pair of
numbers whose first member is the sum of the values of all the concurrent desire
satisfactions/frustrations he gets and whose second member is the sum of the values of
all the nonconcurrent desire satisfactions/frustrations he gets.
We could generate such a pair for any part of a person’s life, a single moment, a
few days or years, or the entire life. And the pair would tell us how intrinsically
valuable the relevant life-part is for the person. We could then specify a way to rank
and compare levels of well-being as follows.
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First, let us say that for any life-part/person pairs <P,S> and <P',S'>, we express the
intrinsic value of P for S and P' for S', respectively, with ordered pairs of integers as
follows: IV<P,S> - <n 1 ,n2>, IV<P'.S'> = <n I
',
n2'>. We can then compare values
according to the following:
Tl: (i) IV<P,S> = IV<P',S'> iff nl=nl' and n2=n2'; and
(ii) IV<P,S> > IV<P',S’> iff nl>nl' or (nl=nl' and n2>n2').
The idea here is that the relative well-being of a person during some part of his
life is primarily determined by the extent to which his concurrent desires are satisfied or
frustrated; his desires about the past, the future or indeterminate times are
incommensurably less important. 15 Regarding Jill’s case, ADS4 has the result that she
would be better off now if she were in New York now; it entails this because her desire
to be in New York is concurrent and so its satisfaction would be incommensurably more
valuable to her than the satisfaction of her nonconcurrent desire to be in France,
regardless of how intensely she now wants to be in France later. I think this result of
ADS4 is reasonably plausible. In Jack’s case, ADS4 does commit us to saying that he
would be better off now if his desire to be in France later is satisfied, but I don’t think
this is an especially troubling commitment. Given the stipulation that Jack has only one
desire, and it is nonconcurrent, Jack is a very strange fellow. So it seems to me that our
intuitions about whether or not Jack would be better off now if his desire about the
future is satisfied ought to be defended with at best moderate vigor. I have the intuition
that Jack would be better off, but I certainly wouldn’t defend this intuition to the death.
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You may have a contrary intuition. But since Jack is a freak, I don’t think either one of
us has the ammunition to build a conclusive case for our intuitions about him or against
contrary intuitions. Suffice it to say that regarding actual people, or mere possible
people that are more similar to actual people than Jack, I think ADS4 will give
reasonably plausible results. Most actual people have many concurrent desires at each
moment they are alive, and according to ADS4 these desires are what really matter.
Conclusion
The literature on well-being is full of objections to theories relevantly similar to
ADS. The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to defending ADS from what I take
to be the most popular of these objections. All of the objections I consider are aimed at
views relevantly similar to the simplest version of ADS presented above, ADSL
However, it should become obvious as we go along how suitably modified versions of
these objections could also be used against the other versions ofADS sketched above.
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Notes
i “"rS 1 'n“ke n° distinction b«ween wanting and desiring; if I want a thine1 desire that thing, and vice versa. I also take “desire” to be interchangeable with
want
. The same goes for all the relevant cognates.
It is important to emphasize that my view is not that wanting a thing makes that thingintrinsically good. I do not, therefore, hold what Thomas Carson calls an “actual-desire
eory o value
. See Carson (2000), p. 72. Also, my view is not that a person’s
wanting a thing makes that thing intrinsically good for the person in question. As willbecome clear as we go along, my view is that there is value to be had in the
combination of a person’s wanting a thing and his getting that thing.
,
Also
’
if Wil1 has intermittently wanted Minnow - one moment he wants if the next hedoes not - then given that the precise object of Will’s desire does not change, I would
like to say that he has had only one desire regarding Minnow. It’s just that the desire
comes and goes. And I would treat the desire’s intensity just as I would have if the
desire had been constant; that is, as an average of the intensities it has at the moments
the desire is had. Later on, it will become clear that one consequence of all this is that
when we evaluate how good a person's life is for him, it might turn out that some parts
of his life are more valuable to him than others, even though the parts in question
contain all the same satisfied and frustrated desires. But I welcome this consequence.
It might turn out that we would be better off taking some other things to be the objects
ot our desires. We might, for instance, pick properties so as to accommodate intuitions
such as David Lewis' about de se attitudes. For present purposes, however, I think no
harm will come from understanding the objects of desire to be propositions/states of
affairs. See Lewis (1983).
" Suppose Mike tells us that he wants Hesperus to rise and that he wants Phosphorus to
rise. Suppose he doesn't realize that Hesperus just is Phosphorus. Suppose he tells us
that he has two desires. What’s going on? Does Mike have one desire or two? I don’t
know. However, I think it is clear that if Mike really does want something here, then
it’s fair to say that he has either one desire or more than one, maybe two. And if we do
some philosophy of language and maybe some philosophy of mind and maybe some
psychology, we should be able to get to the bottom of all this. Maybe Mike has some
kind of de re desire about the thing up there in the sky, and maybe his self-attribution of
two desires is simply due to some kind of confusion on his part. Or maybe his is a case
ot some sort of de dicto desire. Maybe he really does have two desires. At any rate,
once we sort out what exactly Mike wants, then the question about how many desires he
has should be resolved. But of course it is possible that there is no fact of the matter
about what exactly Mike wants. Maybe there is no exact content associated with
Mike’s self-ascription of desire. And maybe the best we can hope for when trying to
characterize his desiderative state is that we pick a proposition that more or less gives
the content of his desire. Whatever is the case, I shall assume for present purposes that
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Txpresled tatbTLTf^ 3?“ 3 *”'• * has some “«* content that can be
shTll assume that if h a •
'yP 'Cal folk
-Psychological” desire attribution. And I
I have a desire at some time, t, and I have a desire at some otherime, n, and the content of my desire at t is the very same as the content of my desireat t+n, then we are talking about only one desire. Y
Fred s questions came to me in an email.
Of course it is pretty clearly true that accurately pinning down the desiderative contenta person s life is a monumentally difficult task. And it might be true that for any one
ull and accurate description of what a person wants, at a time or over a period of timethere are other non-equivalent descriptions that would fit him just as well. Just as
’
Euclid s geometry perhaps describes our world no better or worse than various non-
euchdean geometries, so too one method of characterizing desiderative content may be
no more or less accurate than another. All that’s important, though, is that we pick one
method of description and stick to it consistently. If we decide to do science within a
uc idean framework, great. That works. If we decide to do it in a non-Euclidean
framework, great. That works too. Troubles only arise if we mix the two ways up with
one another. Likewise, if we agree that there are multiple, non-equivalent but equally
acceptable ways to fully describe what people want, as long as we pick one method of
description and stick to it, then in principle we should have no problem clearly
characterizing what people desire. And once we do, there should be no problem saying
when a person gets what he wants and when he doesn’t. Of course it is possible, and
even likely, that we can only ever give what amount to rough approximations of what
actual people want and don’t want. For an interesting discussion of related matters see
Lewis (1986), pp.27-50.
g
There are many Mooreans of the kind I have in mind. See Ross (1930), pp. 112-113,
137; Chisholm (1968), pp. 22-23; Chisholm (1986), p. 74; Feldman (1997), pp. 108-
124; Feldman (2000), pp. 325-27; Harman ( 1 967), pp. 792-793; Tolhurst (1982), p. 383.
9
For good discussions of the need for fundamentals in axiology see Feldman (2000)
and Harman (1967).
10 See for example G.E. Moore (1922), p. 260 and Feldman (1997), pp. 136-139.
1
1
I address questions similar to this in greater detail in chapters 3 and 5.
" David Velleman would certainly find grounds to reject ADS1 here. He writes: “We
think of a person’s current welfare as a fact intrinsic to the present, not as a relation that
he currently bears to his future. .
.
[We do not say] of a person raised in adversity, that
his youth was not so bad, after all, simply because his youthful hopes were eventually
fulfilled later in life. We might say that such a person’s adulthood compensated for an
unfortunate youth; but we wouldn’t say that it made his youth any better. Because the
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belief in retroactive welfare effects would entail
counterintuitive. “ Velleman (1991), pp. 56-57.
such judgments, it strikes me as highly
13
Compare R.M. Hare's distinction between now-for-now, now-for-then, and then-forthen preferences in Hare (1981), pp. 101-103. Also, see the mention of" synchronic andasynchromc preferences in Fehige (1998), p. xxvi.
mnemoni
14
To
°"^.
extent or another
,
varllJUS contemporary philosophers have said things in“ST tZ P°Sthumous harms and benefits. See Brandt ( 1979), pp329-330, Feinberg (1984), p. 87; Griffin (1986), p. 23; Kavka (1986) d 41 Parti, P '
1 984), p. 495; Pitcher ( 1 984), pp. 1 84- 1 86; Carson (2000), p. 77. See also’stephen
“Death” ?/
eal
v/ °f
,he S ‘anf°rd E'nCydopedia of Philosophy website. (Luper, Steven,
•To 7 J
Th f°rd Encyd°Pedia °f Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward N.
(eel.).
I discuss temporal issues in greater detail in Chapter 5 when I consider
related to the fact that our desires often change over time.
various issues
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CHAPTER 2
DEFECTIVE DESIRES
Introduction
Most of us spend a great deal of time and energy trying to get what we want.
And it seems natural to think, therefore, that getting what we want is good for us, at
least in some ordinary sense of “good”; otherwise, why spend so much time and energy
running after it? But when our desires are defective, say, based upon our own false
beliefs, it is often wrong to think that we’d be better off getting what we want. And it
seems right to think that some desire satisfactions are, therefore, not good for us. If I
want to drink the deadly poison because I falsely believe it is a milkshake, it would be a
mistake to think that I would be better off getting what I want. And it seems right in
such a case to suppose that the satisfaction of my desire would not be good for me, in
any ordinary sense of “good”. Indeed many philosophers have pointed to desires that
are “defective” in one sense or another as a source of trouble for actual-desire accounts
of well-being such as ADS. Shelly Kagan sketches the apparent trouble nicely when he
writes:
Many of my desires, including desires about my life, are based on
misinformation, sloppy thinking, inexperience, prejudice, bias, and
various other kinds of error or irrationality. I might want something, for
example, because I am misinformed as to its nature, and I falsely believe
that I will enjoy having it. It seems implausible to claim that giving me
what I want in a case like this makes me better off. . . . what seems
implausible is the claim that satisfying this mistaken desire leaves me
better off in and of itself. 1
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Kagan’s words echo those of many other philosophers who seem to share the
widespread intuition that defective desires generate an overwhelming objection to
actual-desire accounts of well-being
.
2
In the next few pages I’d like to explore the
problem of defective desires, and I’d like to see what bearing it has, if any, on the
axiological claim that every desire satisfaction is intrinsically good for the person who
gets it. There is no doubt that we sometimes mistakenly want things that are not good
for us; what I d like to settle is whether this fact generates serious troubles for PIP. My
ultimate conclusion is that such cases aren’t a serious problem. The remainder of this
chapter is devoted to defending PIP from the apparent problem of defective desires. I
first introduce an example involving a person who has a desire that is based on a
mistake; this example is meant to serve as a test case. I then argue that the case does
not give us good reason to think that PIP is false or that PIP is implausible.
Tom and the Poisoned Stream
If we survey the literature on the present topic, we’ll find that many
philosophers, not surprisingly, employ examples of imaginary people with defective
desires. In some examples, the relevant desires qualify as defective because they are
based on or caused, at least in part, by false beliefs. In other examples, the defect is
owing to the fact that the relevant desires arise as the result of a kind of ignorance of all
the relevant facts and not because of some specific false belief. In some examples, the
desire in question has as its object a state of affairs whose occurrence would result in a
diminished level of well-being for the person with the desire. And in other examples,
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the object’s occurrence would not diminish well-being but it would pretty dearly not
raise it either. In some examples it is fairly obvious that the desire in question is meant
to be a merely extrinsic desire. While in other examples, it is not so obvious whether
the desire in question is meant to be extrinsic or intrinsic or both, and in these cases the
reader is left to wonder for himself what the author had in mind. Despite all these
minor differences, though, most of the examples I have in mind are designed to
establish roughly the same thing: some actual-desire satisfactions are not intrinsically
good for those who get them.
Since it would be impractical to discuss individually each and every example in
the literature, I d like to focus on a single archetypical sort of example involving a
person with a defective desire. It involves a person who mistakenly wants something
that would not be good for him. I think that in the process of discussing this example it
will become clear that the minor differences that exist among the many examples just
alluded to are tor the most part irrelevant. And I hope it will become clear to the reader
that what I say about this archetypical case can also be said, with suitable modifications,
about all the other cases of defective desire strewn throughout the literature.
To enable fruitful discussion, then, I'd like focus on a case of mistaken desire
similar to the one suggested by Thomas Carson in his Value and the Good Life 3
Suppose that Tom is thirsty and that because he falsely believes that drinking from the
stream will quench his thirst, he forms a desire to drink from the stream. What Tom
doesn't know is that the stream has been contaminated to the point that it is a caustic
and deadly poison. So if Tom’s desire to drink from the stream were satisfied, he would
not thereby quench his thirst; indeed, he would immediately be poisoned and soon die.
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Furthermore, suppose that ifTom’s des.re were frustrated he would go on to live a long
and satisfying life. In this case, then, Tom mistakenly wants something that would not
be good for him. Indeed, in this case it’s pretty clear that Tom mistakenly wants
something that would be positively bad for him. (To keep things simple, let us also
stipulate that Tom does not have a desire that he does not drink from the stream. In
other words, let’s stipulate that Tom is not “confused” about drinking from the stream;
he does not both want to drink from the stream and want not to drink from the stream;
he simply wants to drink from the stream.)
I think there are two main facts about Tom’s case we need to think about. First,
Tom s desire is based on a false belief, on an unfortunate mistake. If he had all the
relevant facts, he would not believe that drinking from the stream would quench his
thirst, and he would not have a desire to drink from the stream. Second, if Tom's desire
were satisfied, his overall level of well-being would be diminished; the satisfaction
would cause him to be worse oft than he would be otherwise. 4 Now let’s see what all
this has to do with whether or not the satisfaction of Tom's desire would be intrinsically
good for him.
Satisfactions and Defective Desires
According to PIP, desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for those who get
them. In Tom’s case this amounts to saying that it would be intrinsically good for Tom
if the following state of affairs were to obtain: (1) Tom wants to drink from the stream
& Tom drinks from the stream. 5 And we should note that (1) is a complex state of
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affairs with two other states of affairs as parts: (2) Tom wants to drink from the
stream, and (3) Tom drinks from the stream.
Now, as mentioned above, (2) occurs and it is based on a mistake. And by
“based on a mistake” I mean simply that if Tom had not falsely believed that drinking
from the stream would quench his thirst, then (2) would not have occurred. So perhaps
the relation between his false belief and his desire is in some way causal; at any rate, the
relation is certainly contingent. There are many worlds in which Tom wants to drink
from the stream but in which he does not have the false belief in question, and there are
many worlds in which he has the false belief in question but in which he does not want
to drink from the stream. Also, if (2) does not occur, then (1) does not occur, so if the
occurrence of (2) is based on a mistake, then in our example the occurrence of (1) is
too, at least in part.
Let me first say that one thing that PIP is meant to capture is the idea that desire
satisfactions have a kind of value that supervenes on their intrinsic properties and not on
any non-intrinsic, contingent relations that they or their parts might enter into. I briefly
discussed this kind of value above when I talk about the Moore-inspired conception of
personal intrinsic value that I endorse. So if the occurrence of (1) were intrinsically
good tor Tom, its goodness would supervene on its own intrinsic nature, and not on any
contingent relations involving (2) or (3), or (1) for that matter. This is not of course to
say that the occurrence of (1) would be intrinsically good for Tom, although I think it
would be. It is just to say that the contingent connection between Tom’s false belief and
his desire is entirely irrelevant to whether or not the occurrence of (1) would be
intrinsically good for him.
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My first conclusion regarding Tom's case, then, is this: the mere fact that Tom's
desire is based on a false belief is not sufficient to render the corresponding satisfaction
of no intrinsic value to Tom. And I think similar conclusions can be reached in other
relevantly similar cases of mistaken desire sprinkled throughout the philosophical
literature on well-being. So the mere fact that some desires are based on false beliefs,
sloppy thinking, inexperience, prejudice, bias, etc., should not bother proponents of
views relevantly similar to PIP.
We should also note that if being based on afalse beliefor being based on a
mistake is sufficient to render a thing of no personal intrinsic value, then not only is PIP
in trouble, but so too are many other interesting proposals about which things are
intrinsically good for us. Take hedonism, for instance. If the kind of hedonism I have
in mind is true, then episodes of pleasure are intrinsically good for those who get them.
But surely, some such episodes are based on false beliefs. I might falsely believe that I
have just won the lottery and as a result experience a great deal of pleasure. If I hadn't
had the false belief, I wouldn't have gotten the pleasure. So in this case my pleasure is
based, at least in part, on a false belief of mine. But does this fact do anything to
undermine the hedonist’s claim that it would nevertheless be intrinsically good for me
to experience the pleasure? Of course not. If the pleasure is intrinsically good for me,
its goodness is owing to the intrinsic nature of the pleasure itself, and not to its
contingent connections to my various beliefs.
Or consider an item that seems to creep onto many of the lists offered by
“objective list” theorists: knowledge . 6 It is certainly not wildly implausible to think that
possessing knowledge is intrinsically good for us; knowing might very well be
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intrinsically better than not knowing. But of course I might come to know something
precisely because I have a false belief. I might falsely believe that the Eiffel Tower is
just around the comer and only come to know that it is not because my false belief led
me around the corner whereupon I became educated on the matter. Does the fact that
my knowledge was thus based, at least in part, on a false belief entail that the
knowledge itself would be of no intrinsic value to me? Of course it does not. If
knowing is intrinsically good for the person who knows, the goodness here supervenes
on the intrinsic nature of the knowing itself, and not on its contingent relations to his
various true and false beliefs. And more generally, there simply is no necessary
connection between a thing’s being based on a false belief, confusion, misinformation,
lunacy, bias, or anything else for that matter and any personal intrinsic value it may or
may not have. So we should recognize that just as being based on such-and-such has
no bearing on whether or not pleasure or knowledge has personal intrinsic value, it has
no bearing on whether or not desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for those who get
them.
Moreover, what role does Tom’s mistake really play in our intuitive assessment
ot his situation? And what role does the harm he would get from his satisfaction play?
Is it merely because Tom is mistaken that so many are likely to deny the value of (1)?
Or is the temptation to deny the value of (1) rooted in the fact that (1) will harm Tom if
it occurs? Surely, no one denies the value of (1) merely because Tom is mistaken about
the nature of the thing he wants. If Tom’s being mistaken is the only reason one has for
denying the value of (1), then if we take his mistake away, we should thereby take away
one’s reason for denying the value of (1). But surely those who deny the value of (1)
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would continue to do so even if Tom’s desire to drink from the stream were not based
on a false belief. Let’s change the example slightly. Suppose Tom is depressed and he
wants to kill himself. Suppose he correctly believes that the stream is poisonous and
that if he drinks from it he will die. Are those who were at first inclined to deny the
value of (1) likely to reassess the situation and now say that the occurrence of (1) would
indeed be intrinsically good for Tom? I don’t think so. Indeed, I think the “real” reason
most deny the value of (1 ) has nothing much to do with whether or not Tom’s desire is
based on a false belief. I think most deny the value of (1) because its occurrence would
harm Tom, because it would result in his having a much worse life.
Satisfactions and Instrumentally Bad Objects
Let us now consider the instrumental disvalue of Tom’s getting what he wants.
Does it entail that his desire satisfaction would not be intrinsically good for him? No.
And a line of thinking similar to the one above shows why the harmful consequences of
Tom's getting what he wants are irrelevant to whether or not (1) would be intrinsically
good tor him. Even though drinking from the stream would not quench Tom’s thirst
and would deprive him of a long and satisfying life, this fact about the causal relation
between (3) and Tom’s death has no bearing on whether or not the occurrence of (1)
would be intrinsically good for Tom. We can all grant that sometimes the net result of a
desire satisfaction is a lower level of well-being; we can all agree that we are sometimes
left worse off as a result of getting what we want, that some desire satisfactions are
instrumentally bad for us. But this fact about the negative instrumental value of some
desire satisfactions entails nothing about any intrinsic value that these same
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satisfactions might have for those who get them. Instrumental value supervenes on
extrinsic properties; personal intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties. And
there simply is no necessary connection between a thing's (extrinsic) instrumental value
and any personal intrinsic value it might have (or lack).
So we account for what’s bad about Tom’s case by simply pointing out that
drinking from the stream would result in Tom’s living a much shorter, and worse (less
satisfying) life than he would otherwise; getting what he wants in this case would be
instrumentally very bad for Tom. But we need to note that despite this instrumental
badness, it is entirely possible that Tom could nonetheless reap some intrinsic benefit
from the satisfaction of his desire. Let me emphasize here that nothing I have said thus
far is meant to convince the reader that Tom’s desire satisfaction would be intrinsically
good for him. My main point so far has just been that contingent, extrinsic properties of
the parts of desire satisfactions (such as (2) and (3)) or of satisfactions themselves entail
nothing about the personal intrinsic value of these same satisfactions.
Before moving on, let’s note one more thing about the relationship between
instrumental value and personal intrinsic value. Just as above when we noted that if
being based on afalse belief\s a problem for PIP, then it is also a problem for some
other interesting views, so too we should now note a similar point about a thing’s being
instrumental ly bad. Tom’s desire satisfaction has two parts, one of which - its object -
would, if it occurred, be instrumentally bad for Tom. So the satisfaction itself would be
instrumentally bad for Tom. (If the satisfaction occurs, the object of Tom’s desire
occurs, and if the object occurs, Tom will be worse off.) But if thus having negative
instrumental value is sufficient to render a thing (in this case a desire satisfaction) of no
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personal intrinsic value, then not only is PIP in trouble, but so too are many other
interesting proposals about which things are intrinsically good for us. Consider
hedonism again. There are obviously a great many pleasures that leave us worse off,
that are mstrumentally bad for us. But does this fact furnish opponents of hedonism
with a plausible objection? Of course it does not. If pleasures are intrinsically good for
us, they are good in virtue of their own intrinsic natures, and not in virtue of what they
might or might not cause. So we should not conclude that pleasures lack intrinsic value
merely because some pleasures are instrumentally bad for us.
Or consider the view that only the satisfaction of “fully-informed” desires
should count as intrinsically good for us. On this view it’s intrinsically good for me to
get what I want only when what I want is something I would continue to want if I were
fully informed about, or fully appreciated what it would be like to get it. Now imagine
a soldier who jumps on a hand-grenade to save his comrades. Surely there are
situations where such a soldier would still desire to sacrifice himself even ifhe were
fully informed about what the satisfaction of his desire would be like. And so there are
cases where the satisfaction of our fully-informed desires would leave us worse off.
But does the mere fact that such satisfactions would be instrumentally bad entail that
they would fail to be intrinsically good for those who get them? No. If such
satisfactions are intrinsically good for us, they are good for us because of their own
intrinsic natures, and not because of their effects . 7
Let me beat a dead horse some more. Consider again knowledge and the idea
that it is intrinsically good for us to posses it. There are certainly cases where knowing
something proves to be instrumentally bad for the person who knows it. I don't doubt
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that there a number of people at the bottom of the East River, or people buried in
shallow graves all over New Jersey, for instance whose lives took turns for the worse
primarily because they came to know something or other; these folks perhaps knew too
much tor their own good. But this fact does nothing to refute the claim that possessing
the knowledge they did was intrinsically good for them. The effects of knowing
something have no bearing on any personal intrinsic value that knowing it might or
might not have for the person who knows it. And in general, if a thing, whatever it
might be, is intrinsically good for a person, its goodness is not dependent in any way on
its effects or its instrumental value. And we should recognize, therefore, that just as
being instrumentally bad doesn’t entail that certain pleasures or bits of knowledge fail
to be intrinsically good for us, it doesn’t entail that actual desire satisfactions are not
intrinsically good for us.
An Interlude
Some will object to the defense of PIP that I’ve just outlined by saying that I’ve
missed the whole point of examples such as Tom’s. It might be suggested that when
someone wants a thing because he falsely believes that it would be good for him or at
least not bad for him, there is a natural and obvious sense in which it is correct to say
that he doesn’t “really” want the thing. This is not to say that he doesn’t actually have a
desire for the thing; it is just to say that his desire is itself a kind of cognitive mistake.
And we might say that what makes it a mistake is that the person would cease to have it
if he were “fully rational” and “fully informed” about all the relevant facts, or if he were
to undergo some kind of “cognitive psychotherapy”.
8
Alternatively, we might say it is a
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mistake because its satisfaction would conflict with something like what John Rawls
might characterize as the person’s rational plan of life
.
9
That is, the desire is a mistake
because a life plan including the satisfaction would not be chosen by the person if he
were to choose a plan “with full deliberative rationality, that is, with full awareness of
all the relevant facts and after careful consideration of the consequences .” 10
So the idea here is that we should distinguish between “ideal” desires, desires
that satisfy some kind of idealization criterion (that is, desires such as those that would
survive cognitive psychotherapy or whose satisfactions would be part of our rational life
plan or that we would have only if we were “fully informed” and “fully rational”) and
desires that do not satisfy the criterion. Consider Tom’s case again. Given the
stipulations of the case, it’s reasonable to suppose that Tom’s desire to drink from the
stream is not an ideal desire. It probably wouldn t survive cognitive psychotherapy, and
its satisfaction probably wouldn’t be part of a rational life plan. After all, if Tom had all
the relevant facts, he would realize that drinking from the stream would frustrate many
of the other desires he presumably has, e.g., his desire to continue living, to avoid pain,
to drink non-poisonous water, etc. He’d realize that getting what he wants would make
his life worse. So the desire that Tom, unfortunately, actually has is mistaken and not
ideal. And we, therefore, have no reason to think that getting what he wants in this case
would be intrinsically good for him. So the reason to think that Tom's desire
satisfaction would not be intrinsically good for him is not that Tom’s desire is caused by
a false belief or that the satisfaction would be instrumentally bad; rather, it is because
Tom’s desire is not ideal.
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There are several responses I might make to defend PIP here. And although it is
only the second response that I would like to offer seriously, I will throw out both
responses for the reader’s consideration. First response: rather than distinguishing
between mistaken and ideal desires as just suggested and saying that the satisfactions of
mistaken desires are not good for us because they fail some idealization criterion, we
might take a different tack. Suppose I tell my wife that I want to drink some sour milk
I’ve found in the refrigerator. And suppose that she warns me against drinking the milk
by telling me that if I only knew what drinking sour milk was like I’d realize that I don’t
really want to drink the stuff after all.
Now there is a kernel of truth in what my wife said. And we could get at this
kernel in one of two ways: (i) we could say that she is correct because, in effect, she is
saying that if I had all the facts I would not have a desire to drink the sour milk, a desire
that unfortunately I do now actually have, or (ii) we could explain what seems right
about her warning by saying that she has noticed that I suffer from a kind of double
confusion. First, I falsely believe that the sour milk is safe to drink, and second, I
falsely believe that I want to drink the milk. We might claim that she is literally correct
in saying that I don’t actually want to drink the milk. And we might justify this claim
by noting that if my veil of false belief were removed, I would immediately realize that
drinking the milk would conflict with my genuine interests and I would realize that I
don’t actually want to drink the milk.
We often talk as if this is exactly the sort of thing that is going on in cases of
desire based on false belief. It’s not hard to imagine that shortly after drinking the sour
milk I might say to my wife, ‘’boy, you were right. I didn’t really want to drink that
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milk. What was I thinking? Man, was I confused?’ So one thing we might want to do
here is consider taking this kind of talk seriously. And if we do, we might say that cases
of mistaken desire based on false belief like mine and Tom’s are not really cases of
desiring at all. And we might then say that since such cases don’t involve any actual
desires, they are irrelevant to the question as to whether actual-desire satisfactions are
intrinsically good for us. Since I never actually wanted to drink the milk, there is no
corresponding desire satisfaction to cause troubles for PIP. And since Tom never
actually wanted to drink from the stream, questions about the alleged intrinsic value of
getting what he wants in this case are also irrelevant. We might thus try to defend PIP
by restricting what counts as an actual desire and say that so-called “desires” based on
false belie! like Tom s and mine are not actual desires. '
' But for various reasons I
prefer another defense, and it goes as follows.
I think it is actually less plausible to say that we ought to count as relevant only
those desires that satisfy an idealization criterion along the lines of those mentioned.
Suppose we count only the actual desires that one would continue to have if one were to
become “fully rational” and “fully informed” about what it would be like for the
relevant object to obtain. Although I doubt it, some of my actual desires might survive
such a transformation on my part. However, I think it is a stretch to say that these
desires, and only these desires, reflect the interests of the person I am now. I think that
at best they reflect the interests of someone who is perhaps similar to me in some
respects but who is wildly different in many others, and I don’t think we should confuse
his interests with mine. And I think matters would be made even worse if we decide to
count only those desires that I would have if I were fully informed and fully rational,
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even if none of these desires are among the desire that I actually do have. If I were fully
informed and fully rational, chances are that I would want all sorts of things that I now.
in fact, do not want and even want not to get. And so if here, in the actual world, I get
these things, they might very well frustrate many, if not all of the desires I actually do
have.
12
So I do not think we should equate what is intrinsically good for me, here in the
actual world, with what I would want if I were some God-like superman.
The Betterness Test
So far, I ve tried to establish just two rather modest, and perhaps obvious things:
(i) the contingent connection between Tom’s desire and his false belief has no bearing
on whether or not it would be intrinsically good for him to get the desire satisfaction in
question, and (ii) the instrumental disvalue of his drinking from the stream is also
irrelevant to whether or not his desire satisfaction would be intrinsically good for him.
All I've tried to do, therefore, is take a little of the sting out of the “overwhelming”
objection to the claim that all desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for those who
get them. But since I haven’t done anything by way of making a positive case for this
claim, many will still be inclined to think it implausible to say that Tom's desire
satisfaction would be intrinsically good for him. After all, given the way we’ve spelled
out the case, there doesn’t seem to be much, if anything, that would be good for Tom
about getting what he wants. At this point, therefore, I’d like to say a few words about
why I think that the occurrence of (1) would be intrinsically good for Tom.
To make my intuitions here clearer, I’d like to perform a little test on Tom’s
case. I’d like to compare a life in which Tom gets the desire satisfaction in question
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With a life that is as much as possible the same, and I’d like to see if it would be
reasonable to think that one life would be better for him. Let me say a few words about
the kind of test I want to perform here. Suppose someone claims that all things of type
X are intrinsically good for the people who get them. How could we go about
evaluating the plausibility of this claim? One way to start would be to imagine a
person, say, Joe and some specific thing that is an X, say, r. We could then do a little
thought experiment in which we compare two possible lives Joe could live: one in
which r exists and a life that is as similar as possible but in which it does not. And if
upon reflection the r-life seems better for Joe than the other, then the claim that things
of type X are intrinsically good for us has gained some plausibility. Of course this little
test would not show that the claim is true, for we haven’t performed the test on
everything that is an X, but at least the claim has passed one small test involving Joe, so
it is not entirely without hope of being true.
But to make the kind of test just mentioned useful for our present purposes, I
need to say a bit more about it. Specifically, I should elaborate on what I mean when I
say that the two lives we compare need to be as similar as possible except for the
existence of the thing whose value is in question. If we are evaluating the claim that all
things of type X are intrinsically good for us, and r is an X, when we select lives to
compare the first thing to do is make certain that with the exception of r the lives are
alike with respect to all other things of type X. We need to do this so that any
assessment we make of the relative values of the lives isn't influenced by other things
of type X. Our test results might be spoiled otherwise.
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To see what I mean, suppose the claim we are evaluating is that every pleasure
is intrinsically good for the person who experiences it. To do the test properly here we
might first imagine a life in which Joe experiences 10 units of pleasure on Monday. We
then imagine another life that is exactly the same (in every possible way) but that is 10
units short on pleasure, because Joe does not get the 10 units of pleasure on Monday.
When we compare these lives, it is certainly plausible to think that the first life would
be better for Joe than the second; after all, the first life is more pleasant, so the claim
that pleasures are intrinsically good for us has passed the test. We have just done the
test correctly. If however, we had selected a different second life for comparison, our
test results might have been different. Suppose that the second life differs from the first
not only with respect to the 10 units of pleasure on Monday but also with respect to
some other pleasure. Imagine, for instance, that the second life contains 20 additional
units of pleasure on Tuesday. So on balance, the second life contains more pleasure
than the first, and it seems therefore that the second life would be better. In this case,
then, the 1 0 units of pleasure on Monday do not make the first life better than the
second. But are we therefore justified in saying that those 10 units are worthless? Of
course we are not. The test works only when, with the exception of the thing whose
value we are evaluating, all other things are equal. And in this case, the ceteris paribus
clause means that the lives need to be hedonically on a par, except of course for the 10
units of pleasure on Monday.
When doing the test we should also take pains to make sure that the lives we
compare are alike in other respects as well. If we are testing whether all things of type
X are good for us, and r is an X, not only should the lives we compare be alike with
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respect to all things of type X (other than r), they should also be alike in every other
possible respect. Again, suppose we are evaluating the hedonic claim made above.
And again suppose that in one life Joe experiences 10 units of pleasure on Monday. But
also suppose that he is an ignorant moron in this life. Now suppose we compare this
first life with a second life that is short the 10 units of pleasure, but in which Joe is
exceptionally knowledgeable and wise, and certainly no moron. So here we have a
slightly more pleasant life of an ignorant moron to compare with a slightly less pleasant
life of a wise man who possesses a great deal of knowledge. When we compare these
lives I think many will be inclined to say that the second life would be a better life for
Joe to live. The second life is a bit less pleasant, but at least in this life Joe is no moron.
But even if we are thus inclined to prefer the second life to the first, are we justified
therefore in concluding that the 10 units of pleasure are worthless to Joe in the first life?
Of course we are not. Here we are comparing “apples with oranges”. The lives are so
dissimilar that meaningful comparison of the relevant kind is impossible. To get a fair
reading on whether or not the 10 units would “in and of themselves” add value to Joe’s
life, we need to compare more similar lives. And when we do, it is clearly plausible to
say that the 1 0 units of pleasure do make Joe’s life better. So again, when we apply the
test properly, hedonism passes the test. 13
But what is the point of all this talk about hedonism and things of type X and
comparing one life to another? I’ll tell you. I think that if we apply the kind of test I’ve
just been discussing to the claim that all desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for
those who get them, we’ll get the result that whenever we compare lives that differ only
with respect to one desire satisfaction, it is plausible to suppose that the more satisfying
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life would be better than the less satisfying life. At least this is the kind of result that I
get whenever I apply the test. In other words, my intuitions consistently tell me that,
0th6r thingS being e(
*ual ’ desire satisfactions improve lives. I can’t overemphasize the
importance of the ceteris paribus clause here. When we compare two lives to see if a
desire satisfaction would make one better than the other, we need to keep as much as
possible fixed from life to life. This includes making sure that the lives are the same
with respect to all other satisfactions and frustrations. If they are different in this
respect, or they are different in other ways not necessarily entailed merely by the
existence of the satisfaction in one life but not in the other, then we can't get an accurate
read on whether or not the satisfaction in question alone adds any value, and we are
likely to get results just as misleading as we did when we applied the test improperly to
hedonism above. Now, when I say that the lives we compare need to be as similar as
possible except for the satisfaction in question, one thing I don’t mean is that they must
be as similar as the laws of nature allow; rather, I mean they must be as similar as
logically or metaphysically possible. In our world, when a person gets what he wants
there are often obvious consequences owing to the (contingent) causal laws that obtain
here. And so, in our world, getting what one wants often results in a life that is wildly
different from what it would have been had one not gotten it. In our world, a single
desire satisfaction can make a big difference in someone’s life. As a result, our
intuitions about whether or not such a satisfaction would in itselfadd value to a life can
become muddied by all the differences it contingently would bring about. And so if we
really want to focus just on the satisfaction itself and gauge its contribute to the value of
a life, we need to keep fixed everything not necessarily entailed by the existence of the
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satisfaction in the life in question. So now let’s see if we can apply such a test to Tom’s
case.
14
To begin with, recall that I’ve characterized Tom’s desire satisfaction as the
following state of affairs:
(1) Tom wants to drink from the stream & Tom drinks from the stream
So in the present case, we want to test the claim that the occurrence of (1) would be
intrinsically good for Tom. We need, therefore, to compare a life in which (1) occurs,
let s call this the Satisfaction-Life
,
with a life in which it does not occur but that is
otherwise as similar as is logically possible. And the point here is just to see whether it
is reasonable to suppose the Satisfaction-Life would be a better life for Tom.
Let’s begin by stipulating a few facts about the Satisfaction-Life. First, as
mentioned above, in the Satisfaction-Life Tom’s desire to drink from the stream is
satisfied, so (1) occurs. And since (1) is a complex state of affairs, the following also
occur in this life:
(2) Tom wants to drink from the stream
(3) Tom drinks from the stream.
Furthermore, let’s suppose that in the Satisfaction-Life Tom is poisoned and dies
prematurely. So in the Satisfaction-Life the following also occur:
(4) Tom is poisoned.
(5) Tom dies prematurely.
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So the Satisfaction-Life is a pretty sad life. Tom wants to drink from the stream,
he drinks from the stream, he’s poisoned, and he dies prematurely. We certainly should
not think of the Satisfaction-Life as an optimally good life with respect to Tom’s well-
being; he could surely hope to do better. But is it better than a life that is just like it
except for the occurrence of (1)? The first thing to note is that (1) fails to occur under
several conditions: (2) & ~(3), or ~(2) & (3), or ~(2) & ~(3). And corresponding to
each of these conditions is a possible life for us to compare to the Satisfaction-Life. We
need, then, to compare the Satisfaction-Life with three distinct possible lives in which
(1 ) does not occur. First, there is the life in which (1) fails to occur because although
(2) occurs, (3) does not; this is a life in which Tom wants to drink from the stream but
he does not drink from the stream; so we can call this life the “Frustration-Life”. The
Frustration-Life differs from the Satisfaction-Life only with respect to everything that
would necessarily be different owing to the fact that (3) does not occur in it. Second,
there is the life in which (1) fails to occur because although (3) occurs (2) does not; in
this life Tom does not want to drink from the stream but he drinks from it anyway; let's
call this the “Indifferent-Life” because in it Tom “gets” something he neither wants to
get nor wants not to get, viz., Tom drinksfrom the stream. The Indifferent-Lite differs
from the Satisfaction-Life only with respect to those things that would necessarily be
different owing to the fact that in the Indifferent-Life (2) does not occur. Third, there is
the life in which (1) fails to occur because neither (2) nor (3) occurs; in this life Tom
does not want to drink from the stream and he does not drink from it. Lacking a better
tag for this life, let’s just call it the “Disinterested-Life” because in it Tom has no
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interest one way or the other about drinking from the stream and drinking from the
stream never enters into his life - Tom drinks from the stream doesn’t “happen” to him;
it is simply not part ot the world in which he lives. So the Disinterested-Life is as
similar as possible to the Satisfaction-Life with respect to everything that would not
necessarily be different owing merely to the occurrence of (2) and (3).
So there are three relevant pairs of lives we need to consider. The pairs look
like this:
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
Satisfaction-Life Satisfaction-Life Satisfaction-Life
Frustration-Life Indifferent-Life Disinterested-Life
Let's start with Pair 1 . In both these lives Tom wants to drink from the stream;
the difference is that in one he does drink from the stream and in the other he does not.
So the two lives will be alike with respect to everything that is not necessarily entailed
merely by this difference. Among other things, what this means is that if Tom is
poisoned in the Satisfaction-Life, he will be poisoned in the Frustration-Life; if he dies
prematurely in the Satisfaction-Life, he dies prematurely in the Frustration-Life. The
lives would be alike in these respects because the occurrence of (3) does not necessarily
entail either (4) or (5).
15 And the lives will be exactly alike in a great many other
respects as well; again, the only difference is that in one life Tom wants something and
gets it, and in the other he wants the very same thing but does not get it. So, what are
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we to make of these two lives? Does it seem reasonable to suppose that one would be
better for Tom than the other?
The first thing to say is that I don't think we have any reason to think the
Satisfaction-Life would be worse for Tom than the Frustration-Life. Both lives are
almost exactly the same with respect to satisfactions and frustrations, and they are
exactly the same with respect to pleasure, pain, and everything else we might think
matters; the only difference is that in one Tom drinks from the stream and in the other
he does not. And given the stipulations of the case, Tom’s drinking from the stream in
the Satisfaction-Life would certainly not be worse for him than not drinking from the
stream in the Frustration-Life, at least in any relevant sense of “worse” that I can think
of. So I don’t think the Satisfaction-Life would be worse for Tom. But would it be
better?
As I said above, I think that if a person wants something, we have prima facie
reason to think that getting it would be better for him than not getting it. What I mean is
that unless we have reason to think that getting the thing would be worse than not
getting it, we have reason to think that getting it would be better. So in Tom’s case, it
seems to me that the Satisfaction-Life would be better for him than the Frustration-Life.
In the Satisfaction-Life Tom has a desire and it is satisfied; he wants something and he
gets it. In the Frustration-Life Tom has the same desire and it is frustrated; he wants
something but doesn’t get it. So in the Satisfaction-Life Tom gets slightly more of what
he wants, and he doesn’t pay any price that he doesn’t also pay in the Frustration-Life.
Both lives seem pretty sad, and in both lives Tom falsely thinks that drinking from the
stream will quench his thirst, but at least the world Tom inhabits in the Satisfaction-Life
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IS a bit closer to the way he wants it to be, misguided as his wants might be. So I think
the Satisfaction-Life occurs in a world that is slightly better for Tom to inhabit; in other
words, I think his life there would be a bit better for him. I should emphasize that my
intuition here is not that the Satisfaction-Life would be an optimally good life; indeed
given what we ve said about it, it seems an unfortunate life, and it could be better. My
intuition is just that the Satisfaction-Life would be slightly better than the Frustration-
Life. And I don’t see why anyone would honestly claim otherwise. 16
But what about Pair 2? Would the Satisfaction-Life be better for Tom than the
Indifferent-Life? In both of these lives Tom drinks from the stream, the only difference
is that in the former, and not the latter, Tom wants to drink from the stream. So the two
lives will be alike with respect to everything that is not necessarily entailed by the
occurrence of (2) in the Satisfaction-Life. In both lives, then, Tom is poisoned and dies
prematurely, and so on. So is one life better than the other?
As above, the first thing to say is that I don’t think we have any reason, prima
facie or otherwise, to think the Satisfaction-Life would be worse for Tom than its pair
mate: the Indifferent-Life. Both lives are exactly the same with respect to pleasure,
pain, and everything else we might think matters; the only difference is that in one Tom
wants to drink from the stream and in the other he does not. And given the stipulations
of the case, we have no reason to think that Tom’s wanting to drink from the stream in
the Satisfaction-Life would be worse for him than not wanting it in the other life, at
least in any relevant sense of “worse” that I can think of. So I don’t think the
Satisfaction-Life would be worse for Tom. Indeed I think it would be better.
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Just as hard-core hedonists will say that for anything that is the case (or isn’t the
case tor that matter), other things being equal, we’re better off being pleased that it is
the case, so too I say that for anything that is the case, we’re better off wanting it to be
the case. And I don’t think we’re saying anything implausible here. Other things being
equal, we re better off taking •'pro” attitudes towards things that are the case. We’re
better off if we are pleased that such-and-such is the case (because being pleased entails
desire satisfactions); 17 and we’re better off wanting that such-and-such is the case, if it
is the case, because, ceteris paribus, we’re better off when things are the way we want
them to be. In the Satisfaction-Life Tom is favorably disposed to his drinking from the
stream - he wants to drink from the stream, and he does. So he is better off in the
Satisfaction-Life.
I can now feel some objectors chomping at the bit. One might object here that if
we are better off, ceteris paribus, wanting whatever is the case, then if we want to
enhance our own well-being, we ought to start wanting everything that is the case. And
this means we ought to start wanting all sorts of nasty things. The Crimean War
occurred and was a pretty awful thing. Many innocent people were dealt miserable
fates that they did not deserve. And many people suffered undeserved horrors at the
hands of people who did not deserve to inflict them. All in all, it was a very bad thing.
But given that the war did occurred, what should our attitudes be towards all the misery
it caused? Should we be pleased that it occurred? Should we want it to have occurred?
The correct answer to both questions is no. We should not be pleased that it
occurred and we should not want it to have occurred. There seems to be something bad
or wrong about adopting such attitudes towards such misery. But what accounts for the
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apparent badness? I think there are several things. First, people who adopt such
attitudes are generally bad for the world. People who take pleasure in or want the
suffering of innocent people generally do nasty things. This is why, in part, we try to
teach our children not to take pleasure in or want the pain of others. If they learn to be
pleased by or want only the “right” things, they are more likely, it seems, to add value
to the world. And adding value to the world is a good thing.
Second, people with such attitudes generally lead miserable lives themselves.
Wanting others to suffer and being pleased when they do often ruins the lives of those
who want such things and are pleased by them. Nasty people generally have few
friends and often seem miserable. Moreover, people who have such abhorrent attitudes
often feel guilty and suffer as a result. So from a purely self-interested standpoint, it
seems a mistake to adopt such attitudes. Third, many of us want to be virtuous people.
We want to have the correct emotions and attitudes about things. And these desires
seem at odds with wanting innocent people to suffer and being pleased if they do. So if
we want to be virtuous we will naturally be inclined to think that there is something
wrong with taking these “positive” attitudes towards the misery of others.
Notice that I have just outlined three reasons why it would probably be
instrumentally bad to take pro attitudes towards the misery of the innocent. If we were
all to start wanting such stuff, and we were all to start being pleased by it, the world
would probably go to hell in a hand basket. We would probably behave badly, and we
would probably end up miserable ourselves. And our desires to be virtuous, as well as
many other desires, would probably be frustrated. But if we ignore all the
consequences, and focus just on the having of the relevant attitudes, it’s hard to see
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why, other things being equal
,
it would be contrary to our own interests to be pleased
and want such stuff. Of course it may very well be that the world would be intrinsically
worse if we had such attitudes; indeed many have objected to hedonism on these very
grounds. But it’s hard for me to see why we should think that, other things beinu
equal, we ourselves would not be better off adopting the attitudes I’ve been discussing.
If a person is stuck with the fact that p is the case, then, other things being equal
,
isn’t
he better off accepting that p is the case?
19
Indeed, if other things are equal, isn’t he
even better off if he can learn to like it or want it? I think so.
Finally, what about Pair 3? Would the Satisfaction-Life be better for Tom than
the Disinterested-Life? In the former life Tom wants to drink from the stream and he
does, so he gets a desire satisfaction there. In the Disinterested-Life Tom does not want
to drink from the stream and he does not drink from the stream. Is the existence of one
extra desire satisfaction sufficient to make the Satisfaction-Life better? Just as above,
we should note first that the Satisfaction-Life would certainly be no worse for Tom than
its pair mate: the Disinterested-Life. Given the stipulations of the case, then, it seems to
me that there is no reason to think that wanting something extra and getting it would be
worse for Tom. But would it be absurd to think it would be better?20
Let me try to explain my intuitions. Think of something that exists; let’s give it
a name, “E”. Now suppose that throughout the duration of its existence, E has no
desires; it never wants anything to be the case nor does it want anything to not be the
case; nothing at all “matters” to E one way or another. If the thing you’ve thought of is,
say, a stone these suppositions shouldn’t be too difficult. If on the other hand, what you
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initially thought of was a living person you happen to know, the task is perhaps more
problematic. Nevertheless, try to imagine the thing.
Now what I want to say about E is that I don’t think it is the kind of thing that
can be better oft or worse off. Absent any desire that things are one way rather than
another, I don’t see how it is even intelligible to say that E could, say, live the Good
Life. Any even remotely plausible candidates for constituents of the Good Life, it
seems to me, are worthless to a thing that has no desires. Indeed I think some of the
most promising candidates are such that a thing (or a person) could not even get them
unless he had some desires.
Consider pleasure. Is it possible for a thing with no desires to experience
pleasure? I don’t think so. Many philosophers have suggested an intimate connection
between desires and pleasures and pains . 21 And although I’m not aware of anyone who
gives a fully adequate analysis of pleasure or pain in terms of desires or their
satisfactions and frustrations, I think there is certainly something plausible about the
idea that pleasures/pains and desire satisfactions/frustrations are necessarily linked
somehow. Indeed, at least in spirit, I am pretty sympathetic to what I think Parfit means
when he says that “all pains are when experienced unwanted, and a pain is worse the
more it is unwanted. Similarly, all pleasures are when experienced wanted, and they are
better or greater the more they are wanted .... One of two experiences is more pleasant
if it is preferred .”
22
Now, I do not mean to suggest that every pleasant experience is wanted by the
person who gets it either before, during or after it occurs; nor do I want to suggest that
every painful experience is wanted not to occur either before, during or after it does
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occur. I’d just like to suggest that if an experience does not entail the satisfaction of any
desires whatsoever, we should not think of it as pleasant. When I experience some
pleasure I am in some specific sort of mental state. And it seems to me that if there is
absolutely nothing at all about being in that state that, while I am in it, I want and get.
we are mistaken in calling it a pleasure
.
23
Likewise, if there is nothing about an
experience that, while it is occurring, involves the frustration of some desire/s of mine, I
don t think we should think of it as a painful experience. Pain, by its very nature, I
think involves getting something or other that one wants not to get . 24
But what does all this have to do with Tom? Well, imagine, two new lives Tom
might live. In the first Tom has no desires whatsoever. So in this life Tom is more akin
to a stone than a normal person, and it seems to me that the most we can say about
Tom s level of well-being in this life is that it is completely neutral, just as a stone’s
level of “well-being” is neutral. In the second life, Tom has one desire; he wants to
drink from the stream; and this desire is satisfied. Now it seems to me that because in
this second life Tom has an interest about the way something is, he is the type of thing
that can fare poorly or well. And because things are exactly as he would like them to be
in this second life, he is better of! than he would be if he had no desire satisfactions at
all. So I think, other things being equal desire satisfactions improve lives. And I think,
therefore, that since the Satisfaction-Life has an extra desire satisfaction, it would be
better for Tom than the Disinterested-Life.
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Conclusion
As the reader has surely surmised by now, I think that in some fundamental way
it is because we want things that it possible for us to fare poorly or well. And it seems
to me that wanting things might very well be just what unites all of the various sorts of
things that can be better or worse off. Stones on the ground don’t want things and so
they can't do well or poorly. But I want things and I can fare well or poorly. So too
with my dog and my cats. Indeed I think the small oak tree in my backyard might very
well want things too. And this might be why it makes sense to say that the tree is doing
well. It s getting everything it wants: enough light, just enough water, and fertile soil . 25
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Carson writes: “When our actual desires are ill informed or the result of false beliefs,
satisfying them can be bad or harmful for us. Suppose that I am thirsty and desire to
drink water from a stream, not knowing that it was poisoned by a chemical leak at a
nearby factory. I will die if I drink from the stream. Satisfying my desire to drink from
the stream would clearly be bad for me.” Carson (2000), p.72.
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There is one more relevant fact we might want to consider: Tom’s desire is merely
extrinsic. And it might be suggested that the real problem for PIP here stems from this
fact. Indeed some philosophers seem to suggest that the real lesson of cases such as
Tom’s is that if we are desire satisfactionists, we ought not suppose that satisfactions of
merely extrinsic desires are intrinsically good for those who get them. See Griffin
(1986), p. 12 and Fehige (2000), p. 255. Discussion of this matter raises some side
issues that would take me off the present topic.
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In much that follows, when I talk about what people want and talk about desire
satisfactions and frustrations, I will describe what’s going on in elliptical terms. I will
often omit specific mention of the relevant desire intensities; and I will often omit
relevant temporal information as well. For example, when I characterize Tom’s desire
satisfaction as (1), I make no mention of when exactly he has the desire in question, I
make no mention of precisely how intense his desire is, and I don’t specify whether
Tom wants it to be the case that he drinks from the stream now, later, at 12PM, or at
some other time, etc. I assume however, that a fully accurate description of a
desiderative situation such as Tom’s would convey a pretty hefty amount of
information about such things. In what follows, I will mention such information only
when it is relevant to the topic at hand.
6
See for example Parfit (1984), p.499.
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1 discuss desires for self-sacrifice in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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Richard Brandt repeatedly makes suggestions along these lines. See for example
Brandt (1998), p. 1 13 and p. 268.
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See Rawls (1999), pp.358-359.
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For an interesting related discussion see Murphy (1999), pp. 250-256.
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Various philosophers say similar things. Robert Merrihew Adams writes- “But I
think the substitution of hypothetical for actual desires is likely to undermine any
advantage there may be in defining what is good or desirable for me in terms of my own
desires. The acquisition of an understanding of reality that would be ideally adequate
for decision making would change me quite drastically—so drastically, indeed that Idoubt that the question, what I would want if I had such an understanding, has a moral
importance very different from that of the question, what another, better informed
person would want if he were in my position, or what he would want for me if he loved
me. Adams ( 1 999), p. 86. David Sobel writes: “The idealization process turns us into
such different creatures that it would be surprising if the well-being of the two of us. my
informed self and my ordinary self, consisted in the same things.” Sobel (1994). p. 793
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3
See Chapter 8 where I discuss the intuition that pleasures are intrinsically good for
those who get them.
The kind of comparison I am suggesting here involves contrast cases relevantly
similar to those discussed by Shelly Kagan in his “The Additive Fallacy”. And
although I am sympathetic to much of what he says about such cases, I don’t think that
what he says has much relevance to what I want to say about Tom’s case. My purpose
here is simply to make my own intuitions about Tom's case clearer to the reader. And
although I have similar intuitions about other cases, cases relevantly similar to Tom’s,
my discussion of Tom’s case is not meant to “prove” anything about these other cases.
And it is certainly not meant to “prove” that all desire satisfactions are intrinsically
good for those who get them. If, however, the reader’s intuitions are swayed in my
direction by what I say, that’s fine with me. If they are not, that’s fine with me too. See
Kagan (1998).
15
But how, someone might ask, could Tom be poisoned in the Frustration-Life if he
never drinks from the stream? My answer is this: in the Frustration-Life (4) simply
occurs in exactly the same way that it occurs in the Satisfaction-Life; the only
difference is that in the Frustration-Life the occurrence of (4) is not preceded by the
occurrence of (3). Whatever event constitutes being poisoned, say, the failure of Tom’s
liver due to the presence of arsenic in Tom’s blood stream, happens in both lives. In the
Satisfaction-Life it happens because Tom drinks from the stream; in the Frustration-Life
it “just happens”. Of course given what I’ve just said, odds are that the Frustration-Life
occurs in a possible world with different natural laws than our own. In our world, being
poisoned doesn’t “just happen”. But so what? The Frustration-Life is a possible life,
and it is exactly similar in all the relevant ways to the Satisfaction-Life; so the
Frustration-Life is an appropriate candidate for the Betterness Test.
16
I’m fibbing here. I can think of reasons why someone would disagree with me. I
discuss many of these reasons in the chapters ahead.
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See Chapter 8 where I suggest that pleasures necessarily entail desire satisfactions.
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See Broad (1961), pp. 53-54; Brandt (1959), p.316; Brentano (1969), p. 90.
I think there is a famous prayer that contains a sentiment to this effect. It goes
something like this: God give me the serenity to accept things which cannot be changed;Give me courage to change things which must be changed; And the wisdom to
distinguish one from the other.
20
Thomas Scanlon suggests that it would be absurd. He writes: “A second problem for
desire theories concerns the way in which the fulfillment of various desires contributes
to well-being. One idea would be a “summative” conception according to which a
person's overall well-being is measured by the sum of his or her desires that are
fulfilled, that is to say, by the number of desires that are fulfilled, perhaps weighted by
their intensity and by the length of time they are held. But it does not seem that a
person s well-being is in fact always increased by increasing the number of desires or
even aims that he or she fulfills. If this were so then everyone would be advised to
adopt as many desires or aims as possible as long as these could be satisfied. This
seems absurd.” Scanlon (1998), p. 121.
21
See Chapter 8.
22
Parfit (1984), pp.493.
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See Chapter 8.
I might want the pain resulting from vigorous exercise because I believe in the slogan
no pain no gain. So I might want the aching sensation in my arm. I might take a
certain kind of “pro” attitude towards the fact that I have the sensation. But if there is
absolutely nothing whatsoever about the aching sensation that, while it is occurring, I
also want not to have, then I would rather not call the experience painful.
I’m not sure I want to say that plants have desires. In some moods I’m inclined to
think they do. In others. I’m afraid to think so. If plants have desires, then we might be
committed to saying that all living things have desires. And then I might be committed
to saying that all living things can live the “Good Life.” So I might end up having to
say that the malignant tumor in my friend’s lung is living a pretty great life; after all it’s
getting everything it “wants”. Moreover, if plants and tumors have desires, I might end
up being committed to the idea that plants and tumors are what Tom Regan calls moral
patients. See Regan (1983), Chapter 5. Or I might have to say that plants and tumors
have moral rights. I’m not sure what to say about these things. For a discussion of
“plant's rights” see Stone (1987), pp.220-226.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROBLEM OF REMOTE OBJECTS
Introduction
Suppose I meet a stranger who has what he believes to be a fatal disease. And
suppose that after chatting with him for a while my sympathy is aroused and I form a
desire for him to be cured. Also suppose that after our brief encounter the stranger and I
part ways and never meet again. Finally, suppose that many years later, in some distant
land, the stranger is indeed cured but that his cure has no effect on me at all; among
other things, it doesn t affect what I feel or what I think or what I do or what happens to
me. Is it goodfor me that the stranger is cured? Does his cure enhance my well-being?
My guess is that most would answer both questions in the negative. And I
suspect that many would say something to the effect that the stranger’s cure has nothing
at all to do with me, let alone my well-being, and so it would not be good for me if he is
cured. Indeed among philosophers writing about well-being, the consensus seems to be
that desires such as mine show us that we should reject so called unrestricted desire
satisfaction accounts of well-being, such as ADS, because they entail, among other
things, that a person’s welfare can be enhanced merely by getting what he wants, even
when the thing he wants has nothing to do with him. While discussing such an account
of well-being, Thomas Scanlon objects as follows:
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Since one can have a desire about almost anything, this makes an
implausibly broad range of considerations count as determinants of a
person’s well-being. Someone might have a desire about the chemical
composition of some star, about whether blue was Napoleon’s favorite
color, or about whether Julius Caesar was an honest man. But it would
be odd to suggest that the well-being of a person who has such desires is
affected by these facts themselves
... The fact that some distant star is
made up of the elements I would like it to be made of does not seem to
make my life better.
The problem here revolves around the fact that we sometimes have desires with
what we might call remote objects. These are states of affairs that are, in some obvious
sense, beyond the boundaries of what we would ordinarily think of as relevant to well-
being. For present, we can say that a state of affairs counts as a remote object provided
that it entails nothing about the person who desires it (it does not entail that he is this
way rather than that, or even that he exists), and its occurrence would not affect him in
any way; it would not be a link in any causal chain of events that ultimately terminates
with an event involving him. The problem of remote objects is, then, this: unrestricted
desire satisfaction accounts of well-being entail that all desire satisfactions are
intrinsically good for us and all frustrations are intrinsically bad for us. They entail,
therefore, that all remote-object satisfactions are intrinsically good for us and all such
frustrations are intrinsically bad. So among other things, such accounts entail that I
would get something that is intrinsically good for me if the stranger is cured, and most
people apparently find this kind of entailment counterintuitive.
To handle the problem of remote objects, someone sympathetic to desire
satisfaction accounts of well-being could make one of several moves. He could grant
that desire satisfactions involving remote objects are not intrinsically good for us and
67
suggest a way that we might restrict the class of desires whose satisfactions count as
good for us only to those that do not have remote objects. I think Derek Parfit makes
such a suggestion in the form of what he calls The Success Theory according to which
one's well-being is determined by the satisfactions and frustrations of his desires “about
his own life”.
2
According to this sort of view, satisfaction of my desire about the
stranger wouldn’t be intrinsically good for me because the object of my desire is not
about my own life; if anything, it is about the stranger’s. A more radical sort of
suggestion about how we might avoid the problem of remote objects is given by Wayne
Sumner who suggests that we might want to modify unrestricted satisfaction accounts
by adding some kind of experience requirement. He says things to suggest that we
might want to move towards a theory something like this: x is intrinsically good for a
person, S, provided that (a) S desires x, (b) x occurs, and (c) S is at least aware of x’s
occurrence. On this sort of view, the satisfaction of my desire about the stranger
wouldn’t be intrinsically good for me because I am never aware that it occurs . 4
So one way to deal with the problem of remote objects is to work around it. But
another way to handle the problem is to take it head on and deny that we have good
reason to think that remote-object satisfactions are not intrinsically good for us. This
last approach is what I’d like to explore in the present chapter. More specifically, I
want to explore some of what I take to be the most obvious reasons for thinking that
remote-object satisfactions are not intrinsically good for us. And since I believe that
such satisfactions are intrinsically good for us, one goal will be to dismiss these reasons.
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But I also want to discuss some reasons for thinking that remote-object satisfactions are
intrinsically good for us. In the end, my main goal is just to take some sting out of the
problem of remote objects and hopefully make desire satisfaction accounts of well-
being such as ADS seem a bit more plausible.
In what follows I consider five reasons for thinking that some, if not all, remote-
object satisfaction are not intrinsically good for us: (1) remote objects “have nothing to
do with the people who desire them; (2) remote-object satisfactions fail, when they
occur, to make a difference in our mental states; (3) remote-object satisfactions fail,
when they occur, to make a difference in our intrinsic properties; (4) some remote-
objects fail to play significant roles in our lives; (5) no desire satisfactions are
intrinsically good for us. After discussing each of these reasons, I conclude by saying a
tew words about why I think remote-object satisfactions, and desire satisfactions more
generally, are intrinsically good for us.
Irrelevant Objects
One reason for doubting the value of remote-object satisfactions revolves around
the fact that remote objects themselves have nothing to do with the people who desire
them. Consider the following state of affairs:
(S 1 ) The stranger is cured
This state of affairs is the object of my desire about the stranger mentioned
above, and in several obvious senses it has nothing to do with me. For one thing, it
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doesn’t entail anything about me\ among other things, it doesn’t entail anything about
what I feel, or what I think, what I do, what happens to me, or even that I exist.
Moreover, as a contingent matter, (SI) doesn’t cause anything involving me; that is, the
stranger s cure has no effect on any events involving me; his cure doesn't, for example,
trigger a chain of events that ultimately results in my being aware that he has been cured
or in my being happy that he has been cured. So in a couple of obvious senses, (SI) has
nothing to do with me: it entails nothing about me and its occurrence doesn’t affect me.
But what should we conclude from these facts?
We might conclude that these facts about (SI) themselves entail that the
satisfaction of my desire for (SI) would not be intrinsically good for me. But I think
this conclusion is a mistake. As I see it, if a thing is intrinsically good for a person, it
has a kind ot value that supervenes on its intrinsic properties, and not on the properties,
intrinsic or extrinsic, of some distinct thing. And the satisfaction of my desire for (SI)
is something distinct from the occurrence of (SI) itself. On my view, satisfaction of my
desire about the stranger occurs only provided that the following state of affairs occurs:
(S2) Mark wants the stranger to be cured & the stranger is cured.
Granted, (SI) is entailed by (S2). But since (SI) and (S2) are distinct, (S2) has
properties that (SI) lacks. We cannot conclude therefore that the value of (S2) will be
determined merely by the properties of (SI). So although (SI) has various properties
that might lead us to think that it has nothing to do with me and that perhaps its
occurrence would not be intrinsically good for me, the fact that (SI) has these properties
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does not itself entail that (S2) would not be intrinsically good for me. Moreover, (S2)
clearly does have something to do with me.
Mental States
If we talk seriously about what distinguishes a normal, living person from, say, a
stone on the ground, one thing we are likely to mention is the person’s mental life. A
person has thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires, etc. A stone has none of these things.
And it s no wonder, therefore, that we never concern ourselves with the “well-being” of
a stone. We never worry about hurting a stone’s feelings or whether moving a stone
from here to there would be in its best interests. We never worry about these things, I
think, in part because we know that stones have nothing even remotely resembling
mental lives, and so they have no interests that could be promoted or harmed. But
people are obviously a ditterent matter. We have interests. Things can harm or benefit
us. Things can be good or bad for us. And I think it is reasonable to suppose that there
is some intimate connection between a person s various mental states and how well he
fares in life. Indeed many suppose that well-being supervenes entirely on mental states.
Consider a typical hedonistic theory of well-being according to which one’s
well-being is determined entirely by the pleasant and painful experiences one has.
Since it is likely that pains and pleasures ultimately boil down to mental states, most
hedonists, like many others, will suggest that well-being supervenes entirely on mental
states. Accordingly, if I live well in one possible life and not so well in another, the
difference in my well-being from one life to the other must be owing to a difference in
my mental states from life to life. But now consider my desire about the diseased
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stranger. His being cured would make no difference to my mental states. Granted.
satisfaction ofmy desire about the stranger does entail something about my mental
states; it entails that I have a desire, and presumably this involves my mental states. But
with respect to my mental states, the satisfaction ofmy desire would be no different
than its frustration. Consider the following state of affairs:
(S3) Mark wants the stranger to be cured & the stranger is not
cured.
As I see it, the occurrence of (S3) would constitute the frustration of my desire
about the stranger. But (S3) entails exactly the same thing about my mental states that
(S2) does. So with respect to my mental states, getting what I want is no different than
failing to get it.
5
Those sympathetic to mental state accounts of well-being will
theiefore claim that since satisfaction ot my desire about the stranger would make no
difference in my mental states, it would not be intrinsically good for me.
While it is true that the satisfaction of my desire would not make any difference
in my mental states, it is not entirely obvious that this fact alone would render the
satisfaction valueless to me. As a number of philosophers, and ordinary folk, have
suggested, there seem to be cases in which one’s well-being is affected by things that
make no difference whatsoever to one’s mental states. Examples of such cases crop up
frequently in the literature surrounding the possibility of posthumous harm and benefit.
Thomas Nagel, for example, suggests that it would be good for me if the executor of my
will abides by my wishes once I am gone. 6 And surely if the executor does this, it
would not make a bit of difference in any of my mental states; once I’m dead I have no
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more mental states. Consider another example. Suppose a woman, Judy, devotes thirty
years of her life to the furtherance of certain ideals and ambitions in the form of one
vast undertaking. She founds an institution dedicated to these ends and works single-
mindedly for its advancement, both for the sake of the social good she believes it to
promote, and for the sake of her own glory. One month before she dies, the “empire of
her hopes” collapses utterly as the establishment into which she has poured her life's
energies crumbles into ruin, and she is personally disgraced. She never learns the
unhappy truth, however, as her friends, eager to save her from disappointment, conceal
or misrepresent the facts. She dies unaware of her disgrace . 7 Now, it is certainly not
wildly implausible to think that Judy’s life was made worse (for her) by her disgrace
and the ruin of her life’s work. It would have been better for her if she had not been
disgraced and her life’s work had not been ruined.
Somewhat less controversial examples involve what goes on behind our backs
while we are still alive. Hare, Nagel and others have given us examples of this sort. In
his book Harm to Others
,
Joel Feinberg persuasively suggests that, indeed, what I don’t
know can hurt me:
If someone spreads a libelous description of me among a group whose
good opinion I covet and cherish, altogether without my knowledge, I
have been injured in virtue of the harm done my interest in a good
reputation, even though I never learn what has happened. That is
because I have an interest, so I believe, in having a good reputation as
such, in addition to my interest in avoiding hurt feelings,
embarrassment, and economic injury. And that interest can be
seriously harmed without my ever learning of it .
8
The examples given by Feinberg and others play on the widespread intuition that
there is more to the good life than merely having experiences of the right sort. When it
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comes to the things that matter to us, most of us don’t merely what to experience that
things are thus-and-so; we want them to actually be thus-and-so 9 Most us don’t want
merely to be in the mental states typically associated with having a good reputation; we
want to actually have a good reputation. And so it seems reasonable to think that if
someone wants a good reputation, then other things being equal he’s better off getting
it, whether getting it affects his mental states or not. And if thus getting the good
reputation one wants could, on its own, enhance or diminish the quality of one’s life
without making a difference in mental states, then even though the satisfaction of my
desire about the diseased stranger would not make any difference in any of my mental
states, it is not entirely obvious that this fact alone is sufficient to render the satisfaction
ot no intrinsic value to me. Of course those sympathetic to mental-state theories will
warn against taking any comfort in the kinds of examples given by Nagel and Feinberg.
Some will claim that these examples fail to show that there are things intrinsically good
or bad for us that don't ultimately make some difference in our mental states. They
could simply deny the intuitions that support such examples or instead try to explain
them away. Either way, though, the onus is on the mental-state theorist to deny or
explain away what I take to be some pretty strong intuitions.
Intrinsic Properties
But even if we grant that a person’s well-being might not ultimately supervene
entirely on facts about his mental states, one might insist that it must supervene on at
least some of his states. Surely, some will say, if there is a difference in a person’s
well-being from one possible world to another, it must be a difference in the state of the
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person that determines this difference, something about the person must be different
from one world to the other. And if the diseased stranger recovers, this will certainly
make a difference in him
,
but not in me.
For variety s sake, let s consider another example. Imagine two possible worlds
that differ only with respect to the existence of a single atom. In world A the total
number of atoms is prime whereas in world B the number is not prime. Suppose also
that in both worlds I want the total number to be prime; in world A, therefore, my desire
is satisfied and in world B it is frustrated. And if it’s intrinsically good for me to get
what I want, then I lead a better life (with respect to my welfare) in world A than in
world B. But the only difference between the two lives is that one takes place in a
world with an extra atom. And assuming that the extra atom is not inside me, this is a
difference in the world around me, not in me; the difference is entirely external to me.
Not only don’t my mental states differ from world to world, but none of my other states
differ either; nothing about me differs. And so we might conclude that it would not be
intrinsically good for me if my desire about the atoms were satisfied, and we might
reach a similar conclusion about my desire regarding the stranger.
Of course the central idea here is that a difference in someone’s well-being must
entail at least some difference in his intrinsic properties. Shelly Kagan discusses this
idea at some length in his essay “The Limits of Well-Being .” 10 And although he
concludes in the end that he has no argument to show the idea to be true, he says that he
nevertheless finds it to be “overwhelmingly plausible”. I admit there is a whiff of
plausibility lingering about, but I wouldn’t go so far as to say it is overwhelming.
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Consider what Kagan says: ‘'Increasing well-being is providing an intrinsic,
ultimate benefit to the person; thus, it would have to involve altering the person’s
intrinsic properties. Since a person just is his body and mind, changes in well-being
would have to involve changes in the person’s body or mind.” Now although I agree
with Kagan that an increase in a person’s well-being is intrinsically good for him. I
don’t think it follows that such an increase entails a change in his intrinsic properties.
Let me explain.
I am sympathetic to the Moorean conception of intrinsic value according to
which a thing’s intrinsic value supervenes on its intrinsic properties. So I have no
problem saying that if a person has intrinsic value, this value supervenes on his intrinsic
properties. And I have no problem saying that if person’s life has intrinsic value, its
value supervenes on its intrinsic properties. But we need to keep in mind that a person
and his life are two distinct things: a person is probably just a physical object while his
life is probably best understood as an event. And as I see it, assessments of a person’s
well-being are best understood as assessments of how intrinsically good his life is for
him, or how intrinsically good some part of his life is for him. So although I think that a
person s well-being does ultimately supervene on intrinsic properties, I think the
relevant properties are not properties of the person; rather, they are the intrinsic
properties of his life. 1
1
Let me elaborate.
Imagine a duplicate of yours who exists as the sole inhabitant of his own
possible world. You and he are very similar in a number of ways. There is a one-to-
one correspondence between your parts and his, and all of the relations that obtain
between your parts also obtain between his. But although you and he share exactly the
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same intrinsic properties, your lives are quite different. You might read philosophy
books, ride a motorcycle, build things from wood and teach philosophy courses. Your
duplicate, although he shares all your intrinsic properties, does none of these things.
You might have children and a house and a car. He has none of these things. You
might live in the United States, on earth, in the Milky Way. He lives in none of these
places. The differences go on and on. So although you and your duplicate share the
same intrinsic character, your lives do not.
But what makes up the intrinsic character of a person’s life? I can't say exactly,
but I think the intrinsic character of a person’s life at some world is determined, to a
large degree, by many of the relational properties that he has at that world. So it is, for
instance, an intrinsic property of my life in the actual world that I am now in St. Louis.
This of course is not an intrinsic property of mine, but it is an intrinsic property of my
life. My being in St. Louis now is part of what makes my life the life it is. A life that is
"just like” the one I am now living - a duplicate life, if you will - would involve my
being in St. Louis now. And my being in St. Louis now is certainly something that a
thorough biographer ought not leave out of his story. So it seems to me that this
relational property of mine ought to count towards determining the intrinsic character of
my life. But what other relational properties of mine should count?
Although I am in no position to give a complete answer to this question, I do
think that the cognitive relations I enter into ought to count. It seems to me that if we
are to give the full story of a person’s life at a world, we ought to mention, for instance,
what he believes at that world and whether his beliefs are true or false at that world.
And we ought mention what he wants at that world and whether what he wants is the
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case at that world. These are just the sorts of thing that make a real difference in the
character of a person’s life. The fact that your duplicate might falsely think he is
reading a philosophy paper at the moment is a relevant fact about his life that
distinguishes it from your lite, a life in which you actually are reading a philosophy
paper.
Consider the example mentioned above involving my desire about the number
of atoms in the universe. When we describe the intrinsic character of my life in world
A we ought to include the fact that in that world I bear the desiring relation to the true
state of affairs the number ofatoms in the universe is prime. Indeed I think that it is this
relation alone that distinguishes the intrinsic character of my life in world A from that
of my life in world B, a world where I do not bear the desiring relation to this true state
of affairs. So in world A my life has an intrinsic property that it lacks in world B. And
I can say, therefore, that the difference in intrinsic value that I think these lives would
have for me would indeed be owing to a difference in the intrinsic properties of the two
lives .
12
In the end, therefore, although I agree with Kagan that well-being supervenes
on intrinsic properties, I do not agree that the relevant properties are those of the person
involved; rather, they are the intrinsic properties of his life. Specifically, I think they
are the desire satisfactions and frustrations that his life contains. And it seems to me
therefore that although some desire satisfactions don’t make a difference in the intrinsic
properties of the desirer, this does not entail that these same desire satisfactions are not
intrinsically good for him. So even though satisfaction of my desire about the stranger
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wouldn't make a difference in my intrinsic properties, I don’t think this entails that it
wouldn't be intrinsically good for me to get what I want.
Importance
Even if we grant that (i) well-being does not supervene entirely on mental states,
and (ii) well-being supervenes on the intrinsic character of a person’s life, not the
person, and (iii) the intrinsic character of a person’s life at a world is determined in part
by what he wants and gets (or fails to get) at that world, we might nevertheless be
reluctant to say that remote-object satisfactions are intrinsically good for us. For if we
do, we are stuck having to admit that the satisfaction of my desire about the stranger
would be intrinsically good for me. But if we accept (i), (ii), and (iii), then what
grounds are left for denying the value of my satisfaction? Is there something else about
the stranger’s cure that would make the satisfaction of my desire worthless?
Near the beginning of this chapter, I characterized remote objects as states of
affairs that (a) entail nothing about those who desire them, and (b) fail, when they
occur, to affect those who desire them. Then I went on to introduce several examples of
such objects: the stranger is cured, and the total number ofatoms in the universe is
prime. With respect to me, I characterize these objects as remote because they satisfy
both (a) and (b). But both objects are remote in another respect as well, a respect that I
have thus far neglected to mention. Although I want the stranger to be cured and I want
the total number of atoms to be prime, neither one of these things is very important to
me. I don’t try to bring either about and nothing else of importance to me is riding on
whether either is the case. So even though I want them to occur, these states of affairs
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are at best on the remote fringes of those things that we would ordinarily characterize as
important to me. And we might therefore conclude that the relevant satisfactions would
not be intrinsically good for me.
I think James Griffin says some things to suggest that he would agree with such
a conclusion regarding my case because, indeed, the objects of my desires are not
sufficiently important to me. While discussing matters closely related to our present
topic, Griffin asks us to imagine that he has a desire about an ambitious stranger he has
met on a train. We are to suppose that Griffin wants the stranger to succeed with his
plans. Like my desire about the diseased stranger, Griffin’s desire has a remote object;
the stranger’s success entails nothing about Griffin and it would not affect him in any
way. Moreover, the stranger’s success is not important to him. Griffin then contrasts
his desire about the stranger with another desire he has about his own children. And he
suggests that unlike the former desire, the latter enters into his life in a way that would
render its satisfaction of some value to him. He writes: “Think of the difference
between my desire that the stranger succeed and my desire that my children prosper. I
want both, but they enter into my life in different ways. The first desire does not
become one of my aims. The second desire, on the other hand, is one of my central
1
ends, on the achievement of which the success of my life will turn.”
Griffin’s words suggest a kind of compromise position we might want to take
regarding desire satisfactions such as mine involving the stranger. We might want to
distinguish between objects of desire that are central ends and those that we merely
want. And we might want to say that satisfactions involving central ends are
intrinsically good for us, even if the relevant objects would fail to make any differences
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in our mental states or intrinsic properties, etc. But we could deny the value of such
satisfactions that involve things we merely want. A compromise along these lines
would allow us to say, for instance, that satisfaction of Griffin’s desire about the
stranger would not be intrinsically good for him because the stranger’s success is not
sufficiently important to him, because it is not one of his central ends. And for similar
reasons we could deny the value of satisfying my desire about the diseased stranger.
But the compromise would also allow us to say that satisfaction of Griffin’s desire
about his children would be intrinsically good for him because his children’s prospering
is very important to him and is one of his central ends
,
even though his children’s
prospering might occur after he no longer exists. And being able to say all these things
does have some appeal, so the suggested compromise is not entirely without merit . 14
But in order for such a compromise to get off the ground, we would of course
need to say some more about how to distinguish between things that are central ends
and things that are not. Some things that I want are correctly described as central ends
of mine; others aren’t. How do we distinguish the central ends from the others? One
proposal involves an appeal to facts about intensities. We might suggest that a state of
affairs counts as central end of mine provided that my desire for it is sufficiently
intense. Other things I want would not count as central ends of mine because the
relevant desires are not sufficiently intense. But even if we are able to make sense of
“sufficiently intense” here, this kind of simple appeal to intensities seems problematic.
At the moment, I intensely want to finish my dissertation. This is certainly a central end
of mine; it is something I hope to achieve. But I also intensely want the earth to
continue in its orbit around the sun for the next few days. But the earth continues in its
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°rbU does not seem t0 be best described as one ofmy central ends, or indeed as an end
of any kind. I do not hope to achieve anything regarding how the sun moves. Although
I have two very intense desires here, one involves a central end of mine and the other
does not. We cannot, therefore, distinguish between central ends and mere wants by a
simple appeal to intensity such as the one just suggested.
Perhaps we should say that central ends are intensely desired states of affairs in
which the person doing the desiring brings something about. So Markfinishes his
dissertation counts as a central end of mine because it is something I intensely want and
it involves me making something happen. We could then say that although I intensely
want the sun to continue in its orbit, its continuing is not a central end of mine because
the sun continues in its orbit does not involve me bringing anything about. It seems to
me that characterizing central ends in the way just suggested is rather promising. I
think something along these lines is right. The gist of the difference between central
ends and things we merely want seems to involve the having of intense desires about
what one does and not merely about what occurs. But if we characterize central ends in
some way along these lines, where does it get us? Does it help dissipate any of the
intuitive stench lingering about the problem of desires with remote objects? Consider
again my desire about the stranger. Because I think that all desire satisfactions are
intrinsically good for those who get them, I want to say that it would be intrinsically
good for me if the following were to occur:
(S2) Mark wants the stranger to be cured and the stranger is cured.
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Now let's consider the view that (S2) would not be intrinsically good for me
because the stranger’s cure is not a central end of mine. According to this view, being a
central end makes a difference. So according to this view, it would be intrinsically good
for me if the following were to occur:
(S3) Mark intensely wants to bring about the stranger’s cure and Mark brings
about the stranger’s cure.
If the stranger’s cure becomes something other than a mere desire of mine and
becomes something I intensely want to bring about, then this is alleged to make a
difference. It is alleged that if I now get what I want, then a central end of mine has
been achieved and I get something intrinsically good for me - namely, the occurrence
of (S3). But is there really a relevant difference here? Suppose that after chatting with
the stranger, his cure becomes a central end of mine. Suppose I intensely want to bring
it about that he is cured. Suppose I offer him some encouraging words in an attempt to
lift his spirits and thereby increase his odds of beating his disease. Suppose that we part
ways and that a few days later, while enrolling in medical school so that I might learn
more ways to help the stranger, I choke on a chicken bone and die. Suppose that years
later, in some distant land, the stranger recalls our brief meeting and thinks about what I
said to him. Suppose the recollection makes him happy. Suppose his happiness snaps
him out of a suicidal depression and causes him to take his medicine. Suppose he is
thereby cured. Suppose that had he not recalled my words he would never have been
cured. Has my central end been achieved?
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Well, given that my comforting words are a link in a causal chain that ultimately
results in the stranger s cure, it seems that my end has been achieved. At one time I
intensely wanted to bring about the stranger’s cure; it was a central end of mine. I did
some things in an attempt to bring about the stranger’s cure; the things I did ultimately
worked, albeit after I ceased to exist. Will those who are inclined to deny the value of
(S2) be any less inclined to deny the value of (S3)? Perhaps, but I don’t know why. If
one thinks that the stranger s cure is irrelevant to my well-being in the case where his
cure is merely something I want, then I don’t see why one should think that things
would be different in the case where his cure is a central end of mine. In neither case do
I learn of the stranger’s cure; in neither case does his cure affect what happens to me or
what I do or what feel or think. So why think there is any difference? So it seems to
me that we ought to make one of two moves here. We should either say that both (S2)
and (S3) are worthless, or we should just bite the bullet and say that both would be
intrinsically good for me. Of course it would still be open to us to say that desire
satisfactions involving central ends are generally better for us than those involving mere
wants. But we could explain this by appeal to the fact that when something is a central
end it is generally wanted with greater intensity than when it is merely wanted.
Worthless Satisfactions
Another reason for doubting the value of remote-object satisfactions might stem
from one’s attitude towards the value of satisfactions generally. For whatever reason,
we might think that no desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for us, and we might
think that remote-object satisfactions are no exception. If, for example, we are dyed-in-
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the-wool hedonists, then, strictly speaking, we deny the value of remote-object
satisfactions not because the objects involved are remote, because they fail to entail any
pleasure or pain for the desirer, but because they themselves are not episodes of pain or
pleasure. The remoteness of any objects involved is really irrelevant.
Suppose I want to feel some pleasure. So if my desire were satisfied, the
following state of affairs occurs: (S4) Mark wants to feel pleasure & Mark feels
pleasure. Now a hedonist might say that (S4) would be intrinsically good for me (if it
were to occur), but what he means is that the following would be intrinsically good for
me: (S5) Mark feels pleasure. In other words, any value to be had in my getting the
pleasure I want stems not from the fact that I want the pleasure; rather, it stems entirely
from the fact that I get it. Wanting and getting a pleasure is no better for me that simply
getting the pleasure. To a hedonist, desire satisfactions just don’t matter, whether their
objects have hedonic entailments or not. Hedonists deny the value of remote-object
satisfactions not because the objects involved are remote but because they believe all
desire satisfactions are worthless.
I think similar things can be said about other accounts of well-being as well. I
think that most “objective list” theorists, for example, will deny the value of remote-
object satisfactions not because the objects involved are remote but because getting
what one wants does not appear on their “objective lists” along with, say, engaging in
rational activity, acquiring knowledge, and being a goodparent }' For these objective
list theorists, remote-object satisfactions fail to have value not because they are remote-
object satisfactions but simply because they are satisfactions. Similar things can be said
about so called perfectionist and eudaimonist theories of well-being.
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So what can I say to those who deny the value of not only remote-object
satisfactions but all satisfactions? One thing I could do is spell out a full-fledged
version of unrestricted desire satisfactionism and explain why I think it is superior to all
competing theories of well-being. But of course this would do little to alter the gut
intuitions of those who think it self-evident that desire satisfactions are worthless.
Moreover, such a project is beyond the scope of the present chapter. I will, therefore,
settle for doing something more modest. I will say a few words about my gut intuitions
regarding the value of desire satisfactions generally and remote-object satisfactions in
particular.
Conclusion
Axiology is a tricky business. Some parts of the job are relatively easy while
others are much more difficult. If someone proposes that all things of type x are
intrinsically good for us, it is usually a relatively easy matter to come up with
counterexamples. I don’t know of any serious (non-trivial) axiology that is bullet proof.
So playing the gunslinger is easy. A much tougher part of the job is establishing that
some given axiology is true. How does one “prove” that, say, pleasures or desire
satisfactions are intrinsically good for us? I don’t think one can. I think the best we can
do is try to show how our favorite axiology matches up with the gut intuitions of our
audience. Beyond this, I think we are left with poetry. So let me now briefly appeal to
the gut intuitions of my reader and see if some of them don’t match up with my own.
First, it seems self-evident to me that other things being equal , we are better off
getting what we want. As I said near the beginning of this dissertation, I think that if a
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person wants something, we have prima facie reason for thinking he’d be better off
getting it. That is, if a person wants something, then absent any reason to think that
getting it would be worse for him than not getting it, we have reason to think it would
be better tor him to get it. After all, I think wanting a things is assigning value to its
being the case. And so if someone gets what he wants, he gets something he values.
And other things being equal, we’re better off getting what we value.
Second, I believe that when we evaluate how well someone’s life is going for
him we need to take into account his particular interests. We need to think about what
he values, what’s important to him. We need to ask whether he is getting what he wants
out of life. When I wonder about my father’s quality of life, I never wonder about how
well his duck hunting career is going because he never hunts ducks and has no interest
in doing so. My father does not want to kill ducks and he has no desire for a duck
hunting career. So it would be silly for me to think that his well-being is in some way
determined by his successes or failures as a duck hunter. Duck hunting just doesn’t
matter to him. And it would be just as silly to wonder about other things that he doesn’t
care about, say for example, his level of fluency in the Klingon language. When
wondering about how well my father’s life is going for him, I should concern myself
only with the things that matter to him. And I think what distinguishes these things
from other things is ultimately a matter of what my father wants.
My father wants world peace. He wants to enjoy himself, and he wants to avoid
pain. He wants to watch German-language television every morning. He wants a fat
bank account. And he wants people in the 24 century to levitate. Of course he wants
many other things too. And because he wants all these things I think it matters to his
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quality of life whether they occur or not. Why? Because I think we are always better
olf, other things being equal, getting what we want
.
16 Why? Because desire
satisfactions are intrinsically good for us and frustrations are intrinsically bad for us.
even when the relevant objects are remote. These are my intuitions.
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Griffin (2002), p. 21.
14 A different compromise position along similar lines is also suggested, I think, by
some things Thomas Scanlon says in his What we Owe Each other. Scanlon writes, for
example, that “the fulfillment of a person’s desire that a distant star should have a
certain chemical composition would not, normally, contribute to that person’s well-
being, but that things might have been different if the person were an astronomer who
had devoted his or her life to the development of a theory that would be confirmed or
refuted by this evidence.” He then goes on to suggest, I think, that the object of the
astronomer’s desire, unlike that of the ordinary person who wants the star to be
composed of such-and-such, is one of his rational aims
,
and that “when something
becomes one of a person’s rational aims it thereby becomes something that affects how
his or her life goes.” See Scanlon (1998), pp. 120-121.
15
For an interesting discussion of objective list theories, see Parfit (1984), pp. 499-502.
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CHAPTER 4
SELF SACRIFICE
Introduction
ADS is a form ot Desire Satisfactionism (DS), the view that one’s well-being is
determined entirely by the satisfactions and frustrations of one’s desires. Over the years
a number of philosophers have suggested that this view is incompatible with our
ordinary intuitions about self-sacrifice. 1 It has been argued variously that DS “renders
the concept of self-sacrifice incoherent,”2 or that it has the “preposterous consequence”
that we are better off for sacrificing our own self-interest,3 or that it commits us to the
“dogmatic and counterintuitive”4 claim that we benefit from self-sacrifice, or that it
doesn't “make enough conceptual room” for self-sacrifice. 5 In light of its apparently
outlandish consequences, the consensus seems to be that we ought to either reject DS
completely or take great care in formulating it so as to exclude the satisfaction of “non-
self regarding” desires from counting towards a person’s well-being. Although such
attacks against DS are usually delivered with admirable vigor, notwithstanding some
inflammatory rhetoric, I think most philosophers have wildly overstated the case against
DS. Indeed, I think DS is fully compatible with our ordinary intuitions about self-
sacrifice. And so I think DS has been given a bad rap, something I hope to correct in
the present chapter.
To make the discussion that follows clearer, it would probably help if we had a
formulation of DS that is slightly more substantial than the one given above. For
present purposes, there is no harm in thinking of DS as equivalent to ADS1, the
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simplest version of ADS presented in chapter 1 . Accordingly, we can think of DS as a
theory composed of two main parts. The first part is the value-theoretic component. It
tells us that (actual) desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for us and frustrations are
intrinsically bad for us, the values of satisfactions and frustrations being determined by
the intensities of the corresponding desires. More intense desires generate desire
satisfactions that are intrinsically better for us and they generate desire frustrations that
are intrinsically worse for us. The second part of DS is mechanical or structural. It tells
us how the values of satisfactions or frustrations combine to generate welfare levels that
can be ranked and compared. It says, in a nutshell, that the intrinsic value of a person’s
life, for him, is given by the sum of the values of all the satisfactions and frustrations it
contains; more satisfying lives are intrinsically better, and more frustrating lives are
intrinsically worse.
6
Now regarding self-sacrifice, it might appear that DS commits us to some rather
counter-intuitive things. For instance, it’s obvious that if I want to sacrifice my own
self-interest, then my self-interest is not promoted by getting what I want; therein lies
the sacrifice. But if DS is true, then it seems that getting what I want does promote my
self-interest, for it would be intrinsically good for me if my desire for self-sacrifice were
satisfied and intrinsically bad for me if it were frustrated. So on the face of it, it seems
that DS commits us to the view that we always benefit from sacrificing our own self-
interest. But things get worse for DS. Consider this: if I want to sacrifice my own well-
being, then according DS it would be intrinsically good for me to get what I want. But
how could it be intrinsically good for me to get what I want if what I want is, say, to be
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deprived of everything that is intrinsically good for me? This indeed seems paradoxical
and perhaps gives us grounds for rejecting DS.
To help us explore the present issues, I'd like to discuss three imaginary cases
involving a person wants to sacrifice his own self-interest. My main goal in discussinu
the first case is to show just that our ordinary intuitions about typical cases of self-
sacrifice do not preclude us from saying that sometimes getting what we want amounts
to genuine self-sacrifice and that we can benefit, in several ways, from getting what we
want in such cases. And moreover, the fact that we might benefit in such cases does not
require us to say that we “enhance” or “promote” our welfare by sacrificing our self-
interest. My main goal in discussing the second case is to show that we have good
reason to think that when we want self-sacrifice it is intrinsically good for us to get what
we want. My main goal in discussing the final case is to show that although DS does
entail that some kinds of self-sacrifice are impossible, this is not really a problem, for I
think (a) we have good reason to think that such self-sacrifice is not possible, and (b)
the impossibility of such self-sacrifice does not prevent us from saying anything
plausible we might ever want to say about self-sacrifice.
Self-Sacrifice: Case 1
The first case of self-sacrifice I'd like to discuss was inspired by Mark
Overvold. While discussing a form of DS that he describes as the prevailing view of
self-interest, Overvold says the following:
Consider an apparent case of self-sacrifice: An individual dies in an
effort to save another. Now it seems to me that it would be not only
incorrect, but unintelligible, to describe such a case as both a genuine
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instance of self-sacrifice and an act that enhances the individual's
welfare. Let this be our first constraint on the concept of self-interest:
The account of self-interest must not be so broad as to allow us to
describe the same act as a self-sacrifice and as an act that promotes the
agent's self-interest... In this way, the prevailing account of self-
interest or personal welfare renders the concept of self-sacrifice
incoherent
.
7
To see whether Overvoid’s words suggest a real problems for DS we should
flesh out his example a bit. Imagine a soldier, Larry, who finds himself standing next to
a foxhole containing several of his comrades. Suppose an enemy grenade suddenly flies
into the hole. Larry thinks quickly. He sees that unless someone throws himself on the
grenade everyone in the hole will be destroyed. But since Larry is not in the foxhole he
also realizes that he could easily save himself by merely stepping aside. Suppose
however that Larry forms a desire to throw himself on the grenade so as to save his
buddies in the foxhole. Moreover, suppose his desire is satisfied, he throws himself on
the grenade, takes the brunt of the blast and thereby saves his comrades. Imagine also
that in the process Larry is mortally wounded, but that he lingers on for several days in
a nearby army hospital before succumbing to his wounds and dying. Finally, imagine
that if Larry’s desire had not been satisfied, and he had not thrown himself on the
grenade, he would have gone on to live a long and satisfying life.
I think the first thing to note is that Larry’s case indeed illustrates a typical
instance of genuine self-sacrifice. Let me explain why. First, by getting what he wants,
Larry ends up being worse off than he would be otherwise. We may suppose that like
the rest of us Larry intensely wants to live a long and happy life; he wants pleasant
experiences; he wants to see his family again, and he no doubt wants a great many other
things as well. And since jumping on the grenade frustrates all these desires, that would
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otherwise be satisfied, satisfying his desire to jump leaves him worse off. Second,
Larry has alternatives open to him that would not leave him worse off, and he knows it.
It Larry were to refrain from jumping on the grenade and step aside instead, he would
save himself and go on to live a long and satisfying life. Yet because Larry wants to
benefit his friends, he is willing to accept a worse life for himself. So I don’t think we
would be mistaken in thinking that Larry’s getting what he wants would amount to
genuine self-sacrifice.
Also, it seems to me that Larry s case exemplifies the most typical kind of
(genuine) self-sacrifice we are likely to run into here on earth, in the actual world. I do
not mean that most typical cases of self-sacrifice involve people jumping on grenades;
rather, I mean that Larry’s case is typical because, although getting what he wants
would leave him worse off and he knows it, the object of Larry’s desire is not itself to
sacrifice his own well-being or harm himself. Rather, it is to jump on the grenade and
thereby save his comrades. If Larry could do both, save his comrades and preserve his
own well-being, he probably would. So Larry is like the mother who throws herself on
her child to protect it from theflames
,
and he is like the secret service agent who throws
himself in front of the bullet to save the president. And lest we think that all cases of
self-sacrifice involve someone throwing oneself somewhere, Larry is like the virgin
who flings herself into the volcano to protect her village from the monsoon god. All
these people, like most who sacrifice themselves, are motivated by something other than
their own harm, but they are willing to accept that they will be worse off as an
unfortunate consequence of getting what they want. And in part it is because of this
willing acceptance that we often call such people heroes.
96
At any rate, the fact that typical cases of self-sacrifice involve people who
accept that they will be hurt as a result of getting what they want shows that in most
such cases the down side of getting what one wants is instrumental. It would be
instrumentally bad for Larry if his desire to jump on the grenade were satisfied.
Jumping on the grenade would cause Larry to miss out on future goods; it would cause
him to get a less satisfying life. If it didn’t cause these things, and after jumping on the
grenade Larry went on to live a long, happy and all around fantastic life, then it’s hard
to see how getting what he wants would be bad for him at all, let alone constitute self-
sacrifice. But just as getting what he wants could, and indeed would, thus be
instrumentally bad for Larry because it would cause him to miss out on some goods
(satisfactions) and receive some evils (frustrations), I don’t see why we should think
that it couldn’t also cause him to get some goods. There is no reason to think that
getting what Larry wants could not both constitute genuine self-sacrifice and benefit
him instrumentally.
Indeed as I see it the satisfaction of Larry’s desire might very well be a mixed
bag of instrumental goods and evils. On the one hand, it would certainly be
instrumentally very bad for Larry because it would deprive him of a very good life, but
on the other hand, there is no reason to think it couldn’t also confer some instrumental
benefits. For instance, as Larry lingers on in the army hospital he might take great
pleasure in the realization that he has saved the lives of several close friends . 8 And this
hedonic benefit would not have come Larry’s way had he not sacrificed himself. Larry
might get other benefits too, even after he is dead. He might, for instance, finally get
the medal of valor he has always wanted, albeit posthumously. Or he might finally get
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the long coveted esteem of his superior officers, albeit posthumously 9 So although the
net effect of Larry’s desire satisfaction is a diminished level of well-being, and the
satisfaction would, therefore, be on balance instrumentally very bad for Larry, it could
nevertheless bring some benefits. And in other typical cases of self-sacrifice like
Larry's, I don’t think there is anything counter-intuitive about thinking that a desire
satisfaction could both constitute genuine self-sacrifice and confer some instrumental
benefit to the person who sacrifices.
But could Larry’s desire satisfaction constitute genuine self-sacrifice and be
intrinsically good for him as DS entails? The answer is obviously yes. Although the
satisfaction of his desire would on balance be instrumentally very bad for him, for it
would result in his having a worse life than he would have had otherwise, this fact has
no bearing whatsoever on any intrinsic value the satisfaction might have for him.
Here’s the reason. As I see it, if a state of affairs is intrinsically good for someone, its
goodness supervenes on its own intrinsic properties, and not on any of its extrinsic
properties or on any of the extrinsic properties of its proper parts.
10 As a result, if a
desire satisfaction is intrinsically good for someone, its goodness will supervene on its
own intrinsic properties, and not on any of its extrinsic properties or any of the extrinsic
properties of its individual proper parts. Consider the following states of affairs:
1 . Larry wants to throw himself on the grenade
2. Larry throws himself on the grenade
3. Larry wants to throw himself on the grenade & Larry throws himself
on the grenade
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I would like to make several claims here. First, since these are three distinct
states of affairs, if the occurrence of any one of them would be intrinsically good for
Larry its value would be independent of any value that the others might have or lack.
So even though 2 would be instrumentally very bad for Larry, this fact is irrelevant to
whether or not 3 would be intrinsically good for him. Indeed, even if, implausibly, 2
were intrinsically bad for Larry, this fact too would be irrelevant to whether or not 3
would be intrinsically good for him. Moreover, even though 3 would be instrumentally
bad for Larry, because it entails 2, this fact is irrelevant to whether or not 3 might also
be intrinsically good for Larry. For 3’s instrumental value supervenes on its extrinsic
properties, specifically on the extrinsic properties of one of its proper parts, viz., 2. And
any intrinsic value that 3 might have would supervene solely on its intrinsic properties.
So the occurrence of 3 could constitute genuine self-sacrifice and be intrinsically good
for Larry. And in general, it does not follow from the mere fact that a desire
satisfaction constitutes self-sacrifice that it could not also be intrinsically good for the
person who gets it.
Of course opponents of DS will counter that although it is certainly possible that
Larry’s satisfaction would be intrinsically good for him, we have no reason to think it
would be. So despite all I have said, some will still find it counterintuitive to insist that
Larry would get anything intrinsically good by throwing himself on the grenade. For
the moment I am willing to accept this. Nothing I’ve said so far has been meant to
convince the reader that Larry’s desire satisfaction would be intrinsically good tor him.
And I have certainly not tried to show that it is always intrinsically good for us when
our desires for what amounts to self-sacrifice are satisfied. All I have tried to show is
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that it possibly is, and that there is nothing “paradoxical” about thinking that in typical
cases like Larry’s we might benefit from self-sacrifice, either instrumental^ or
intrinsically. In other words, I have tried to show just that DS does not render our
intuitions about typical cases of self-sacrifice like Larry’s incoherent. Moreover. I hope
it’s clear by this point that DS does not commit us to saying that Larry, or anyone
relevantly like him, would on the whole be better off for sacrificing himself. Indeed, by
getting what he wants Larry severely diminishes his own well-being; he does not
enhance it. But again, this fact has no bearing on whether he also might benefit in some
way from getting what he wants.
Self-Sacrifice: Case 2
I now want to get to an issue I skirted a bit in my discussion of Larry's case.
Specifically, I'd like to explain why I think people who voluntarily sacrifice their own
self-interests get something intrinsically good for themselves in the process. To help
the discussion I’d like to discuss another imaginary case of self-sacrifice. This case was
inspired by Richard Kraut. He writes:
Suppose a man has committed a serious crime at an earlier point in his
life, and although he now regrets doing so, he realizes that no one will
ever believe him if he confesses. So, he decides to inflict punishment
upon himself for a period of several years. He abandons his current
line of work, which he loves, and takes a job he considers boring,
arduous and insignificant His aim is simply to balance the evil he
has done to others with a comparable evil for himself. He punishes
himself because he regards this as a moral necessity.... It would be
dogmatic and counter-intuitive to insist that he must benefit from his
punishment simply because he desires it. The more reasonable
response is to concede that sometimes carrying out one's plans and
getting what one above all wants conflicts with one’s good...The
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moral that is most naturally drawn from this case is that there are
circumstances in which people voluntarily renounce their good. When
they do so, they are still getting what they want, and so we cannot
equate well being with the satisfaction of desires. 11 [Emphasis mine]
To make exposition easier, I suggest a modified version of the example Kraut
gives. Consider Larry’s friend Moe. Suppose Moe has committed a serious crime and
although he now regrets doing so, he realizes that no one will ever believe him if he
confesses. Troubled by his situation, Moe decides to consult a very reliable oracle to
see what the rest of his life would look like if he were never punished for his crime.
The oracle tells Moe that if his life continues on its current path he will indeed never be
punished and he will live a very long and satisfying life. Moe decides that he doesn’t
deserve such a wonderful life and he forms an intense desire to kill himself
immediately, thereby depriving himself of the life predicted by the oracle. So the
question before us now is this: why should we think that Moe would benefit from
killing himself simply because he desires it? Alternatively, why should we think that it
would be intrinsically good for Moe if his desire for suicide were satisfied?
Let me begin by explaining some of my intuitions about the disvalue of being
harmed. I think that in general, if something bad happens to a person, other things
being equal, it is worse for him if the bad thing happens contrary to his wishes, or
absent any wishes that it happen. In other words, it seems to me that wanting one’s own
harm can mitigate the disvalue of getting it. This is why, I think, that if someone makes
a martyr of himself and suffers harm as a result, we are likely to pity him less than we
would a similar person who suffers the same ills but does not want to sutfer them. A bit
of history might help me here. In 1 872 a girl named Emily Davison was born in
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England. During her early years she experienced firsthand how various social injustices
relegated women to a “second class" status in her country. Eventually she became
politically active and joined the suffragettes. She became driven to get the vote for
women in England. As part of her crusade she took part in various acts of civil
disobedience to further the cause. As a result, she suffered through a host of ills
including prison time, near starvation, forced feedings, and a near drowning at the hands
of her prison guards. Eventually she decided to intensify her efforts. And in 1913. to
draw international attention to the struggle, she went to England’s most famous horse
race, the Derby, and killed herself by throwing her body in the path of the King’s horse
as it ran down the track at full speed. The inscription on her gravestone apparently
reads “Deeds, not words’’. 12
Now suppose we show up at Emily’s funeral. Given how she died, we might try
to console Emily’s loved ones by saying some such thing as this: “well, at least she got
what he wanted. Good for her! She wanted to die for the cause and she did. So at least
that’s something.’’ I think it really is something. It is better,for Emily
,
that she died as
she did rather than by, say, accidentally falling into a well on her way to the Derby. If
she had died in the well, and we had known of her plans, we might very well pity her
more. We might think it a pity that she had come so close to sacrificing herself as she
wanted only to be robbed by an unfortunately positioned well. But why the extra pity?
I think the answer is that Emily wanted to die at the Derby; it was important to her. So
when she died at the Derby, although it was bad for her, it wasn’t as bad as it would
have been if she had fallen into the well and died, something she did not want, and
presumably wanted not to happen. 13 And it seems to me that we might say similar
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things about other people who voluntarily sacrifice themselves under more mundane
circumstances. Why? Because other things being equal, voluntarily sacrificing one’s
well-being just isn't as bad as having one’s well-being “sacrificed” contrary to one’s
wishes.
I think it is instructive to note that we do not usually describe most suicides as
cases of self-sacrifice, even when the person involved knows he is acting contrary to
self-interest. If a person voluntarily kills himself knowing full well that by doing so he
deprives himself of a life that would on the whole be better for him, and he does so
merely so that he will thus be deprived, we are not likely to describe what he has done
as a sacrifice; even if by killing himself he accidentally leaves the world better off, say,
by saving several innocent people. If contrary to the stipulations of his case, Larry had
not wanted to save his comrades and instead he jumped on the grenade merely because
he intensely wanted to harm himself, then although his getting what he wants might
earn him a medal, knowing what we know I don’t think we should describe his case as
an instance of heroic self-sacrifice. We should probably just think of it as a bizarre case
of suicidal masochism that the medal-givers might mistake for heroism. In such a case,
I think Larry would be less worthy of honors because his motive was, as mixed-up as it
might seem, primarily self-interested. He didn’t kill himself because he valued the
welfare of others above his own, because he wanted to save others; he killed himself
merely because he wanted something for himself: to be deprived of the better life. And
because he thus wanted something merely for himself, when he got it, what he got was
less of a loss. If he had not wanted his own harm, or had indeed wanted the better life,
then his killing himself would have been a greater loss for him. And this is why we
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might then be somewhat more inclined to describe what he has done as real self-
sacrifice, perhaps rising to heroic proportions, and not merely suicide.
What does all this talk of suicide teach us? I think this: since a wanted harm is
other things being equal, better than an unwanted harm, we have reason to think that
wanting one’s harm and getting it, is sufficient (in itself) to make someone’s life better
than it would have been if the harm had come along without being wanted. In other
words, we have reason to think that wanting self-sacrifice and getting self-sacrifice is
intrinsically good for the person who wants it. This is not to say, of course, that the
intrinsic value one gets from self-sacrifice would necessarily outweigh the tremendous
downside of the sacrifice . 14 It is just to say that the disvalue of the harm received in
typical cases of self-sacrifice is mitigated by desire.
Let’s get back to Moe. Although I think that it would certainly be bad
(instrumentally) for Moe if his desire for suicide were satisfied, and that he would be
better off if it were frustrated, I believe he would be worse off dying against his wishes.
(If for instance, Moe has no desire to die, or wants not to die, but we take it upon
ourselves to kill him anyway, we are harming him more than we would be if we had
killed him in accord with his wishes. In the “after-life” Moe would have reason to
complain about what we have done to him. If, however, he had wanted us to kill him,
then he simply lacks the same justification for complaint.) And so I think that although
Moe would be doing himself a great disservice by killing himself, and if he is concerned
at all about his own well-being he ought not do it, we nevertheless have good reason to
believe that it would be intrinsically good for Moe if his desire for suicide were
satisfied. The reader may notice that I have painted myself into a corner at this point.
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For if what I have said so far is right, then some kinds of self-sacrifice are not at all
possible. Could this be right? I think it is right, and this brings us to the last imaginary
case of self-sacrifice I want to discuss.
Self-Sacrifice: Case 3
The last example involves a person who wants a very strange kind of self-
sacrifice. What I have in mind is a person who wants to renounce his own self-interest
completely. Consider Moe’s friend Curly. Suppose that like Moe, Curly has committed
a serious crime and that although he now regrets doing so, he realizes that no one will
ever believe him if he confesses. Troubled by his situation and believing that he ought
to be punished, Curly comes to desire that he be completely deprived off all things
intrinsically good for him. 1 '’ On the face of it, it seems possible for Curly to get what he
wants. After all, there are many possible worlds in which Curly exists but in which he
gets nothing intrinsically good for him. If hedonism is true, these are worlds where
Curly enjoys no pleasure. If some sort of eudaimonism along the lines of what Aristotle
suggests is true, these are worlds where Curly fails to engage in any activity of the
appropriate sort. If some objective list theory of welfare is true, these are worlds where
Larry simply fails to get anything from the list. If DS is true, these are worlds where
Larry gets no desire satisfactions. So it is certainly possible for Larry to live a life that
is completely devoid of things that are intrinsically good for him, whatever our opinions
might be about what these things are. But note that DS runs into what might seem to be
a problem here. Although DS does not entail that Curly couldn’t be deprived of all
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things intrinsically good for him, it does entail that he couldn’t both get such a life and
want it. But is this really a problem? I don’t see that it is.
Let me make two points here. First, I think the kind of self-sacrifice Curly
wants is indeed impossible. And given that I’ve already explained why I think wanting
one s harm mitigates the disvalue of getting it, I might try giving an argument to make
my case. So here I go. Let us assume, for the moment, that satisfaction of such a desire
is possible. That is, it is possible for someone to want and get a life completely devoid
of things that are intrinsically good for him. Now let’s imagine a pair of lives that Curly
might live. In lifel, Curly wants to be completely deprived of all intrinsic goods, and
he is. In life2, Curly does not want to be completely deprived of all intrinsic goods, but
he is anyway; otherwise, life2 is exactly the same as lifel. Now it seems to me that
although both lives are probably pretty awful, they are not axiologically on par with one
another. It seems to me that life2 would be worse for Curly than lifel
. In life2 Curly
gets a heap of unwanted misfortune; in lifel he does not. In lifel Curly wants the fate
he gets; in life2 he does not. So I think it is reasonable to think that lifel is better for
Curly than life2.
16
But given that the only difference between the lives is that in the
first Curly gets what he wants while he does not in the second, it seems to me that
getting what he wants is sufficient, in itself, to make lifel better. But if the satisfaction
of his desire for deprivation, in itself, makes one life better than the other, the
satisfaction is intrinsically good for Curly. But given our stipulations, lifel is
completely devoid of things intrinsically good for Curly. So it seems that lifel both
contains something intrinsically good for Curly and is completely devoid of things
intrinsically good for him. We should, therefore, conclude that it is not possible to
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satisfy Curly's desire for a life completely devoid of things intrinsically good for him.
So much for the argument. Make of it what you will.
My second point is that we don’t lose much by granting the impossibility of the
kind of self-sacrifice we've been discussing. Even though Curly can’t want and get a
life of the kind mentioned, he can want and get, say, a life that is infinitely bad for him.
As I see it, desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for us and frustrations are bad.
Moreover, the value of a satisfaction, or the disvalue of a frustration, is determined by
the intensity of the relevant desire. The satisfaction of a very intense desire would
better than the satisfaction of a less intense one. Likewise, the frustration of a very
intense desire would be worse than the frustration of a less intense desire. So if Curly
wants to balance the scales ofjustice, he might want an infinitely bad life for himself.
And this desire could be satisfied under a number of conditions. It would be satisfied,
for instance, if in the future Curly were to have an infinite number of infinitely intense
desires that are all frustrated. So motivated by cosmic justice Curly can want and get an
infinitely bad life for himself. What more could genuine self-sacrifice require?
Conclusion
My goal in the present chapter has been to establish several things. First, I have
tried to show that our ordinary intuitions about typical cases of self-sacrifice do not
preclude us from saying that sometimes getting what we want amounts to genuine self-
sacrifice and that we can benefit, in several ways, from getting what we want in such
cases. Second, I have tried to show that we have good reason to think that when we
want self-sacrifice and get it, we thereby get something that it is intrinsically good for
us in the bargain. Third, I have tried to show that although DS does entail that some
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kinds of self-sacrifice are impossible, this is not really a big problem, for I think (a) we
have good reason to think that such self-sacrifice is not possible, and (b) the
impossibility of such self-sacrifice does not prevent us from saying anything plausible
we might ever want to say about self-sacrifice. I leave it to the reader to decide how
successful I have been in showing these things.
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whose objects occur after we are dead or whose objects have no causal bearing on what
happens to us while we are alive. This sort of objection can be found in many places.
See for example Parfit, (1984) p. 494; Griffin (1986), pp. 16-17; Kagan (1998), p. 37;
Scanlon (1998), p.100; Murphy (1999), p. 269; I discuss this objection in Chapter 3.
10
1 discuss this somewhat Moorean conception of intrinsic value in Chapter 1
.
11
Kraut (1997), p. 165. For an interesting discussion of Kraut’s comments, see Carson
(2000), pp. 88-92.
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12 Forglve me if some of my details are inaccurate. The gist of what I’ve said about
Emily is true.
13
1 might be accused of trying to smuggle hedons or dolors into my discussion of
Emily’s case. It could be suggested that it would be worse for Emily if she dies in the
well because she would suffer the pain of realizing that she won’t make the race on
time, perhaps as she plummets down the shaft. Or perhaps just as she throws herself
onto the track she experiences some great pleasure in the knowledge that she is about to
sacrifice herself. I am many things, but I’m no smuggler. I think that death-by-horse
would be better for Emily than death-by-well even if neither tipped the hedonic balance
of her life one way or the other.
14
1 do think, however, that if someone wants to harm himself intensely enough, the
intrinsic value of the satisfaction could outweigh its instrumental disvalue. But in such
cases I think the desire for one’s own harm shouldn’t be considered a desire for self-
sacrifice. If the person involved, say, has become obsessed with self-harm and it has
become the most important thing in his life, then if he gets what he wants, some harm
might result, but we would be confused to think that what he gets amounts to a sacrifice.
15
There is a somewhat interesting question related to all this about whether a person
can ever want to be deprived in this way. A great many philosophers have suggested
that, either as a contingent matter or because it is essential to personhood, we all want
what is in our own self-interest, or even this is the only thing we want. And those
sympathetic to some sort of psychological egoism might deny that Curly ever could
want something so contrary to his own self-interest. I’m not entirely sure myself that
such a desire is possible. But for now I shall assume it is.
16
Since we’ve stipulated that the two lives differ only with respect to Curly’s desire
satisfaction, the lives are hedonically identical. Hedonists therefore are committed to
saying that neither life would be better for Curly than the other. I think this is a good
reason to reject hedonism.
110
CHAPTER 5
CHANGING DESIRES
Introduction
Any adequate account of well-being must give us some principled and
intuitively satisfying way to distinguish worse lives from better lives. In his paper
“Two Concepts of Utility,” 1 Richard Brandt says some things to suggest that theories of
well-being relevantly similar to ADS are defective because they fail to adequately tell
us how to distinguish better lives from worse lives. His objection plays on the fact that
our desires often change over time. In the present chapter, I begin by reviewing the
relevant sections of Brandt's essay so as to introduce the kind of problem I want to
discuss. I then argue that ADS, in one form or another, is immune to the kind of
problem suggested in Brandt’s paper. My goal in the present chapter is to present two
solutions to the problem of changing desires.
The Problem
Brandt presents the kind of problem I want to consider in the context of a
discussion about utilitarianism. As a result, much of what he says is expressed in
utilitarian terms. Moreover, his discussion of utilitarianism is somewhat confusing. At
times he seems to be discussing utilitarianism as a theory about how in principle to
maximize utility, or well-being; at other times, he seems to be thinking of utilitarianism
as a kind of practical decision making procedure that we can use, here in the actual
world, to figure out how to maximize utility or well-being in practice; and at other times
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it is somewhat unclear what sort of utilitarianism he means to be discussing. Therefore,
to simplify matters, and since utilitarianism is irrelevant to our present topic, discussion
of the issues at hand would be easier if I were to simply paraphrase much of what
Brandt says, leaving out all the utilitarian lingo and baggage. And since my main
interest in Brandt’s paper is with a problem for ADS that is suggested by some things
Brandt says, and not so much with what Brandt actually says, I think no harm will result
from my paraphrasing. So paraphrase I shall. Concerned readers are advised to
compare what I say here to what Brandt actually says in his paper.
Brandt introduces the kind of problem I want to discuss with an example
involving a young man and his upcoming birthday. We are asked to imagine that a
man. Junior, could get one of two things for his 20 th birthday: a bicycle or a Greek
lexicon. How are we to decide which gift would be overall better for Junior to receive?
In other words, how do we decide which life would be more satisfying, a life in which
he gets a bicycle or one in which he gets the lexicon?2 Brandt suggests and rejects
several procedures that we could use to get an answer. He describes the first procedure,
procedure (1), as follows: “One possible procedure is to identify the utility number for
having the lexicon for each day (or hour?) of the person’s whole life - past, present, and
future - sum the numbers, and then compare with the like sum for the bicycle.”3
Brandt rejects procedure (1) largely because it places too much emphasis one's
past desires. If Junior has wanted, with sufficient intensity, for a sufficiently long time
to get a bicycle on his 20
th
birthday, then regardless of what he wants on his 20 th
birthday or after his birthday, it might turn out on procedure (1) that getting a bicycle
would give Junior what is overall the more satisfying life. And this seems wrong. It
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seems that if on his birthday or after it Junior would rather have the lexicon, then these
desires ought to carry more weight, or even all the weight. Why should we think that
one's past and no longer current desires have any bearing on one's present or future
quality of life?
Brandt goes on to suggest what he characterizes as a somewhat more simple
procedure, procedure (2). Procedure (2) is exactly like procedure (1) except that we are
to ignore all of the desires that Junior has prior to his birthday. In other words, we
assign values only to the day of Junior's 20'" birthday and then to each subsequent day
in each alternative life. We then sum the values for each life and compare as before.
Although procedure (2) avoids the kind of problem associated with past desires faced
by procedure ( 1 ), Brandt rejects it for other reasons. He writes:
...it is not obvious why there should be this asymmetry in the treatment
ot past versus future desires, on the desire theory... For some cases it
does not seem plausible, or at least definitively convincing, to ignore
past desires altogether. Consider the following example... A convinced
skeptic who has rebelled against a religious background wants, most of
his life, that no priest be called in when he is about to die. But, when he
is on his deathbed he weakens as he feared he would, and asks for a
priest. Do we maximizes his welfareDS by summoning a priest, or not?4
Brandt suggests that no clear answer to the question is forthcoming and that his
own intuitions on the matter are anything but firm. Nevertheless, he does seem to
suggest that cases such as the skeptic’s give us reason to doubt the adequacy of
procedure (2). He seems to say that in cases relevantly similar to the skeptic’s, we
ought perhaps to give at least some consideration to past desires, and so we ought not
ignore them entirely as procedure (2) requires.' We might imagine for instance that
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Junior’s case parallels the skeptic's. Imagine that for most of his life Junior has
intensely wanted to get a bicycle on his 20 th birthday and that he has never wanted a
Greek lexicon. But when his birthday actually comes along he undergoes a change of
heart, perhaps due to a fear that he will fail his Greek exam, and he therefore forms a
rather weak desire for a Greek lexicon and loses his intense desire for the bicycle. Here
I think Brandt would suggest that we might not want to ignore Junior’s past desires
entirely. Or that at the very least, if we ignore all his past desires, then we ought to also
ignore all future desires as well, for there seems to be no obvious and compelling
justification for treating the two sorts of desires differently. This brings me to another
procedure Brandt considers, one designed specifically to avoid the asymmetry in the
treatment of past versus future desires.
According to procedure (3), we ignore all Junior’s past desires and all his future
desires and focus only on those desires he has on his birthday. If, on his birthday Junior
wants a bicycle and does not want a lexicon, then regardless of what he once wanted or
will want in the future, he is better off getting a bicycle. If on the other hand, he wants
a lexicon but no bicycle, then regardless of what he once wanted or will want in the
future, he is better off getting a lexicon.
Now if we focus just on Junior’s level of well-being on his birthday, then
procedure (3) seems to be moving in the right direction. If on his birthday Junior wants
a bicycle and no lexicon, then it seems that to give him the best birthday we should give
him a bicycle. What he once wanted or will want in the future seems irrelevant to how
well off he is on his birthday. But if we are concerned not merely with Junior’s well-
being on his birthday but instead with his overall level of well-being, then procedure (3)
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seems less plausible. Even if Junior wants a bicycle on his birthday and no lexicon, we
would surely be doing him no favor by giving him a bicycle if as a result his future life
would be far less satisfying than it would be otherwise. So if we are concerned with
giving Junior the life that is overall best for him, procedure (3) might very well steer us
in the wrong direction. If we want to do what is overall best for Junior, we simply can't
ignore his future desires. And as I see it, we ought not ignore Junior s past desires
either. I think the skeptic’s case does show that past desires are somehow relevant.
Indeed on my view, all of a person's desires are relevant to his well-being. This brings
me to the second part of the present chapter. I now want to explain two ways that ADS
could handle cases of the kind we’ve been discussing. The goal is to show that ADS, in
one form or another, gives us reasonable answers in cases where a person’s desires
change over time.
Solution 1
Recall that according to the simplest form of ADS presented in Chapter 1,
ADS1
,
the value to be had in a person’s getting what he wants, and the disvalue to be
had in not getting it, corresponds directly to how intensely he wants the thing. In other
words, the personal intrinsic values of desire satisfactions and frustrations are reflected
by the intensities of the desires involved. More specifically, the value of a satisfaction
is equal to the intensity of the desire involved, expressed as a positive integer, and the
value of a frustration is equal to the negative of this intensity. So satisfactions are
assigned positive numbers and frustrations are assigned negative numbers. And to
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figure a person's level of well-being we simply sum the values of all the satisfactions
and frustrations he gets.
It we are interested in figuring how intrinsically valuable some particular
moment of a person’s life is for him, we identify all the desires he has at that moment,
note their intensities and whether they are satisfied or frustrated, and then we sum the
relevant values (remember that satisfactions are assigned positive integers and
frustrations are assigned negative integers). The result will be a number that tells us his
level of well-being at that one moment; greater numbers represent higher levels of well-
being and smaller numbers lower levels. In a similar way we could assign values to
temporally extended parts of a person’s life or indeed his entire life. We first identify
all the satisfactions and frustrations he gets during the period of time in question, assign
values as determined by the relevant intensities, and then sum all the values. What we
end up with is a number representing the value of the period of time in question; again,
greater numbers represent more valuable periods and smaller numbers represent less
valuable periods.
At first blush, ADS1 seems to run into problems when it comes to cases such as
those involving the skeptic. Let me explain. Recall that for most of his life the skeptic's
wishes about his own future were clear; he wanted, with significant intensity, to have no
priest present at his deathbed. Also recall that as the skeptic lies on his deathbed, he
undergoes a change of heart and wants a priest at his side. Now imagine two possible
lives the Skeptic could live. Suppose that in both lives the skeptic has all the desires
just stipulated but that in one a priest shows up at the deathbed and in the other he does
not. Which life is better for the skeptic, the priest-life or the no-priest-life? To answer
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this, ADS1 tells us to simply sum the values of all the satisfactions and frustrations
contained in the priest-lite and compare it to the like sum for the no-priest-life. The
problem is that if the skeptic's earlier desire to die priest-free is intense enough, then the
value of its satisfaction would contribute more value to his life than the satisfaction of
his new, weaker desire for a priest. And in such a case, ADS1 has the result that the no-
priest life would be better for the skeptic than the priest-life. On the face of it, this
result seems wrong. It the poor tellow has changed his mind, and he now wants a
priest, then even if his earlier desire was very intense, surely he'd be better off, overall,
if he now gets a priest.
Consider another example. This one was suggested to me by Fred Feldman.
Imagine a man who for most of his life has intensely wanted to live in Florida when he
retires. If at the time of his retirement he has changed his mind, it seems a cruel joke to
say that to maximize the value of his life he must nevertheless live in Florida. If the
man no longer wants to live in Florida, then this new desire, even if it is less intense, is
of far greater importance to the overall value of his life than the more intense previous
desire to live in Florida.
One way to get around the apparent problem is to move to a version of ADS
such as ADS2. Recall that according to this view we only count the satisfactions and
frustrations of a person’s concurrent desires as relevant to his well-being. So regarding
the fellow who no longer wants to live in Florida, ADS2 would allow us to say that his
earlier, nonconcurrent desire to live in Florida is irrelevant. Its satisfaction or
frustration simply has no bearing on the overall value of the man's life. In the skeptic’s
case, ADS2 would have a similar result.
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But I think ADS2 runs into problems. As I said in Chapter 1 , 1 think ADS2
forces us to construe too narrowly what is relevant to a person’s well-being. I think, for
instance, that my desires about the future are relevant to the value of my life. If I want
my grandchildren to flourish after I am gone, it seems to me that other things being
equal I am better off if they do. I am better off because their flourishing make the world
I inhabit more as I would like it to be. Their flourishing results in there being a better
match between my desires and the way things actually are. And I think that this makes
my life better for me. So because I think that desire satisfactions are always
intrinsically good for us, even when the desires involved are nonconcurrent, I don’t
think we should ignore nonconcurrent desires entirely.
One option is to count both concurrent and nonconcurrent desire as relevant but
weight their values such that other things being equal concurrent satisfactions are better
than nonconcurrent satisfactions. In other words, we might try something along the
lines of ADS3. But of course this leaves open the possibility that in some cases the
value of a nonconcurrent satisfaction could outweigh the disvalue of a concurrent
frustration. For instance, if as a youth the man mentioned above had an extremely
intense desire retire to Florida in the future, then it might turn out that the value of this
desire’s satisfaction would be greater than the disvalue of the frustration of his later,
concurrent desire to not to retire to Florida. And so ADS3 would have the result that
the man would indeed be overall better off if he were to retire to Florida. And on the
face of it, this seems wrong. We might argue that if he has changed his mind, then we
do him no favor by forcing him to live in Florida simply because he once had an
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extremely intense desire to live there. This brings me to the final version of ADS I
presented in Chapter 1
.
Recall that according to ADS4, the personal intrinsic value of a person's life, or
some part of it, is given by an ordered pair of numbers <nl,n2>. Recall also that nl is
the sum of the values of all the concurrent-desire satisfactions the life contains and n2 is
the sum of the values of all the nonconcurrent-desire satisfactions the life contains.
Recall also that ADS4 gives us a way to compare lives. We say first that for any
life/person pairs <P,S> and <P',S’>, we express the intrinsic value of P for S and P' for
S', respectively, with ordered pairs of integers as follows: IV<P,S> = <nl,n2>,
IV<P',S'> = <nl \ n2'>. We then compare values according to the following:
Tl: (i) IV<P,S> = IV<P',S'> iff nl=nl' and n2=n2'; and
(ii) IV<P,S> > IV<P',S’> iff nl>nl’or(nl=nl'andn2>n2’).
The idea here is that over the course of a person’s life it’s most important to his
well-being that from moment to moment his desires about what's going on at those
moments are satisfied. His desires about the past, the future, or indeterminate times,
though important, are incommensurably less important. In other words, concurrent
satisfactions are what really matter.
But how does ADS4 handle the kinds of cases we’ve been discussing? Let us
consider the dying skeptic. For most of his life the skeptic wanted, with significant
intensity, to occupy his deathbed without a priest being present. Note that this desire is
nonconcurrent because it is about what goes on in his future. Also note that his new
desire for a priest is concurrent; it is concurrent because it is about what’s going on
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now, as the skeptic lies on his deathbed, not about what’s going on in the future, the
past, or at some indeterminate time.
Once again, imagine two possible lives the Skeptic could live. Suppose that in
both lives the skeptic has all the desires just stipulated but that in one a priest shows up
at the deathbed and in the other he does not. So one life will contain more
nonconcurrent frustration than the other - this is the life in which the priest shows up
and frustrates the skeptic s earlier desires — but it will also contain more concurrent
satisfaction. So which life is better for the skeptic, the priest-life or the no-priest-life?
According to clause (ii) of Tl, and the above stipulations about the case, the priest-life
is better for the skeptic than the no-priest-life. So if we have the intuition that getting a
priest would be overall better for the skeptic than not getting a priest, ADS4 apparently
gives us what we want. And I think ADS4 would have similar results in relevantly
similar cases, such as the case involving the man who once wanted to retire to Florida. 6
So one way to handle the problem of changing desires is to adopt something
along the lines of ADS4. But I do not think this is the best move to make. I think that
ADS even in its simplest form, viz., ADS1, has the resources to handle cases such as the
skeptic’s in an intuitively satisfying way. Let me now explain what I mean.
Solution 2
Let us begin with a simplified version of the case involving the skeptic.
Suppose that as we speak a skeptic sits upon his deathbed. Suppose that he will be dead
soon, maybe in a few minutes. Also suppose that earlier in his life he had a very intense
desire about his own future. He wanted no priest present at his deathbed. But now he
has changed his mind. That is, he has lost his former desire to die priest-free and he has
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formed in its place a somewhat weaker desire to have a priest at his side. To help us
filter out extraneous details, let us stipulate that over the course of his entire life these
are the only desires he has ever had.
Now it seems to me there are two questions that ADS1 needs to answer regarding
the skeptic’s case:
1 . Would the value of the skeptic’s life as a whole be greater if he gets a priest or if
he does not?
2. Would the value of the skeptic’s life from nowforward be greater if he gets a
priest or if he does not?
So as I see it, ADS1 needs to give us an evaluation for two things in the present
case. The first thing is the skeptic’s life as a whole; the second thing is a small part of
the skeptic’s life that starts now and continues a short while into the future until the
skeptic dies. Let us start with the first question.
Since the skeptic has only two desires, ADS1 tells us that the overall value of his
life would be greater, for him, if his earlier intense desire is satisfied and his current
desire is frustrated. In other words, he would be overall better off if he gets no priest,
despite the fact that he now wants one. I think this is the correct result. How does
ADS1 answer question 2? It tells us that the value of the last part of the skeptic’s life
would be greater if his new desire is satisfied and his earlier desire is frustrated. In
other words, the last few minutes of the skeptic’s life would be better for him if he gets
a priest. I think this is the correct result.
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Some will no doubt think that ADS1 gets things wrong here. A somewhat
plausible-sounding case against ADSl's answer to the first question might go as
follows. Suppose we have it in our power to supply the skeptic with a priest. Suppose
that we are utilitarians of a sort and that we want to maximize the skeptic’s overall well-
being. ADS1 tells us that we should not supply a priest. But this seems a cruel joke.
The poor man has changed his mind. He now wants a priest! To hell with what he once
wanted. If we cruelly deprive him of what he now wants, we will thereby, in effect,
give him a life that is worse than it could have been.
It seems to me that arguing against ADS1 in this way betrays an unwillingness
to fully accept the stipulations of the case. I think some will find it difficult to imagine
a person such as the skeptic in our example. Here in the actual world, if a person has
two desires such as those we’ve attributed to the skeptic, chances are that he has many
other desires too. For instance, as he sits on his deathbed wishing for a priest, he
probably has a host of other desires related to what it would be like to have a priest in
the room. He probably not only wants a priest at his side but also wants to be aware of
the priest’s presence at his side. He probably wants to see that a priest is there, and
perhaps talk to him and feel comforted by the priest’s soothing words, etc. He probably
has feelings of fear and loneliness and he wants them to stop. And he probably also
wants his own earlier desire to die priest-free to be frustrated. And so chances are, here
in the actual world, someone like the skeptic would now have a sufficient number of
sufficiently intense priest-related desires to outweigh his earlier desire that there be no
priest.
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And I think that this is why in a “real life" case relevantly similar to the
skeptic's we might be inclined to think that the person involved would probably be
overall better off if he now gets the priest the wants. Indeed, in such a case he probably
would be overall better off getting a priest. However, if the totality of such a person’s
current and future desires don’t outweigh his earlier desires, then I think our intuitions
on the matter ought to be less conclusive. If in fact such a person has only two desires
such as our skeptic, then I see no reason to suppose that he would not be overall better
off if his new desire is frustrated.
Let us note that the result given by ADS1 here is relevantly similar to the result
that would be given by a simple form of hedonism in a parallel kind of case. Imagine
that Frank could live one of two lives: life A or life B. In life A, he experiences some
intense pleasure early on but some mild pain at the end. So the first life is overall rather
pleasant. In the second life, life B, he experiences some intense pain early on and some
mild pleasure at the end. So the second life is overall rather unpleasant. According to a
simple form of hedonism, the first life would be better. I don’t think that hedonists
should find this result troubling. And likewise, I do not think proponents of ADS1
should be troubled by the answer that ADS1 gives to question 1.
Given what I have just said, perhaps we should note what is apparently an
interesting difference between ADS1 and the simple kind of hedonism I just mentioned.
If we combine ADS 1 with an obvious form of consequentialism, we get the view that an
act is morally right iff it maximizes desire satisfaction (DSAU). In a similar fashion we
could generate a hedonic form of consequentialism according to which an act is morally
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right iff it maximizes hedonic utility (HAU). Let us see how the first view would
handle the skeptic’s case and how the second view would handle Frank’s.
Suppose we are around prior to the skeptic’s birth and that we are in a position
to give him one of two lives. In the first he does not get a priest at his deathbed; in the
second he does. If we focus just on the skeptic’s desire satisfaction, DSAU has the
result that it would be morally right to give him the first life and it would be morally
wrong to give him the second. In effect, we are required to give the skeptic a better
overall life at the cost of his final few moments of well-being. We must give him a
better whole at the cost of a worse part.
What does HAU tell us about Frank’s case? Suppose we are around prior to
Frank’s birth and that we have it within our power to give him one of the two
alternative lives mentioned above. Should we give him life A or life B? If we focus
just on Frank’s pleasure and pain, HAU tells us that it would be morally right to give
Frank life A and morally wrong to give him life B. In effect, we are required to give
Frank a better overall life at the cost of his final few moments of well-being. We must
give him a better whole at the cost of a worse part. So far the results of the two views in
question parallel each other exactly.
But now let us change the examples slightly. Suppose we are now in a room
adjacent to the skeptic’s deathbed. And suppose that we can bring it about either that
the skeptic gets a priest or that he does not. If we focus just on the skeptic’s desire
satisfaction, DSAU has the result that it would be morally right to deprive the skeptic of
a priest and wrong to give him one, despite the fact that he now wants a priest. Again,
we are required, in effect, to give the skeptic a better overall life at the cost of his final
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few moments of well-being. We must sacrifice his near term well-being for the sake of
an overall better life. We must give him a better whole at the cost of a worse part.
Now suppose we are with Frank near the end of his life. So we are no longer in
a position to give him life A or life B. We have no control over what Frank has already
experienced, so our options are now more limited than they were a moment ago. The
best we can hope for now is to improve on the life Frank has already lived. So suppose
we can bring it about either that the last few moments of Frank’s life are mildly pleasant
or mildly painful. If we focus just on Frank’s pleasure and pain, F1AU tells us that it
would be morally right to give Frank the pleasure and wrong to give him the pain,
regardless of any pleasure or pain Frank might have experienced earlier in his life. In
effect, we are required to give Frank the best overall life by maximizing his near term
well-being. Now we must give him a better whole not at the cost of a worse part but by
giving him a better part.
The apparent difference between DSAU and HAU is this: one’s moral
obligations under HAU seem to vary depending on one’s temporal location since one’s
temporal location directly determines one’s open alternatives. Since we cannot
retroactively alter the amount of pleasure and pain that has occurred, we are never
required to do so. Since we cannot now bring it about that an earlier part of a person’s
life contains more pleasure than it in fact did, we are never morally obligated to do so.
The most that can be asked of us is that we improve the future. But one’s moral
obligations under DSAU do not, at least on the face of it, seem to vary in the same way.
Since some of a person’s desires might be about the future, we might very well now
have it within our power to “retroactively” bring it about that some earlier part of his
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life is more or less satisfying. And so in some circumstances DSAU might require us to
do so.
I ve been saying all along that the difference here is apparent. I say this because
it is merely apparent. In principle, there really is no difference of the sort I’ve just
mentioned. There are clearly situations in which HAU would entail a moral obligation
to “retroactively”' cause pleasure or pain. Although these sorts of situations are
certainly unfamiliar to us here in the actual world. If for instance, time flows in a circle,
then our actions now might very well causally affect what happens in the past. And if
they do, HAU may very well require us to perform actions that “retroactively” cause
pleasure or pain. Or if backwards time travel is physically possible in our world, as it
apparently is, then we might very well be required by HAU to take actions now so as to
bring it about that we go back in time and cause some pleasure or pain.
The main point I want to make now is just this: if the problem of changing
desires is indeed a problem for ADS 1, then there exists a parallel kind of problem for
hedonistic accounts of well-being too. But since there obviously is no such problem for
hedonistic accounts, there is no problem for ADS1 either.
Conclusion
I think Brandt’s discussion suggests several interesting questions for those of us
interested in defending desire satisfaction accounts of well-being. One question is this:
with regard to how well off a person is at some particular time, are his past and future
desires relevant? Or should we concern ourselves just with the desires he has at the
time in question? Another question is this: given that our desires change over time, how
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are we to know which desires to count as relevant to the overall value of a person’s life?
I hope it is clear at this point how ADS can answer these questions.
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Notes
1
Brandt (1982), pp. 169-185.
2 Thomas Carson discusses some similar examples involving desires that change over
time. See Carson (2000), pp. 84 - 87.
3
Brandt (1982), pp. 179-180.
4
Brandt ( 1 982), p. 1 80. Brandt uses “welfareDS” just to signify that he is talking about
welfare or well-being as conceived in terms of desire satisfactions and frustrations.
5
Derek Parfit discusses an example relevantly similar to the sceptic’s. See Parfit
(1984), p. 1 57. Parfit also seems to suggest that past desires ought to count somehow.
6
At this point some might suggest that the skeptic's case is relevantly dissimilar to that
of the man who no longer wants to spend his retirement in Florida. They might say that
although it is obvious that we ought not force a man to live in Florida against his will,
it's not so obvious that we should call a priest for the skeptic. They might suggest that
although the skeptic now says he wants a priest, this new desire is not perhaps
“genuine”. For recall, as Brandt presents the case, he says that the man “weakens as he
feared he would” and asks for a priest. This seems to imply that upon his deathbed, the
man does not in fact want a priest, but that he has been compelled by fear or something
else to ask for one. But if this is so, and despite his request the man does not want a
priest, and wants there to be no priest, then the kind of problem we’ve been discussing
goes away. If in fact he now wants there to be no priest present, just as he has always
wanted, then it seems to me that any apparent uncertainty about what would be best for
him vanishes.
128
CHAPTER 6
AN OBJECTION FROM PARFIT
Introduction
According to ADS, more satisfying lives are intrinsically better for those who
live them and less satisfying lives are worse. So if we want to know how intrinsically
good someone’s life is for him, we look to see how satisfying it is. According to a very
simple version of ADS, we first identify all the satisfied and frustrated desires the life
contains. Then we assign a number to each satisfaction and frustration. To each
satisfaction we assign a positive integer corresponding to the intensity of the relevant
desire. To each frustration we similarly assign a negative integer. Finally, we sum the
numbers. The resulting number tells us how satisfying the life is. Larger numbers
correspond to more satisfying lives and smaller numbers to less satisfying lives. In the
present chapter I examine an objection to ADS suggested by Derek Parfit according to
which more satisfying lives of the sort just described are not always better for those
who live them.
Parfit’s Drug Addict
In his Reasons and Persons Derek Parfit discusses various theories about what
makes someone’s life go best. Among other things he discusses and rejects what he
calls summative theories. Roughly, these theories entail that more satisfying lives are
always better than less satisfying lives and that we simply “add up’’’ the satisfactions
and frustrations in a life to figure how satisfying the life is, so Parfit’s summative
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theories are relevantly similar to the view I just sketched above. Parfit objects to
summative theories as follows:
I tell you that I am about to make your life go better. I shall inject
you with an addictive drug. From now on, you will wake each
morning with an extremely strong desire to have another injection
of this drug. Flaving this desire will be in itself neither pleasant
nor painful, but if the desire is not fulfilled within an hour it will
then become very painful. This is no cause for concern, since I
shall give you ample supplies of this drug. Every morning, you
will be able at once to fulfil this desire. The injection, and its after-
effects, would also be neither pleasant nor painful. You will spend
the rest of your days as you do now...On the Summative Theories,
if I make you an addict, I will be increasing the sum-total of your
desire-fulfilment. I will be causing one of your desires not to be
fulfilled: your desire not to become an addict, which, after my act
becomes a desire to be cured. But I will also be giving you an
indefinite series of extremely strong desires, one each morning, all
of which you can fulfil. The fulfilment of all these desires would
outweigh the non-fulfilment of your desires not to become an
addict, and to be cured. On the Summative Theories, by making
you an addict, I will be benefiting you — making your life go
better. This conclusion is not plausible. Having these desires, and
having them fulfilled, are neither pleasant nor painful. We need
not be Hedonists to believe, more plausibly, that it is in no way
better for you to have and to fulfil this series of strong desires . 1
Pretty clearly Parfit’ s words suggest a counterexample to the version of ADS
mentioned above. But should Parfit’s example convince us that a life of addiction like
the one he describes would not be better than the alternative life he hints at? I for one
am not convinced. After all, Parfit stipulates that the life of addiction would be far
more satisfying. So why not think it would be better? Of course if we assume that
desire satisfactions are intrinsically worthless for those who get them, if we assume that
satisfactions cannot, on their own, improve lives, then Parfit’s conclusion might follow.
But in that case we would beg the question. It seems to me that the whole point of
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Parfit s example is to refute the idea that a life can be improved merely by adding
satisfactions to it, so we cannot therefore assume beforehand that a life cannot be thus
improved. If Parfit s case is to be successful, then, we need to consider other reasons
for concluding that the life of addiction would not be better. But what other reasons are
suggested by Parfit for concluding this?
To get at the heart of the matter and make discussion somewhat easier, let’s
recast Parfit’s example a bit. Let us imagine two possible lives that Joe might live: life
A and life B. Suppose that life A and life B differ only with respect to a drug addiction
like the one described by Parfit. So suppose that in life A, Parfit makes Joe into an
addict by injecting him with a drug; in life B he does not. In life A Joe has a weak
desire not to live an addict’s life, but Parfit frustrates this desire. In life B, Joe has the
same desire but it is satisfied since he is not an addict. In life A, Joe has many intense
desires for daily injections and they are all satisfied. In life B Joe gets none of these
satisfactions. Suppose that otherwise the lives are as similar as possible. That is,
suppose they are the same in every way not necessarily entailed by the above
stipulations. Suppose, for example, that they are equal in duration, they contain equal
amounts of pleasure and pain, and except for the stipulated extra satisfactions and the
one frustration associated with his addiction in life A, the lives contain the same
satisfactions and frustrations. So if our imaginations are working properly, we should
now be imagining two lives that are remarkably similar except that one is much more
satisfying than the other owing to a peculiar Parfit-induced drug addiction. We can now
spell out the objection to ADS in the form of the following argument:
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The Addict Argument
1. It ADS is true, then life A would be intrinsically better for Joe than life B.
2. Life A would not be intrinsically better for Joe than life B.
3. Therefore, ADS is false.
Now although I have the intuition that life A would be better than life B, and so
I think that premise 2 is false, I recognize that based on what we’ve said about Joe’s
alternative lives there are several obvious reasons that might tempt one to affirm
premise 2. I will now discuss and reject four possible rationales for premise 2. 2
Rationale 1
As I said above, my intuition is that life A would be better for Joe than life B.
So my preferred method of dealing with the argument at hand is to reject premise 2. I
see no good reason to suppose, given the stipulations of Joe's case, that life A would not
be better for him than life B. Of course hedonists will disagree. Since neither life
contains more pleasure or pain than the other, a hedonist has no grounds for picking one
life over the other. So if we are hedonists, we must conclude that life A would not be a
better life. Now although Parfit says some things to suggest that we need not be
hedonists to reach this conclusion, I do think hedonism affords objectors to ADS the
most defensible position. But having said this, I think Joe’s case illustrates a defect in
the hedonistic idea that the quality of a person’s life is determined entirely by how
much pleasure and pain it contains. Although I do think that other things being equal
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more pleasant lives are better, I think this is owing to the fact that pleasures entail desire
satisfactions and pains entail frustrations. 3 Moreover, I think it is a mistake to suppose
that absent some hedonic difference no one life could be better for a person than
another. I think “brain-in-vat” cases show this. If I would rather be a flesh-and-blood
person sitting in a chair than a brain in a vat who falsely thinks he’s sitting in a chair,
then even if being a vat dweller would be hedonically on a par with being a real person
plopped in a chair, I’m better off, ceteris paribus, living the flesh-and-blood life. The
reason? I think that other things being equal, more satisfying lives are better than less
satisfying lives. So even though life A is hedonically indistinguishable from life B, I
don’t think this alone affords us sufficient grounds for concluding that life A would be
no better than life B. Indeed since life A is more satisfying I think Joe would be better
off living life A.
Rationale 2
Another reason to affirm premise 2 might stem from some kind of pre-
philosophical aversion to drug addiction. Most of us rightly suppose that being a drug
addict is usually bad for the person in question. And I suspect that many who would
affirm premise 2 might do so because they feel, in their gut, that indeed life A would be
worse than life B. But I think this feeling might be owing to a failure to appreciate the
peculiarities of Joe’s situation. In the example described, Joe is a very strange kind of
drug addict. In life B, Joe does not live the kind of life that most actual drug addicts do.
Most actual drug addicts live extremely frustrating and painful lives. However, as
stipulated, life A would be much more satisfying and no more painful (or less pleasant)
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than life B. Joe's addiction would not result in the typical pains and frustrations
associated with drug addiction. Among other things, Joe would not need to share dirty
needles, risk life-and-limb to acquire drug money, or endure the other unwanted pains
and frustrations of the typical addict. In fact, life A would have most all the benefits of
life B plus the daily satisfactions of his intense desires for injections -- not bad. I think
the lesson here is just this: we should not let our natural intuitions about the typical
evils of drug addiction cloud our thoughts about Joe’s peculiar life of addiction. In
Joe’s case we have stipulated away all the normal downsides of addiction. So we ought
not think that life A would be worse for Joe than life B merely because addiction
usually results in lower quality lives here in the actual world.
Rationale 3
Even if we do not appeal to hedonism and we do fully accept the stipulations of
Joe’s case, we might affirm premise 2 on the grounds that in life A Joe does not want to
be an addict. And we might be inclined to think that the frustration of Joe’s desire not
to live a life of addiction ought to somehow carry more weight than the many
satisfactions of his more intense desires to get an injection. Indeed a page after
introducing his addict example Parfit says some things to suggest a position along these
lines. Parfit first identifies what he apparently takes to be the most salient features ot
his drug-addict example. He writes that “the imagined case of addiction is in its
essentials similar to countless other cases. There are countless cases in which it is true
both (1) that, if someone’s life went one of two ways, this would produce a greater sum
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total of local desire-fulfilment, but (2) that the other alternative is what he would
globally prefer, whichever way his actual life went.”4
On the same page Parfit distinguishes between what he calls global desires and
local desires. A desire is global, Parfit says, “if it is about some part of one’s life
considered as a whole, or is about one’s whole life.” 5 And a desire is local he suggests
without actually saying, if it is not global. We may suppose that Joe’s desire to not live
the life of an addict is, then, global since it is about his life as a whole, and his daily
desires for an injection are local. And it is because the latter desires are local, one
might suggest, that their satisfactions should not count as much, or at all, towards Joe’s
well-being. So the suggestion is that life A is no better than life B because although it
contains a greater sum total of satisfaction, the relevant satisfactions all involve only
local desires, and satisfactions of local desires ought to either not count at all or they
ought to be valued in such a way so that no amount of them could ever outweigh the
frustration of even one global desire. We might thus suppose a kind of
incommensurability between the values of local and global satisfactions/frustrations. I
think Parfit would hold a position similar to this; at least he says some things to suggest
that he favors such a position.
Let me first say that I see no reason to suppose that satisfactions of so called
local desires are worthless. As I have said elsewhere in the present work, I think that all
desire satisfactions are intrinsically good for those who get them, and I see no reason to
think that local-desire satisfactions are an exception. So I think that if Joe wants an
injection, then other things being equal he’s better off getting an injection. And if he
wants an injection on each day of his life, then given the stipulations of the case
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described, I think he’s better ott getting the injections he wants. Let me say next that I
see no reason to think that global-desire satisfactions and frustrations ought to be treated
any differently than local-desire satisfactions and frustrations. So I see no reason to
think that the frustration of Joe’s rather weak global desire about his life ought to carry
more weight than the satisfactions of his many intense local desires. The mere fact that
a person would rather not live the life he is living and might prefer some alternative
doesn’t alone give us grounds to think the alternative life would be better for him. We
can grant that Joe would rather not live an addict’s life, but this shouldn’t convince us
that he wouldn’t be better off as an addict of the kind described. However, if Joe’s
global desire not to be an addict were very intense, as I think many actual global desires
are, then the matter might be different. If Joe very much wanted not to live the life of
addiction, then frustration of this desire might very well outweigh the satisfactions of all
his local desires for drugs. But as it stands the object of Joe’s global desire just isn’t
that important to him; this is reflected in the fact that his desire for it is weak. And so I
do not see why the relatively small disvalue of his global-desire frustration ought to
outweigh or trump the tremendous value of his many intense local satisfactions.
Moreover, even if we do decide to somehow count global satisfactions and
frustrations differently, I think we are likely to run into cases relevantly similar to the
addiction case we are now considering. So I do not think moving to global desires
would give Parfit what he wants. To see this, we need only modify Joe’s case a bit; we
simply replace all the local desires in the original case with suitably similar global
desires. Suppose Parfit injects Joe with an addictive drug. Suppose that Joe wakes
every morning with an extremely intense global desire to get an injection on every
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remaining day of his life. Suppose Parfit supplies plenty of the drug so that Joe can
satisfy his daily global desires. To avoid tedium, I shall not spell out the details of the
example further. I hope my point is clear. I don’t think global desires solve the alleged
problem with summative theories. If summing local-desire satisfactions is a problem,
then summing global-desire satisfactions is a problem too.6
Rationale 4
Another rationale for premise 2 is based on a quantity/quality distinction
regarding satisfactions and frustrations. The idea is that even if we grant that all desire
satisfactions are intrinsically good for us and all frustrations are bad, we ought to
recognize that some things are in themselves worth wanting and other are not. And
when it comes time to tally up the values of all the satisfactions and frustrations in a
life, we need to look at more than just the intensities of the desires involved. When
evaluating the value of a satisfaction, for instance, we need to consider whether the
relevant object of desire is worthy of being desired. If it is, then we ought to factor this
worthiness into our evaluation. Wanting and getting something that is worth wanting is
in itself better than wanting and getting something that is not worth wanting, regardless
of the intensities of the desires involved. Likewise, failing to get a worthy object of
desire is worse than failing to get an unworthy object of desire, regardless of the
relevant intensities. So the idea is that satisfactions and frustrations involving worthy
objects have a kind of value that is incommensurable with the kind of value had by
satisfactions and frustrations involving unworthy objects.
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Regarding Joe s case, the position is this: Joe’s desire to live a life free of
addiction has a worthy object. So if Joe's desire is satisfied, he gets a “high-quality”
satisfaction; if it is frustrated, he gets a “high-quality” frustration. His many daily
desires for drug injections on the other hand do not have worthy objects. If these desires
are satisfied, Joe gets “low-quality” satisfactions. Therefore, although Joe’s many drug-
satisfactions would be intrinsically good for him, the combined value of these
satisfactions would be trumped by the disvalue of the frustration of his one desire to be
tree of addiction. So life A would be worse than life B because although it is more
satisfying, it contains a greater level of “high-quality” frustration.
Regarding this kind of rationale for premse2, 1 want to say several things. First,
I don’t buy it. I think that wanting and getting pushipin is other things being equal no
better or worse than wanting and getting poetry. My view is this: to each his own.
However, for those who disagree and think we ought to observe some kind of quality
distinction that allows us to say that life A would be worse than life B, I’d like to briefly
sketch one way to modify ADS to get the desired result. Roughly, the idea is this: to
evaluate the value of a life, we first identify all the satisfactions and frustrations it
contains. To each satisfaction we assign a positive integer corresponding to the
intensity of the relevant desire. To each frustration we similarly assign a negative
integer. We then total up two separate sums of numbers. The first set of numbers
contains all the values assigned to the hiqh-quality satisfactions and frustrations in the
life; the second set contains all the values of the low-quality satisfactions and
frustrations. We could then say that when comparing two lives, we first compare how
satisfying they are with respect to the high-quality satisfactions/frustrations they
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contain; if one is more satisfying than the other then it is the better life. If the lives are
tied with respect to high quality satisfactions/frustrations, only then we check the
number representing the low quality satisfactions/frustrations to see which life is better.
If we take this approach we could then say that life A is worse than life B because it is
less satisfying than life B with respect to high-quality satisfactions and frustrations.
Of course adopting a quality distinction of this kind is somewhat problematic.
Among other things, we would need to come up with a plausible way to distinguish
between high and low quality satisfactions. What is it that makes a thing worthy of
desire and another thing unworthy? Why is wanting and getting, say, Mozart better,
other things being equal, than wanting and getting muzak? Those who think Mozart is
better owe us an explanation. Also, if we say that Mozart satisfactions are high quality
and muzak satisfactions are low quality, what do we say about B.B. King satisfactions?
Are they high or low quality? Or somewhere in between? If they are higher in quality
than muzak satisfactions but lower than Mozart satisfactions, how do we value them?
Those interested in making a quality distinction need to sort this kind of thing out too.
But since I don’t have the intuition that wanting and getting Mozart is, other things
being equal, better than wanting and getting muzak, I shall spend no more time
discussing how we might integrate a quality distinction into ADS. I prefer ADS as it is.
To each his own.
Conclusion
I confess that I am somewhat troubled by Parfit’s addict case. I do not think I
am exactly sure why he thinks the more satisfying life would not be better. However,
my hunch is that he has an intense aversion to drug addiction, and so he would not
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choose such a life for himself. So be it. To each his own. We need to keep in mind,
though, that Parfit’s desires regarding drug addiction are irrelevant to the quality of life
that Joe would get if he were an addict such as the one we've been discussing.
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1
Parfit(1984), p.497.
Thomas Carson discusses an example relevantly similar to Parfit’ s drug addict
SeeT't'
' °f Wha ‘ ' Say ab0U ' Parfi, ’s examP ,e also to Carson’s.Carson (2000), p. 81.
3
See Chapter 8.
4
Parfit (1984), p. 498.
5
Parfit (1984), p. 498.
6
Indeed, although Parfit himself suggests that an appeal to global desires might help
solve the problem he sees, he also seems to suggest that an appeal to global desires
won t solve the problem. He says, “Suppose that I could either have fifty years of life
o an extremely high quality, or an indefinite number of years that are barely worth
living.
. .On the Summative Theories, if the second life was long enough, it would be
better for me. In each day within this life I have some desires about my life that are
fulfilled. In the fifty years of the first alternative, there would be a very great sum of
local-desire fulfillment, But this would be a finite sum, and in the end it would be
outweighed by the sum of desire-fulfilment in my indefinitely long second
alternative... I do not believe that the second alternative would give me a better life.”
Parfit (1984), p. 498. Here Parfit imagines two lives. The first life, he says, contains a
very great sum of local-desire fulfillment; the second life, because it is very long,
contains an even greater sum of desire fulfillment. But when describing the second life,
Paifit says that in each day within this life I have some desires about my life that are
fulfilled.” So these seem to be global desires - they are about Parfit’ s life. And yet
Parfit seems to say that even though the desire satisfactions in the second life involve
global desires, the second life would not be better than the first life — the life containing
a finite sum of local-desire satisfaction. At any rate, regardless of whether or not Parfit
thinks an appeal to global desires would be helpful, I don’t think global desires solve
the alleged problem with summative theories. For an opponent of summative theories
could simply say something along the lines of what Parfit says in the passages just
quoted.
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CHAPTER 7
ON THE ARRANGEMENT AND VARIETY OF GOODS IN A LIFE
Introduction
We can think ofADS as a additive theory of well-being since it entails that the
personal intrinsic value of a life is gotten by “adding up” the values of all the atoms of
personal intrinsic value contained in the life. According to a simple version of ADS,
the atoms are actual-desire satisfactions and frustrations, and the values of the atoms are
determined by the intensities of the relevant desires. So to get the value of a life we
simply add together all the values assigned to all the satisfactions and frustrations
contained in the life. Structurally, ADS is therefore like simple hedonistic theories of
well-being according to which the value of a pleasure or pain is a function of its
intensity and we get the value of a life by totaling up the values of all the episodes of
pleasure and pain contained in the life. The difference between ADS and this kind of
hedonism comes down to the atoms of value — ADS says they are satisfactions and
frustrations; hedonism says they are pleasures and pains. What these theories have in
common is the idea that the quality of a life can be improved by merely heaping more
atoms of value onto it, regardless of what relations obtain between the atoms.
In the present chapter I consider a few reasons for thinking that ADS is false
owing to the fact that it is additive in the sense just described. If these reasons are good,
we have reason to reject ADS as well as other additive theories. I begin with some
considerations against additive theories suggested by David Velleman in his paper
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Well-Being and Time.” I then briefly consider a problem suggested to me by Fred
Feldman.
Narrative Structure
One of the central ideas expressed by Velleman in his paper is that well-being
isnt additive because "how a person is faring at a particular moment is a temporally
local matter, whereas the welfare value of a period in his life depends on the global
features of that period. More specifically, the value of an extended period depends on
the overall order or structure of events - on what might be called their narrative or
dramatic relations. 1 The most vivid examples that Velleman gives of how these
narrative or dramatic relations may contribute to the overall level of well-being involve
comparisons between pairs of lives. The first example illustrates that the temporal order
in which momentary welfare values accrue may play a role in determining well-being
over a period. Velleman writes:
Consider two different lives that you might live. One life begins in the
depths but takes an upward trend: a childhood of deprivation, a troubled
youth, struggles and setbacks in early adulthood, followed finally by
success and satisfaction in middle age and a peaceful retirement.
Another life begins at the heights but slides downhill: a blissful
childhood and youth, precocious triumphs and rewards in early
childhood, followed by a midlife strewn with disasters that lead to
misery in old age. Surely we can imagine two such lives containing
equal sums of momentary well-being...Yet even if we were to map each
moment of one life onto a moment of equal well-being in the other, we
would not have shown these lives to be equally good. For after the tally
of good times and bad times had been rung up, the fact would remain
that one life gets progressively better while the other gets progressively
worse; one is a story of improvement while the other is a story of
deterioration. To most people, I think, the former story would seem like
a better life-story — not, of course, in the sense that it makes for a better
story in the telling or the hearing, but rather in the sense that it is the
story of a better life . 2
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Here it would seem that we have a clear illustration of something like the
principle of the bonum progressionis: ifA is a situation in which a certain amount of
value x is increased to a larger amount y, and if B is like A except that in B there is a
decrease from the larger amount of value y to the smaller amount x, then A is preferable
to B.3 It may seem that the life of improvement is better than the life of deterioration
precisely because through improvement progressively greater welfare values accrue
whereas through deterioration progressively smaller values accrue. In the life of
improvement, as time progresses lesser levels of well-being are followed by greater
levels. In the life of deterioration, the reverse is the case. The objection to additive
theories suggested by the example might then be that such theories of well-being entail
violations of the principle of the bonum progressionis, for if well-being is additive, then
the two lives are of equal value, contrary to the principle. But if this is the only problem
for additive theories that Velleman means to point out, those of us who favor additive
theories have an easy fix at hand. Consider figure 1
.
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Figure 1. Two Lives
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Notice that Life A and Life B both span the same temporal period of one
hundred years. Notice also that the lives are the same with respect to overall lifetime
welfare levels. The relevant difference is that Life A is the life of someone whose
levels of momentary well-being steadily rise as he grows older whereas Life B is the
life of someone whose levels of momentary well-being steadily sink. Now according to
typical additive theories, Life A would be just as good for someone living it as Life B
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would be for whoever might live it. So the chart illustrates the most salient feature of
the phenomenon described in Velleman's example.
But notice that the chart seems to provide all the information needed by an
additive theorists who wishes to accommodate the intuition that Life A is better than
Life B. For note that the slope of the line describing the welfare levels of Life A, is
positive whereas the corresponding slope for Life B is negative. If we want to hold an
additive theory and accommodate the intuition that Life A would be better than Life B,
we need only integrate slope information into our additive theory. If we say that lives
such as Life A have positive slopes and that lives such as Life B do not, we could then
say something like this:
LI . Life X is better than Lite Y iff (i) the sum total of welfare in X is greater
than that in Y, or (ii) the sum total in X is equal to Y, but Life X has a positive
slope whereas Life Y does not.
If we are merely concerned with addressing the problem of temporal order, LI
apparently gives us what we want. It tells us that other things being equal, it's better for
a life to get progressively better rather than progressively worse. It tells us that the
temporal order in which moments of well-being accrue is relevant to determining the
overall level of well-being that a person enjoys (or endures) over a period of time. But I
think there is a problem with LI. It seems to me that there are some negative-slope
lives that are no worse, and perhaps even better, for those who live them than similar
positive-slope lives.
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Consider two different lives that a person might live. The first is the life of a
young Prince who enjoys tremendous wealth and happiness as a young man. He lives
in a lavish palace replete with all manner of earthly delights. As a young man the
Prince has many intense desires, most of which are satisfied. But as he grows older, the
Prince grows restless with his life of privilege; he finds himself becoming less and less
interested in the lush-life of the palace. As time passes, he sheds one lustful desire after
another; one day it's harem girls; the next, it's extravagant banquets. Eventually, the
Prince leaves the palace altogether and becomes a wondering mendicant; once satisfied
only by exotic fruits and rare meats, the Prince is now satisfied with a single bowl of
rice and a few scraps of bread. After a number of years living as an ascetic, the Prince
sits under a tree and begins to meditate; he struggles to find enlightenment. Finally, the
Prince, once a man with many intense desires, all satisfied, becomes a simple man of
few desires, all less intense but also satisfied. Eventually the Prince dies, old but happy.
Now consider a second life. The second life is that of a lazy man bom with
many desires, most of which are frustrated. As a young man, Mr. Lazy sits at home day
after day complaining about his frustrations and watching trashy day-time television.
But as time passes, through no industry of his own, his fortunes change. His rich uncle
dies and leaves him a fortune. Finally the lazy man is able to satisfy his numerous
intense desires for wine, women, and song. As time passes, Mr. Lazy indulges his
every whim, gaining new and even more intense desires with each passing day; luckily,
his wealth allows him to satisfy them all. Eventually, Mr. Lazy dies a rich, bloated, and
happy old man.
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Surely we can imagine two such lives containing equal sums of momentary
well-being. The only difference is that the Bulk of the Prince's desire satisfactions
come at the beginning of his life whereas the bulk of Mr. Lazy's come at the end of his
life. If we were to chart the course of both lives, we would see that the welfare line of
the Prince's life would have a negative slope, whereas the welfare line of Mr. Lazy's life
would have a positive slope. According to PI, then, Mr. Lazy would have a better life,
with respect to well-being, than the Prince would.
At the very least, I find this consequence of LI questionable. It seems to me that
the Prince's life is at least as good as Mr. Lazy's, if not better. The mere fact that Mr.
Lazy progressively accumulates greater levels of momentary well-being over time does
not suffice to establish that he would have a better life than the Prince. Likewise, the
mere tact that the Prince progressively accumulates lower levels of momentary well-
being, owing primarily to the fact that he has fewer desires, does not establish that his
life would be worse than Mr. Lazy's. I am led to believe, therefore, that although
Velleman is correct in pointing out that the life of improvement he mentions would be
better for someone who might live it than the life of deterioration would be, its
“betterness” cannot be accounted for merely by appeal to the principle of the bonum
progressionis.
Indeed Velleman himself suggests that the life of improvement is better not
merely because in it lesser goods are consistently followed by greater goods, but
because its story is the story of a better life. In another example, Velleman
demonstrates that even when equivalent sums of momentary well-being accumulate in a
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like temporal order, overall well-being may differ owing to the narrative relations
between events in the life. He writes:
In one life your first ten years of marriage are troubled and end in
divorce, but you immediately remarry happily; in another life the
troubled years ot your first marriage lead to eventual happiness as the
relationship matures. Both years contain ten years of marital strife
followed by contentment; but let us suppose that in the former, you
regard your first ten years of marriage as a dead loss, whereas in the
latter you regard them as the foundation of your happiness. The bad
times are just as bad in both lives, but in one they are cast off and in the
other they are redeemed. Surely, these two decades can affect the value
of your life differently, even if you are equally well off at each moment
of their duration
.
4
Velleman suggests that the two decades have different effects on value because
the events that occur during them have different “meanings” and that an “event's
meaning is what determines its contribution to the value of one's life .” 5 In the story of a
life, ten years of strife redeemed has a meaning distinct from ten years of strife suffered
in vain; other things being equal, redeemed suffering is better for us than vain suffering.
Other things being equal, the effort put into a struggling marriage that eventually
succeeds adds more to the value of a life than equal effort put into a marriage doomed
to failure. What's valuable, according to Velleman, “is living out a story of efforts
rewarded rather than efforts wasted .” 6
Velleman then goes on to suggest that examples such as those just discussed
illustrate that “a person has two distinct sets of interests, lying along two distinct
dimensions - his synchronic interests, in being well off at particular moments, and his
diachronic interests, in having good periods of time and, in particular, a good life.”
The idea is that facts about one’s diachronic well-being are not reducible to facts about
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one’s synchronic well-being. In other words, we can’t explain facts about the personal
intrinsic value of a life, or some extended part of it, simply in terms of the values had by
the atoms of personal intrinsic value it contains.
Let me now suggest, contrary to Velleman, that we can explain the relevant
intuitions about the cases we've been discussing by appeal only to the values of the
atoms of personal intrinsic value contained in a life. I want to discuss two ways we
might do this. The first involves an appeal to our intuitions about the narrative
structures of our own lives here in the actual world and the second involves an appeal to
the concept of desert. First, I think it’s fair to say that most of us would rather live lives
that get progressively better than lives that get progressively worse, even if we are told
that the lives in question would contain equivalent amounts of atomic value. But I think
such preferences are easily explained by facts about how such lives generally unfold
here in the actual world. Here in the actual world, when someone’s life gets
progressively worse, the disvalue of the downward slide is usually compounded by the
frustrations of one’s desires about the direction one’s life is taking. Or if we are
hedonists, we might say it is compounded by the pains one experiences as a result of
realizing that one’s life is getting worse rather than better.
Let’s consider a simple example. Suppose my life is divided into ten equal
parts. Suppose that the first part contains 10 units of atomic value, the second contains
9, the third 8, and so on. Here we can think of the atoms as either satisfactions and
frustrations or as pleasures and pains. So my life starts out pretty well and gets
progressively worse. Now if the life just described were my actual life, part of what
would account for the downward slide in value would no doubt be the atoms of disvalue
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I get along the way as a direct result of the fact that my life is getting worse. Think of
my life in hedonistic terms. So the first part of my life contains 10 units of hedonic
value; the second contains 9; the third contains 8, and so on. Here in the actual world, if
I were to live such a life, part of the hedonic downslide would no doubt be accounted
for by the fact that as I go along I am pained or less pleased by the direction my life is
taking. During the second part of my life I might feel regret (i.e., pain) that I am getting
less hedonic pay off than I was during the first part. During the third part, I might get
even more pain. And as things go along I might very well start to feel fear or sorrow
(i.e., pain) because I believe that things will never get better again. On my view, the
downward slide would probably contain mounting frustrations. As I go along, more
and more of my desires about how things are going would no doubt be frustrated. Half
way through I might recall how things once were and wish they were that way again.
But this desire will be frustrated.
So my point now is just this. Here in the actual world, lives of deterioration are
almost always worse for those who live then precisely because in virtue of their
downward direction they contain extra atoms of disvalue. Likewise, lives of
improvement are almost always better for those who live them precisely because in
virtue of their upwards direction they contain extra atoms of value. But absent these
extra atoms of disvalue or value, I see no reason to think that the direction of a life has
any bearing on the value that the life would have for the person who lives it. If my life
is going downhill, then chances are I have so called “global desires” about my life that
are being frustrated. I probably have desires to the effect that my life does not go
downhill. Likewise, if my life is going uphill, chances are I have global desires about
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the narrative structure of my life that are being satisfied
.
8
But if I really don't care
which direction my life goes, if it doesn’t “matter” to me one way or the other, then
why think the direction alone has anything to do with the quality of my life?9
Now let me mention another way to address the concerns raised by examples
such as Velleman s. It seems to me that Velleman’s examples perhaps show that desert
sometimes affects well-being. Perhaps deserved goods are better for us than
undeserved goods and undeserved evils are worse for us than deserved evils. If this is
the case, we have at hand another way to explain why it seems that in general a life of
improvement is better for the person living it than a life of deterioration.
When a person is young, he has not yet put much into his life; he has not yet
earned much entitlement to the goods that life has to offer. As a result, goods that come
early in life, while certainly good, fail to contribute as much to well-being as similar
goods that come latter in life when one has acquired greater entitlement. Consider
again Life A and Life B from chart above. I suggest that if Life A is better for the
person who lives than Life B, this is due to the fact that over time the person who lives
it acquires greater desert and greater rewards. The person who lives Life B, on the
other hand, steadily acquires lesser rewards while also acquiring greater levels of desert.
Through merely “putting in time”, effort, or endurance of suffering we acquire desert.
If we are then also rewarded to a greater and greater extent over time, we fare well. If,
on the other hand, the rewards of life diminish while desert increases, we do not fare so
well.
But of course, how much we deserve from life is determined not merely by how
much we time we put in. There are many things that influence what one deserves .
10
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How we live our lives is certainly relevant. Recall the Prince and Mr. Lazy. Mr. Lazy
puts very little into his life; his good fortune comes to him “for free”. As a result. I see
no reason to think that his life is any better for him than the Prince's would be. So
although many lives of improvement are better than relevantly similar lives of
deterioration, some are not. I think that when a life of improvement is better than a
relevantly similar life of deterioration, its greater value can perhaps be accounted for by
facts about what those who live the lives deserve.
If well-being is indeed affected by desert, we can also explain why, other things
being equal, redeemed suffering is better for us than vain suffering. In many cases,
when we endure some torment in an effort to achieve some thing, we thereby acquire
some desert; to some extent, we deserve to get the thing. In most cases, if we then in
tact get the thing, our well-being is enhanced. I suggest that in such cases the degree to
which our well-being is enhanced is greater than it would be if we got the thing without
any such torment. While our well-being would be enhanced in either case, getting some
well-earned reward would enhance it more than simply getting the reward without
earning it. I suggest that this is the case not because it makes a better story to get earned
rewards, but because deserved rewards are simply better for us than unearned rewards.
This is not to say, of course, that I think unearned rewards are bad for us. On the
contrary, I think that rewards are rewards and that they are good for us to get whether
we deserve them or not. (But at this stage an objection to what I'm suggesting might
arise. It might be said that if I'm right, we should always try to get the things we're after
“the hard way”, for the more effort we put into getting something, the better it will be
for us once we get it. If given the choice, for example, between painting a large house
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with a large brush or a small cotton swab, we should choose the swab, for painting with
it will swab will require much more effort; in the end, when we finally get what we
want, a painted house, our well-being will be enhanced to a greater extent than if we
had painted with the brush. To this objection I respond as follows: in general, the costs
of doing things the hard way far exceed any benefits to be gained. It should be obvious
how I might elaborate on this response, so I will spare the reader the torment of a
lengthy monologue on the topic.)
My tentative claim is that positive desert enhances both the value of a received
good and the disvalue of a received evil. Accordingly, if I work hard and thereby
deserve some thing that I then do not get, I am worse off than I would be had I not put
in any work at all. (provided, of course, that the work does not have its own rewards
that somehow compensate for my failure to get the thing I'm after) Other things being
equal, if I struggle, for instance, to maintain my health and then get sick anyway, I am
worse off than I would have been getting sick but without the antecedent struggle to
maintain health.
If we thus take desert to affect well-being, we could formulate an additive theory
that counts desert as relevant and gives us, I think, the correct results. To illustrate, let
us consider a simple hedonic theory of well-being. According to the kind of theory I
have in mind, a person’s well-being is determined entirely by the pleasures and pains he
experiences, and the personal intrinsic values of pleasures and pains are determined by
their intensities and durations. Intense, long lasting pleasures are better for us and
intense, long lasting pains are worse for us. There are several ways we might try to
modify such a view so as to integrate the relevance of desert.
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One way would be to say that the personal intrinsic value of a pleasure or pain is
in part a function of whether it is deserved. We might say, for instance, that the
personal intrinsic value of a pleasure is determined by three things: its intensity, its
duration, and whether or not it is deserved. We could stipulate a function that takes us
from intensities and durations to a number, and we might call this number the base
value of the pleasure in question. We could then stipulate another function that
enhances this base number if the pleasure is deserved and does not enhance it if the
pleasure is undeserved. Finally, we could say that the personal intrinsic value of a
pleasure is equal to its base value if undeserved or its enhanced base value if deserved.
We could say something similar about pains. Finally, we could say that a person’s
well-being is determined by adding up the personal intrinsic values of all the pleasures
and pains it contains. The resulting hedonic account is both additive — because it
entails that the value of a life is gotten by adding up the values of all the personal
intrinsic goods and evils it contains from moment to moment -- and, I suggest, robust
enough to give us the proper results in the kinds of cases mentioned by Velleman.
The same mechanism used here to modify the hedonic account of well-being
just mentioned could also be used, mutatis mutandis, to modify ADS. The idea is that
desert affects the personal intrinsic values of desire satisfactions and frustrations; so
other things being equal, deserved satisfactions contribute more to well-being than an
undeserved satisfactions; likewise, undeserved frustrations detract more from well-
being than a deserved frustrations.
Recall that according to ADS, the personal intrinsic value of a satisfaction is
given by a positive integer representing the relevant desire’s intensity, and the value of
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a frustration is given by the negative of the integer representing the intensity of the
relevant desire. To integrate desert into ADS, we can define a function, D, that takes
the personal intrinsic value of a satisfaction to a greater number if the satisfaction is
deserved and the value of a frustration to a greater negative number if it is undeserved.
Now the extent to which we want D to alter the values of satisfactions and
frustrations will depend on how important we think desert is in determining well-being.
If we think desert is very important, we will define D is such a way that it dramatically
increases the value of satisfactions that are deserved and dramatically increases the
disvalue of undeserved frustrations. If we take desert to be of little importance, we will
define D in such a way so that its influence on values is less dramatic. So, with D
modifying personal intrinsic values as suggested, levels of well-being over time, as well
as momentary levels of well-being, will be “desert adjusted”; the D function, then, gives
us a way to alter ADS so that we end up with what I take to be a plausible additive
account of well-being that gives the right results in Velleman-style cases. 1
1
Variety
Another reason to suppose that the value of a life is not gotten merely by
summing the atoms of value it contains stems from the idea that other things being
equal a life containing a heterogeneous collection of goods is better than a life
containing a homogeneous collection. Suppose Bubba lives for 100 years and that each
day he wants nothing but mashed potatoes and muzak. And suppose all his desires are
satisfied. According to ADS, we would have to say that Bubba’ s life has gone
extraordinarily well. Yet it seems like a pretty dull life. Some might suggest Bubba
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would be better off having a richer variety of desires and having them satisfied even to a
smaller extent, and they might suggest therefore that ADS is false
.
12
Let me first say that I do not have the intuition that variety alone is sufficient to
make one life better than another, especially if the more varied life is less satisfying. I
think that Bubba’s life was pretty good for him, and I think we would be short changing
him if we were to give him a shorter less satisfying life, even if it contained more varied
satisfactions. However, for those who disagree I offer a method by which we may
tweak ADS so that its results conform more closely with their intuition that variety
matters.
If a person wants and gets only, say, mashed potatoes every day of his life, then
in one sense his life does contain a varied collection of satisfactions. After all, each day
of his life he wants to eat mashed potatoes on that day
,
and so when he gets what he
wants he gets something new. However, there is also an obvious sense in which he
wants and gets the same old thing day after day, viz., mashed potatoes. What we need,
then, is a way to rig up ADS so that it entails that wanting and getting the same old
thing in this last sense is less valuable, other things being equal, than wanting and
getting something new. To begin, we need a way to distinguish desires that are not new
in the sense just mentioned from those that are new. If we can find a way to make such
a distinction, we will be in a position to say that a person is generally better off when
desires that are new to him are satisfied. In this way we will be able to account for the
intuition that Bubba would be better off over time if he were to have a variety of desires
satisfied, rather than having the same old desires for mashed potatoes and muzak
satisfied day after day for a hundred years.
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Our task, then, is to draw a distinction between what we might call novel desires
- desires that are new to the person having them - and what we might call banal
desires, desires that are nothing new. So let us first note that if at some time, t, Bubba
wants, say, to eat mashed potatoes at t, we might express this with some clumsy, though
not inaccurate, locution such as this:
LI
.
(3x)[(x = time t) & (at x Bubba desires that Bubba eats
mashed potatoes at x )].
And if Bubba also desires at some subsequent time, t+n, to eat mashed potatoes
at t+n, we might express this fact with a similar locution that goes something like this:
L2. (3x)[(x = time t+n) & (at x Bubba desires that Bubba eats
mashed potatoes at x Y|.
Now, the point is that locutions such as these provide us with a means by which
we can distinguish between desires that are new for a person, his novel desires, and
those that are not new for him, his banal desires. First note that the underlined portion
of LI is identical to the underlined portion of L2; we might say that the object of Li's
that-clause is the same as the object of L2's that-clause; and we might take this object,
the common object of each that-clause, as the proper object of Bubba's desires at t and
at t+n. We might call this object an “open proposition” or, to stretch customary usage a
bit, we might call it an “open state of affairs”, and we might say that the object of
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Bubba's desires at t and at t+n is the open state of affairs Bubka eats mashedpotatoes at
x. It we thus take such open states of affairs as the objects of our desires, we can say
that a person's desire at some time is novel provided that the open state of affairs that is
its object was never the object of a desire had by the person at some earlier time; and we
can say that if a person's desire is not novel, then it is a banal desire.
With the distinction between novel and banal desires at hand we can modify
ADS in such a way so as to accommodate the intuition that variety matters. It seems to
me there are several moves we could make here. One thing we could do is tinker with
the way we assign values to satisfactions and frustrations. For instance, rather than
saying that the personal intrinsic value of a satisfaction or frustration is given simply by
the intensity of the desire involved, we could instead say that its value is a function of
both the relevant intensity and the relevant desire’s status as either novel or banal. We
could say that other things being equal satisfactions involving novel desires are worth
more than those involving banal desires. And we could say that the disvalue of a
frustration is greater if the desire involved is novel. It would come out, then, that other
things being equal we’re better off wanting and getting new things rather than wanting
and getting the same thing over and over; also, it would come out that we would be
worse off wanting something new and failing to get it than we would be failing to get
something we want that we’ve wanted before. And in Bubba’s case the result is that
100 years of potatoes and muzak might very well be worse that a shorter life containing
a wider variety of satisfactions.
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Conclusion
In the present chapter, my goal was to show that ADS is robust enough to
overcome various shortcomings that it, and other additive theories, are alleged to have.
A proponent of ADS can either explain away the intuitions that temporal or narrative
structure matters; or, if he thinks that it does matter, then once we figure out exactly
how it matters, he can formulate a version of ADS that takes order or narrative structure
into account. Likewise, if we think that, other things being equal, variety matters, we
can formulate ADS in such a way so as to count variety as relevant to well-being. I
prefer ADS in a more simple, unmodified form.
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Fred Feldman makes what I take to be essentially the same point during his defense of
hedonism in Chapter 6 of Feldman (2004). I owe Fred thanks for drawing my attention
to his thought provoking discussion of issues relating to the “shape of a life
phenomenon”.
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For a partial list of such things, see Feldman ( 1 997), pp. 1 6 1 - 1 62.
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My thinking about desert has been inspired and greatly influenced by Fred Feldman.
For anything interesting I might say I owe thanks to Fred. See Feldman (1997)
especially Part III. All the boring and stupid stuff is entirely mine.
1 ^
" This sort of problem was suggested to me by Fred Feldman.
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CHAPTER 8
ON THE VALUE OF PLEASURE
Introduction
As someone who affirms a desire satisfactionist account of welfare, I find
myself with what might appear to be some incompatible intuitions. On the one hand. I
think that desire satisfactions are the fundamental bearers of personal intrinsic value; so
I think that at rock bottom, I get something “in itself’ good for me only if I get a desire
satisfaction. On the other hand, I can’t deny the appeal of hedonism. I enjoy pleasure
as much as the next guy, and it seems to me that when I do, I’m getting something that
is, “in itself’, good for me. So despite the fact that my preferred account of welfare
entails that only one sort of thing is ultimately intrinsically good for me, I find myself
thinking that there are at least two sorts of things that that are, on their own, good for
me; desire satisfactions and pleasures.
Of course the obvious way to resolve the apparent conflict here would be to
establish that whenever we get some pleasure we automatically get desire satisfactions.
If something along these lines could be shown, maybe then I could explain the apparent
value of pleasures in terms of the desire satisfactions that accompany them. In the
present chapter, therefore, I want to look at a of couple proposals about how pleasure
and desire might be connected. The goal is to see the extent to which pleasures involve
people getting something or other that they want. In the end, I tentatively conclude that
there are two main ways pleasure can contribute to the value that a life has for the
person who lives it: (1) because it is reasonable to think that pleasure necessarily entails
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desire satisfaction, it is reasonable to think that if a person is pleased he necessarily gets
something that is intrinsically good for him, (2) because most people want pleasure
most of the time, most people get something intrinsically good for them when they are
pleased.
Pleasure and Desire
Perhaps we should first note that the history of philosophy is packed like a
sardine can with philosophers who have suggested various intimate and interesting
connections between pleasures and pains on the one hand and desires, and perhaps their
satisfactions or frustrations, on the other. Many of these philosophers seem to suggest
some version of the Everybody Wants it View (EV), the view that either as a contingent
psychological matter or as a necessary consequence of being a person, everybody wants
pleasure.
1 Some of these very same philosophers, as well as others, suggest other
connections between pleasure and desire. What I have in mind here are versions of the
Can't Have One Without the Other View (CV), the view that as a matter of either
contingent psychological fact or conceptual necessity hedonic phenomena entail or
reliably cause desiderative phenomena, or vice versa; that is, the view that desires and
aversions cause or necessary entail pleasures and pains, or pleasures and pains cause or
entail desires and aversions. 2 Although it would be a fruitful exercise to examine
carefully what all these philosophers have to say regarding the issues at hand, such an
examination is beyond the scope of my current project. So for now I will settle for
doing something much less ambitious. I first want to take a look at some things Fred
Feldman says about the conceptual links between pleasure and desire. Then I want to
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say just a few words about some versions of psychological hedonism that I find
appealing.
Sensory Pleasure
Early in his paper “Two Questions About Pleasure,” Fred Feldman notes, as
Plato had done earlier, the apparent heterogeneity of sensory pleasures. I might find
drinking cold beer and eating salty peanuts each to be a pleasant sensory experience,
and yet the two experiences are phenomenologically quite dissimilar. My experience of
drinking beer might include certain bubbly tactile sensations, hoppy and bitter taste
sensations, and sweet, malty olfactory sensations. And all these sensations taken
together, with perhaps others, constitute the phenomenological character of my beer
drinking experience. But when I eat peanuts, my experience might include entirely
different sensations, resulting in an experience with a wholly distinct phenomenological
character. So if we are looking for a common feature of all sensory pleasures, we need
to look beyond phenomenological similarity. But what, then, could the common feature
be?
This last question Feldman calls the “heterogeneity question” and he answers it
by appeal to the concept of propositional pleasure. He says that “all sensory pleasures
are alike in virtue of the fact the individuals who have them take a certain sort of
propositional pleasure in the fact that they have them when they have them.” Thus
Feldman takes propositional pleasure to be conceptually prior to sensory pleasure. And
although he suggests that propositional pleasure is unanalyzable, Feldman does say a
few words meant to shed some light on what he takes propositional pleasure to be.
164
Among other things, he says that it is a “pro-attitude” and that it belongs in the same
family as wanting, and favorably evaluating. Like wanting or favorably evaluating,
being propositionally pleased boils down to matching up a certain kind of attitude with
a propositional object or state of affairs.
Now although I agree with Feldman that the heterogeneity question cannot be
adequately answered by appeal to phenomenological similarity, and I agree with him
that sensory pleasure is fundamentally a matter of matching up a certain kind of pro
attitude with propositions or states of affairs, I think Feldman has put his finger on the
wrong attitude. The attitude he chooses is that of propositional pleasure. I choose desire
instead.
In section 6 of his paper, Feldman considers and rejects several analyses of
sensory pleasure that, if true, would establish conceptual links between pleasure and
desire. Feldman’s goal in rejecting these views is, at least in part, to motivate
acceptance of his own view according to which there is no interesting conceptual link
between sensory pleasure and desire. He begins with an analysis of sensory pleasure
that he gleans from some things said by Derek Parfit. Parfit writes:
What pains and pleasures have in common are their relations to our
desires.... all pains are when experienced unwanted, and a pain is worse
the more it is unwanted. Similarly, all pleasures are when experienced
wanted, and they are better or greater the more they are wanted .... one of
two experiences is more pleasant if it is preferred.
4
Now what is Parfit saying in this passage? Although I am not entirely confident
of my own interpretation, it seems to me that he is suggesting merely a necessary
condition that must obtain for an experience to count as a pain and, likewise, a
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necessary condition for some experience to count as a pleasure. I think he suggests that
an experience is a pain only z/it is unwanted, while it is occurring, by the person who
experiences it, and he suggests that an experience is a pleasure only if\\ is wanted, while
it is occurring, by the person who experiences it. And I think he means to say that one
of two pleasant experiences is more pleasant provided it is wanted more intensely than
the other. Nevertheless, Feldman interprets Parfit' s remarks as suggesting not merely
necessary conditions for pain and pleasure but also sufficient conditions. He writes:
Parfit seems to be maintaining that a sensation of any phenomenological sort is a
sensory pleasure iff at the time he has it, the person who has that sensation wants to be
having it.” 5 Feldman then goes on to reject the view attributed to Parfit on the grounds
that wanting an experience while it is occurring is neither necessary nor sufficient for
pleasure.
Feldman first asks us to imagine that he is doing some research on the feeling of
dizziness. We are to suppose that he wants to experience dizziness for himself so as to
further his work. But then Feldman suggests that if he were to spin himself around and
become dizzy, he may very well feel dizzy while wanting to feel dizzy, and yet not
thereby experience any pleasure. Thus, Feldman concludes, wanting a sensation while
one is having it is not sufficient for pleasure. But in this case Feldman's desire would
be merely extrinsic, for he wants the experience he gets not for its own sake, but rather
merely as a means to the furtherance of his research. This prompts Feldman to consider
a modified version of the view he attributes to Parfit: “a feeling is a sensory pleasure iff,
at the time he has it, the person who has that feeling intrinsically desires to have it .”6
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Feldman then goes on to suggest, however, that even if his desire for dizziness
were intrinsic, it would not necessarily follow that his being dizzy would be pleasant.
He might, for instance, find that after years of doing his dizziness research he has come
to find dizziness, which he formerly wanted only extrinsically, to be something he now
wants at least partly intrinsically. Nevertheless, he says, “the feeling of dizziness, when
I get it, may fail to be a sensory pleasure .”7
At first blush, Feldman's arguments seem successful. He does show that a
person can want to feel dizzy while feeling dizzy and yet not thereby experience any
pleasure. But does this refute the second view he attributes to Parfit? I tentatively
conclude that it does not. Let me explain what I think is going on in Feldman’s
example. First, dizziness, it seems to me, is not a sensation; rather, it is a property had
by all things that are dizzy. Alternatively, dizziness is a sort or kind or type of
sensation. So when in his example Feldman experiences dizziness while intrinsically
wanting to experience dizziness, I think what’s going on is something like this: Feldman
intrinsically wants to have an experience involving a certain familiar type of sensation
whose instances are characterized by such-and-such phenomenological features. When
he does have an experience involving a sensation of this type, his desire to have such an
experience is satisfied. However, it does not follow from Feldman’s example that while
he is getting it, he wants the particular instantiation of, or token of, the sensation type in
question. As I understand it, according to the view attributed to Parfit, if a person has
some particular sensation that he intrinsically wants while he is getting it, then he
experiences some pleasure. Feldman’s example does not involve such a person.
Rather, it involves a person who intrinsically wants to experience a particular type of
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sensation who, while experiencing a sensation of this type, intrinsically wants to be
experiencing a sensation of that type. For Feldman’s argument to work, he needs to
convince us that a person can experience some particular sensation while intrinsically
wanting to experience it and yet not thereby experience sensory pleasure. And I don’t
think he has made a convincing case that such a person is possible.
Moreover, when I reflect on all the sensations I have ever wanted, at least those
I can remember and those that I wanted tor their own sake while I was getting them, it
seems to me that they were all are pleasant. Of course we could stipulate that a person
could intrinsically want some particular sensation while he gets it and yet not thereby be
pleased, but we could also stipulate that there are four sided triangles. And I think there
is nothing much to be gained from stipulating either thing since they are both
impossible. So I do not think Feldman has successfully shown that intrinsically wanting
a sensation while getting it is insufficient for sensory pleasure.
Feldman goes on to give another argument against the view attributed to Parfit,
but I do not think this new argument is successful either. He writes:
A thoroughly indoctrinated ascetic provides a counterexample in the
other direction. He may be utterly convinced that pleasure is worthless.
As a result of this conviction, he may lose all extrinsic desire for
pleasure. Eventually, however, he may find that he has no desire for
pleasure. When some sensory pleasure occurs, he has neither the
intrinsic nor extrinsic desire to be having that sensation. Thus, we
cannot say that sensory pleasures are feelings that are intrinsically
8
desired.
To spell out the problem I see with Feldman’s argument, let me elaborate on his
example a bit. Suppose I am a thoroughly indoctrinated ascetic. Suppose that I have no
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desires for pleasure. Now imagine that some sensory pleasure comes my way. Since 1
am an ascetic, I have no desire for this pleasure; indeed, we may suppose that I want not
to get it. But what follows from this? Let me first say that, as I see it, when I
experience a sensory pleasure, several things are going on. First, I have a sensation.
Maybe it is a sweet olfactory sensation. Second, I take a certain “pro attitude” towards
the fact that I am having the sensation. And it is in virtue of my taking this attitude
towards the sensation that I experience pleasure. So the sensation itself does not
amount to a pleasurable experience, rather it is my having the sensation together with
my attitude towards it that makes up the pleasure. This is why on some other occasion I
might have an olfactory sensation that is phenomenologically identical to the one in
question and yet not, on that occasion, experience any pleasure. The difference is that
in one case I take the relevant attitude towards the sensation and in the other I do not.
So what does all this mean? It means that even though I am an ascetic, and I
have no desire for pleasure and indeed want not to experience pleasure, when some
sensory pleasure comes along, I take a certain pro attitude towards the fact that I am
having a certain sensation. Feldman would say that I am attitudinally pleased that I am
having the sensation, despite the fact that I don’t want any pleasure. I say, more simply,
that while it is occurring I intrinsically want the sensation. And it is entirely consistent
with this that I do not want any pleasurable experiences, intrinsically or extrinsically. In
other words, I may want the sensation but not want the pleasurable experience that just
is the complex whole consisting of my having the sensation and my intrinsically
wanting it. In yet other words, I want the sensation, but I do not want to want the
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sensation. I conclude, therefore, that Feldman’s example involving the ascetic does not
show that sensory pleasure can occur without someone getting something he wants
.
9
Propositional Pleasure
I said above that I think Feldman chooses the wrong attitude when he argues that
sensory pleasure is best understood in terms of propositional pleasure rather than desire.
I now want to revise what I said. What I meant to say was that Feldman
mischaracterizes propositional pleasure as an unanalyzable primitive that does not
necessarily involve desire. Let me elaborate.
Many familiar pleasures seem to be most appropriately described as sensory.
These are the pleasures that directly involve one’s senses at the time they are
experienced. On my view, as I sit on the beach and enjoy the warm rays of the sun on
my face, I experience some pleasure due to the fact that my tactile senses are
functioning properly and delivering sensations to me that, while I am getting them, I
intrinsically want to experience. But other pleasures we might not describe as sensory.
Take for instance the pleasure I have now, as I reflect back upon the sensory pleasures I
had at the beach the last time I was there. My current pleasure does not seem to involve
my senses in quite the same way. I am now experiencing some pleasure as I reminisce,
but this pleasure does not arise from any current activity of my senses. Rather, my
pleasure seems to arise directly from my contemplation of a memory, of a way things
once were. What kind of pleasure is this?
I think Feldman would say that I am currently taking propositional pleasure in
having certain vivid images before my mind .
10
These are the images of what it was like
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to be at the beach. Of course, these images need not all be “visual” images. Some, for
instance, might be tactile images. Such an “image” arises in my mind now as I recall
how the sun felt on my face. (The difference between the image I now get and the one 1
got at the beach directly from my senses, and not from my memory, is somewhat
analogous to the difference between watching a live television program and watching a
video tape instead.) Nevertheless, whether I am here reminiscing or at the beach
enjoying the sun directly, my pleasure is fundamentally a matter of the attitude I take
towards the images before my mind. While at the beach, the images I experience are
perhaps best described as sensations, for they arise more-or-less directly from my
senses. The images I now experience, though similar in certain phenomenological
respects, are perhaps best described as something other than sensations, due to their
current origin - namely, my memory. So maybe it would be best to describe them as
memories. At any rate, I think the fundamental hedonic phenomenon is the same in
either case. While at the beach, and while here at home, I experience pleasure in virtue
of the fact that I have before my mind certain images that I intrinsically want to get
while I am getting them.
My conclusion from all this is that sensory and propositional pleasure amount to
pretty much the same thing. Pleasure of either sort involves having a conscious
experience with some particular phenomenological character such that, while I am
having it, I intrinsically want to have it. This is not to say that all pleasures are
phenomenologically similar to one another; rather, it is just to say that each and every
pleasure involves an experience with some particular phenomenological character.
Also, I do not mean to say that all pleasures are wanted. I mean to say just that even
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when I get an unwanted pleasure, or a pleasure I want not to get, I am nevertheless
getting something I want. And that’s why pleasure can “on its own" make my life
better.
Psychological Hedonism
I recently asked some of my friends about pleasure. I asked them if they like it.
They all told me that they do and that they want as much of it as they can get. I think
my friends are typical. As far as I can tell, most people want pleasure. So I subscribe to
a very weak form of psychological hedonism:
VWPH: Most actual people want pleasure.
I think VWPH is true. I think that most actual people want to experience
pleasure, most if not all of the time. It seems to me that VWPH is at least as plausible
as the rather plausible view that most actual people have bones. Until we come across a
very large group of actual people without bones, I see no reason to doubt that most of us
have bones. Likewise, unless someone can produce a very large group of actual people
who don’t want pleasure, I shall continue to think that most people are, as my friends
and I are, pleasure hungry. I generally take pleasure when and wherever I can get it,
and I can t think ot a time when I haven't wanted pleasure, and I think it is reasonable
to suppose that most people are relevantly similar to me. At any rate, ifVWPH is true,
then it gives someone like me who thinks that desire satisfactions are intrinsically good
for us one way to explain at least some of the value that pleasure has for most actual
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people. Most people want pleasure; so when they get it they get something intrinsically
good for them, viz., a desire satisfaction.
It is of course consistent with VWPH that many actual people don’t ever want
pleasure, or that they get some pleasures that they don’t want or want not to get. But if
there are such people, then it seems to me that they don’t benefit, at least not in the
same way, from getting pleasure. If they get some pleasure they don’t want, or want
not to get it, then unless the pleasure itself entails that they get something they want, as
I think it does, the pleasure brings with it nothing of intrinsic value to them.
In addition to affirming the kind very weak psychological hedonism just
mentioned, I also find a slightly stronger, though still weak, version of psychological
hedonism to be somewhat appealing:
WPH: Every actual person wants pleasure.
I think WPH is reasonably plausible. I don’t think I know of anyone who hasn’t
wanted pleasure at least once in his life. And I think it might very well be some kind of
contingent law of psychology that everyone wants pleasure at each moment they are
conscious. And I don t think this last idea would be refuted if we found a person who at
some time got some pleasure that he didn't want or wanted not to get. I think that
although at the time he was getting some pleasure he did not want, he nevertheless
probably did want pleasure of some kind at the moment in question, just not the one he
was getting. At any rate, if indeed every actual person wants pleasure at each moment
he is conscious, then whenever he gets some pleasure, even if he doesn't want the
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specific pleasure he gets, he gets something intrinsically good for him - namely, a
desire satisfaction.
Let me conclude with an even stronger version of psychological hedonism:
MPH: Every possible person wants pleasure.
According to this view, it is conceptually impossible for a thing to be a person
and yet not want pleasure. Of course MPH could be fleshed out in a number of ways.
According to one version of the view, in virtue of being persons we are all saddled with
a persistent craving for pleasure that is satisfied whenever we get some pleasure. I think
Plato and Kant might have both held some version of MPH. And I think some of the
other philosophers I allude to above (and cite in footnote 2) might have thought
something along these lines. At any rate, if indeed it is impossible to be a person
without constantly wanting pleasure, then whenever a person gets some pleasure, he
gets something he wants, and that’s intrinsically good for him.
Conclusion
The goal of the present chapter has just been to suggest some ways that a desire
satisfactionist might try to reconcile some conflicting intuitions. As I suggested above,
I have strong tendencies towards both desire satisfaction views of well-being such
as
ADS and hedonic conceptions of what makes life worth living. In the end I conclude
that one can be a desire satisfactionist without giving up his intuitions
about the value of
pleasure. I think he can do this by appeal to an analysis of pleasure according
to which
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one cannot be pleased without getting something he wants. And to a lesser degree he
can account for at least some of the apparent value of pleasure by appeal to some form
of psychological hedonism.
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Notes
On a pretty natural interpretations of the following, it seems clear that Epicurus held
some version of EV: “We recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from
pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again,
using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.” Epicurus (1996), p61 7. In various places Plato seems to suggest some version of EV too. In Phaedrus he
wntes: “Eet us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles
which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an
acquired opinion which aspires after the best...” Plato (1995) 23 7d. John Locke also
says things that suggest some version of EV. In several places he identifies happiness
with pleasure of one sort or another, and he says, for instance: “.
. .all Men’s desires tend
to Happiness...” Locke (1991), p. 270. “All Men desire Happiness, that’s past
doubt...” Locke (1991), p. 279. “...all that we desire is only to be Happy...” Locke
(1991), p. 283. Joseph Butler suggests a version of EV too. He writes: “Every man hath
a general desire of his own happiness; Butler (1950) Sermon XI: (5). Bentham, Mill.
Schlick and many others say similar things.
Butler says that Every man hath
... a variety of particular affections, passions and
appetites to particular external objects ... distinct from the pleasure arising from them
Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which are by
nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions and affections.” Butler (1950)
Sermon XI. William McDougall says that “pleasure and pain result from conation, are
determined by the striving, pleasure, when the striving attains its natural goal, or
progresses towards it; pain, when striving is thwarted or obstructed and fails to achieve,
or progress toward, its goal.” McDougall (1923), p. 269. Hume asks us to “suppose,
then, that the object, concerning whose reality we are doubtful, is an object either of
desire or aversion, ‘tis evident, that, according as the mind turns itself either to the one
side or the other, it must feel a momentary impression ofjoy or sorrow. An object,
whose existence we desire, gives satisfaction, when we reflect on those causes, which
produce it...” Hume (1989), p. 440. Sidgwick suggests that pleasure is a “feeling which
the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be
desirable; -- desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling, and not in respect of
its consequences, or of any facts that come directly within the cognizance and judgment
of others besides the sentient individual. Sidgwick (1962), p. 131. William Alston also
defends an analysis of pleasure in terms of desire in Alston (1967). Aristotle also says
some things to suggest a necessary connection between pleasure and desire. See
Aristotle (1991) especially Book X, 4, 1 1 74 § 23 ff.
3
Feldman (1997), p. 96.
4
Parfit (1984), pp. 493-494.
5 Feldman (1997), p. 89.
176
6
Feldman (1997), p. 89.
7
Feldman (1997), p. 90.
8
Feldman (1997), p. 90.
g
In his unpublished paper “Pleasure and Desire,” Feldman gives several arguments that
are essentially the same as those we’ve been discussing here. There his arguments are
aimed at the following view: PD41 : Necessarily, if S is a sensation experienced at a
time, t, by a person, P
,
then S is a sensory pleasure iff P intrinsically desires at t to be
experiencing S.
10
See Feldman (2000), pp. 636-638.
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